This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

+ *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.

+ *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.

+ *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.

+ *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at `http://books.google.com/`

3 3433 06183003 4

THE NEW YORK
PUBLIC LIBRARY

ASTOR, LENOX
TILDEN FOUNDATIONS

The Battle of Marathon

Published March 1.1800. by R.Phillips No.6 Bridge Street Blackfriars.

IN TWENTY-FIVE VOLUMES.

BY WILLIAM MAVOR, LL.D.

OF DUDLEY, IN WORCESTERSHIRE, AND CHAPLAIN TO THE EARL OF DUMFRIES.

Factorum est copia nobis.
. . . . . .
Res gestæ regumque, ducumque, et tristia bella.

VOL. III.

LONDON:
PRINTED FOR RICHARD PHILLIPS, 71, ST. PAUL'S

THE HISTORY OF GREECE.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

BY WILLIAM MAVOR, LL.D.

VICAR OF HURLEY IN BERKSHIRE, AND CHAPLAIN TO THE EARL OF DUMFRIES;

AUTHOR OF THE BRITISH NEPOS, &c. &c.

VOL. I.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR RICHARD PHILLIPS, 71, ST. PAUL'S CHURCH-YARD;

AND SOLD BY ALL BOOKSELLERS.

1804.

Price 3s. 9d. in Boards, or 4s. Half-bound.

TO THE

MOST NOBLE

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM

THIS FIRST VOLUME

OF

THE HISTORY OF ANCIENT GREECE

IS,

WITH EVERY SENTIMENT OF RESPECT,

INSCRIBED

BY

HIS LORDSHIP'S

MOST OBLIGED

AND VERY FAITHFUL HUMBLE SERVANT,

THE EDITOR.

CONTENTS.

Page

CHAP. I. *From the earliest Accounts of Greece, to the general Abolition of Royalty in that Country.* 1

II. *The Government of Sparta, to the Subjugation of the Messenians.* 11

III. *The Government of Athens, from the Establishment of the Archons to the Expulsion of Hippias.* - 24

IV. *The Transactions of Greece, from the Expulsion of Hippias to the Death of Darius.* - - 37

V. *The Grecian Affairs, from the Accession of Xerxes to the Throne of Persia, to the Return of that Monarch into Asia, after his Expedition against Greece.* - 51

VI. *From the Retreat of Xerxes into Asia to the final Event of the Persian Invasion.* - - 72

VII. *The Affairs of Greece, from the final Overthrow of the Persians to the thirty Years' Truce.* 89

CHAP.



Page

CHAP. VIII. *The Affairs of Greece, from the Truce for thirty Years to the Peace of Nicias.* - - 126

IX. *From the Peace of Nicias to the total Overthrow of the Expedition against Sicily.* - - 167

X. *The Affairs of Greece, from the Defeat of the Expedition against Sicily to the Conclusion of the Peloponnesian War.* - - - - 249

PREFA-

PREFATORY MEMOIR,

we to the Geography of Ancient Greece, and illustrative of the Map.

ill be impossible in any degree to un-rstand the history of Greece without ously acquiring a distinct idea of the aphical situation and divisions of that ated country; a country which, though alf so large as England, and still further n into many rival states, was able at one o dispute the palm of empire with mo-s who supported their claims by the most rous armies that are recorded in the an-f the world.

ece, in the early periods of history, rehended Peloponnesus, Greece Proper, s, Thessalia, and Macedonia: but when gated by the Romans, it was divided into provinces, Achaia and Macedonia; the r containing the first and second of the nt divisions, and the latter the other three. will review the original divisions in order.

Peloponnesus*.

is peninsula derived its name from Pelops, n of Tantalus king of Phrygia. In its al form it resembles the leaf of a palm-It is joined to Greece Proper by the

* Now called the Morea.

isthmus

isthmus of Corinth, which is only about five miles in width. On this neck of land the inhabitants of Peloponnesus usually intrenched themselves, when in dread of an invasion; and here the Isthmian games were triennially celebrated. Demetrius, Cæsar, and others, attempted at different times to cut through this isthmus, but always failed in success.

The subdivisions of Peloponnesus were Achaia, Elis, Messenia, Laconica, Arcadia, and Argolis.

ACHAIA. The chief towns of Achaia were Corinth and Sicyon; the latter the most ancient city in Greece, and once the head of a kingdom.

Corinth was long and justly celebrated. It stood at the foot of a high hill, on which was built the citadel. Including this fortress, it was about ten miles in circumference. The navigation round the capes of Malea and Tænarus was reckoned so dangerous, on account of storms and pirates, that merchants usually transported their goods by land over the isthmus; in consequence of which, Corinth became the general mart of Europe and Asia. The natives of this city were distinguished for their skill in working in metals. The Corinthian brass, a mixture of copper with some small quantity of gold and silver, formed a composition extremely brilliant and durable. The ornaments on pottery ware were also executed here with inimitable art.

Corinth, after long lying in ruins, was re-
buil-

by Julius Cæsar. In removing the rub-
, an immense quantity of vessels of brass
earthen ware was found, which were car-
to Rome.

e other cities of Achaia were of com-
ively little consequence; their names
Philus, Pallene, Ægira, and Helice.

.is. Of this district the chief cities were
on the river Peneus, and Olympia on the
Alpheus. Near the latter, the Olympic
es, so famous throughout all Greece,
were

mong the Greeks there were four solemn games,
rated to religion; the Olympic, Pythian, Isthmian,
nean. Of these the Olympic were reckoned the
The contests at each were nearly similar. Running,
g, wrestling, boxing, and throwing the quoit, were
itely displayed for the exercise of strength and agi-
The spot on which these contests were exhibited
led the *Stadium*. At each of these games the prize
was of a different kind; in general, however, the victors
were presented with a branch of the palm-tree,
they carried in their hands: but at the Olympic
games, besides, a crown of wreath of [illegible]
[illegible], or laurel, at the Isthmian, of pine, and at
the Nemean games. These [illegible] palm
and the victors, and were received with great pomp
[illegible] native city, which they entered in
[illegible] through a breach in the

were celebrated every fourth year: hence period of four years was called an Olympiac Near Olympia stood the ancient city of Pisa which was demolished by the people of Eli

MESSENIA. The chief city in this divisio was named Messene, by which appellation th whole country was formerly known. It wa built by Epaminondas, and stood at a sho distance (north) from the top of the Messenia gulf. Being under the immediate protectio of a strong fortress, exclusive of its own pecu liar fortifications, it was almost impregnabl The ancient capital was Pylos, the city Nestor: the epithet Messeniacà was afterwa added, to distinguish it from two other plac of the former name.

Pylos of Messenia was situated on the I nian sea; near the small island Sphacter where a large party of Lacedæmonians in Peloponnesian war were, after a valiant res

(which was that of the chariot race) was the period the Greeks first regulated their time by Olympiads. corresponds with the 776th year before Christ, ar remarkable æra in ancient history.

The people of Elis generally had the regulation games; and occasionally the inhabitants of Pisa, p the destruction of that city. Their duration was days. The day on which they commenced was the e of the month called Hecatombeon. During their tion there was a general suspension of hostilities. mense concourse of people attended; not only Greece, but likewise from the neighbouring natic also works of genius were displayed: and it was Herodotus read his history; which so affected Tl who was then a boy, that he shed tears, and thu the notice of the author.

nèe, compelled to surrender to Demosthenes and Cleon.

There were several other towns in this district; among which Cypanissa, Methone, and Asine, were the most important.

LACONICA, or LACONIA. No portion of the Peloponnesus was more celebrated than this. It contained the famous city of Lacedæmon* or Sparta, the most powerful in ancient Greece, which stood at the foot of mount Taygetus, on the banks of the river Eurotas. This city was about six miles in circumference; but had no other walls than the bravery of its inhabitants, till it fell under the dominion of tyrants. The prevailing manners were inimical to external splendour, and therefore the houses were small and destitute of ornament.

South of Lacedæmon, on the west bank of the Eurotas, was Amyclæ; abounding in trees, and honoured with a splendid temple of Apollo.

Gythium, the port of Lacedæmon near the mouth of Eurotas (which falls into the Laconic gulf), was a very strong place. Not far distant was the site of the ancient Helos: the Spartans having taken this place, reduced the inhabitants to slavery; and hence all their slaves were ever afterwards called Helotes.

The promontory of Malea, so dangerous to mariners, bounded the gulf of Laconia on the east, as Tænarus did on the west. This was

* Now called Misitra.

town of Hermione; from which the passage to the infernal regions was supposed to be so short, that it was not necessary to put money into the mouth of the dead to pay Charon's fare.

Greece Proper.

This grand division of Greece was bounded on the north by mounts Othrys and Œta, which divided it from Thessaly; on the west, by the river Achelous, and by Epirus; on the south, by the Corinthian and Saronic gulfs, and by the isthmus of Corinth, which separated it from Peloponnesus; and on the east, by the Ægean sea, the boundary between Europe and Asia.

The subdivisions of Greece Proper were seven: Attica, Megaris, Bœotia, Phocis, Locris, Doris, and Ætolia.

Attica. No part of Greece was so celebrated as this; and from the interest which will ever be attached to it in the estimation of every polite scholar, it is proper to notice several of the principal circumstances connected with it. Athens*, the capital, was long the most illustrious seat of learning, arts, and sciences; and therefore deserves to be described at some length.

In very early times this city consisted of little more than a citadel, built on the top of a rocky eminence about seven miles round. This fortress was surrounded by a strong wall;

* New Setines.

and

and had only one entrance, the ascent to which was by stairs. Within its precincts were several magnificent edifices; the chief of which was the temple of Minerva, called Parthenon. After being burnt by the Persians, it was rebuilt of the finest marble by Pericles; and still exhibits one of the most splendid remains of antiquity; being two hundred and twenty-nine feet long, one hundred broad, and seventy high. The colossal statue of Minerva, made by Phidias of gold and ivory, was thirty-nine feet high. In the citadel also there were a number of statues in honour of that goddess: among the rest, one called *Palladium*, which was believed to have fallen from heaven; it was, however, merely a shapeless mass of olive wood, though held in the highest veneration.

Adjoining to the Parthenon was the public treasury. The chief of the prytanes, or the president of the senate, who was changed daily, had the charge of the key; but some of the treasurers, having embezzled part of the public money, burnt this edifice to the ground, in order to conceal their peculation.

At first the Athenians attended chiefly to agriculture, particularly to the cultivation of the olive; but afterward following commerce, they built a joint temple to Minerva and Neptune, with a chapel consecrated to each. On one side stood the olive tree, which was said to have sprung out of the earth at the command of Minerva; and on the other was a

fountain of salt water, fabled to have be produced by the stroke of Neptune's trider

As the inhabitants of Athens began to i crease, it was necessary to build on the le ground round the citadel; and in process time the lower city became embellished wi many splendid edifices. The temple of Ju ter Olympius, that of Theseus built by C mon, and the Pantheon or temple to all t gods, which latter two are yet standing near entire; the temples of Castor and Pollux, a of Apollo and Pan; the Prytaneum, whe those who had merited well of the state we supported at the public expense; the Odeur or musical theatre; and the theatre of Ba chus; were among the most remarkable.

Near the citadel was the fountain Ca lirrhoe, the water of which was used in nu tial and sacred rites; and on an eminence at small distance, was the place where the Are pagus assembled.

The Ceramicus however, or the place whe pottery was made, is one of the most famo quarters of Athens. In it was the forum market-place, surrounded with temples a various other public buildings. Here we the porticoes of Hermæ and Pœcile; in t latter of which Zeno the philosopher used teach: and from this circumstance his fo lowers were called stoics, *stoa* signifying *portico* in Greek.

Athens had three harbours; the Piræu Munichia, and Phalerum: all very strong

an

have already been cursorily noticed, the
ians had several Gymnasia, either in or
he city, the principal of which were the
mia, Lyceum, and Cynosarges. The
mia lay about three quarters of a mile
-west of the city; and contained besides
nnasium, a garden and a grove, sur-
ed with walls, and adorned with de-
ul covered walks. Here Plato taught
cholars, whence his followers are called
mics; and such decorum was observed
place, that it was forbidden even to
in it.

Lyceum* lay on the opposite side of
is, on the banks of the Ilissus, and was
kably salubrious. Aristotle, the disciple
to, chose the Lyceum for the place of
ful institution; and because he taught
ollowers while *walking*, his sect were

ceived its name from a white or swift dog, which snatched away part of the sacrifice offered to Hercules. In this place foreigners, or citizens of half blood, that is, who were born of an alien mother, performed their exercises: and here Antisthenes taught his philosophy, whence, as some say, he was called the Cynic; though others imagine, and perhaps with greater probability, it was from his snarling disposition that he obtained this epithet, which certainly some of his followers deserved.

The inhabitants of Athens were divided properly into three orders; citizens, sojourners, and slaves. The number of citizens seldom exceeded twenty thousand, and of sojourners or foreigners ten thousand, while the slaves amounted to four hundred thousand. The latter two classes had no share in the government: but it would not here be right to enter into the civil and political institutions of this famous republic.

About ten miles north-east of Athens stood Marathon, illustrious for the defeat of the Persians by Miltiades. In the same direction from Athens was the fortress of Phyle; the place which Thrasybulus first seized, with only thirty men, when he emancipated his country from the tyranny of as many usurpers.

Westward from this lay Acharnæ, the chief borough of Attica, which is frequently mentioned in history; and not far distant was Eleusis,

is, famous for the celebration of the
eries of Ceres.

her memorable places in Attica were Er-
Gargettus, Decelia, and Oropus.

EGARIS. This was a small tract of land
at the top of the Saronic gulf, between
rritories of Attica and Corinth. The
city was Megara; situated on a rising
d, and possessing a good harbour called
a. The other towns of Megaris were
nconsiderable.

e people of Megara had twenty galleys
battle of Salamis, and three hundred
at the battle of Platæa. They even ven-
sometimes to enter into hostilities with
Athenians; but their country is more
entitled to distinction for having pro-
l the celebrated Euclid, than for all their
advantages. This great mathematician
onceived the highest respect for Socra-
and during a war between the Mega-
ns and the Athenians, he frequently vi-
that philosopher by night, disguised as a
e, and returned again before day-break,
gh the distance was twenty miles.

EOTIA. This country stretched along

Greece. It was situated on the river Ismenus; and had seven gates, with walls upwards of seven miles in circumference.

The other states of Greece were long indignant against the Thebans, for their perfidy in joining the Persians; and for this they were severely punished. Under Pelopidas and Epaminondas, however, Thebes was the most powerful city in Greece. It was destroyed by Alexander the Great, after a terrible carnage of the inhabitants; but was rebuilt by Cassander.

About nine miles south of Thebes stood Platæa, at the foot of mount Cithæron, on the banks of the Æsopus. Near this place the Persians, under Mardonius, met with a signal defeat from Aristides and Pausanias.

To the westward of Platæa lay Leuctra; the scene where the Lacedæmonians experienced a dreadful overthrow from Epaminondas, in consequence of which they lost their pre-eminence among the Grecian states.

On the west side of an extensive marshy plain, where the river Melas disappears, stood Chæronea; the birth-place of Plutarch, and remarkable for the defeat of the allied states of Greece by Philip of Macedon, which they never afterward recovered.

Not far from this town was the cave of Trophonius, where oracles were delivered, and which rendered such as entered it melancholy for the rest of their lives.

Thespia sacred to the muses, Ascra the birth-place of Hesiod, Aulis whence the Greeks

ranippe, Dirce, and Hippocrene ; can
be mentioned without exciting poetic
ry.

ocris. This district,, or rather its capi-
lphi, was supposed by the ancients to
e centre not only of Greece, but of the
earth. But Delphi is still more illus-
for its temple and oracle of Apollo,
stood on an eminence above the town,
foot of mount Parnassus, and near the
lian fount. In the middle of this tem-
is a chasm in the ground; whence issued
le vapour, that threw into convulsions
who breathed it : it is said to have been
cidentally discovered by some goatherds.
riestess, or Pythia, being placed on a
over the aperture, and becoming gra-
intoxicated with the vapour, proceeded
er her oracles generally in hexameter

the Pythia and her predictions had fallen into contempt; but she did not wholly give up her very lucrative vocation, till after the period of Nero's reign.

At Delphi, as being the most central situation, was held the meeting of the Amphictyonic council, or deputies from the confederated states of Greece. In its vicinity likewise were celebrated the Pythian games; at first every ninth, and afterwards every fifth, year.

Cirrha, the port of Delphi, lay in the Corinthian gulf, at about eight miles distance; and near this stood Anticyra, famous for the production of hellebore, once reputed a specific in maniacal cases.

In latter times Elatia, situated on the river Cephissus, became the principal city of Phocis. Its other towns were inconsiderable.

Locris. The country of Locris was divided into three parts, but no very satisfactory account is given for this. Amphissa, defended by a strong fortress, was the principal town of the first district; Opus of the second; and Naryx, the native place of Ajax, of the third.

Not far distant from the last-mentioned town, was the famous pass of Thermopylæ, so called from its hot springs. It was justly accounted the key of Greece, and is immortalized by the heroism of Leonidas. Where narrowest there is only room for a single carriage between mount Œta (which here terminates in a precipice) and the Malian gulf.

Doris.

Doris, or Dorica. This country was of but all extent; lying along the foot of mounts ta and Parnassus. Its inhabitants were of the most ancient tribes of Greece, from ris the grandson of Deucalion. It con- ed four cities; Erineon, Boion, Pindus, Cytinium: none of them remarkable.

Ætolia. This was the country of a very like people. It extended from the top of gulf Naupactus* to the river Achelous. The towns were few, but of considerable e. Calydon on the river Evenus was an ient and beautiful city, and the birth-place Tydeus. At the efflux of the Evenus into Ionian sea stood Chalcis, not far from a untain of the same name: and on the th-west extremity of the Corinthian gulf Naupactus, so called from the multitude ships built there; but its very site is now rflowed by the sea.

When the Athenians and Lacedæmonians l enfeebled themselves by mutual contests, Ætolians became a very powerful people, l possessed themselves of several cities be- id their original territories. They were emed the best cavalry in Greece; but were ays turbulent and fickle in their disposition.

Epirus.

The principal subdivisions of this country re into Acarnania, Thesprotia, Molossis, l Chaonia.

Acarnania, extending from the river helous to the Ambrocian gulf, was ancient-

* Now Lepanto.

ly included in Greece Proper, but was afterward added to Epirus.

Near a promontory of the same name, at the mouth of the Ambrocian gulf, lay the little town of Actium; celebrated for its temple of Apollo, and still more for the decisive naval engagement between Augustus, and Antony and Cleopatra. In commemoration of his victory, Augustus built the town of Nicopolis on the opposite side of the strait; and instituted the Actian games, which were celebrated every five years.

The chief city, however, of Acarnania was Stratus, about twenty-five miles from the efflux of the river Achelous; and in latter times Leucas, built by a colony from Corinth on the isthmus which joined the peninsula of Leucadia to the main land. Near this was the rock of Cephalenia, or the Lovers' Leap, which Sappho and others tried, to cure their hopeless passion.

Thesprotia. The chief city of this country was Ambrocia, the royal residence of Pyrrhus, situated near the head of the gulf of the same name. It was built by a colony from Corinth.

On the strait which separates Corcyra from the main land, lay Posidium, Buthrotum, and Portus Pelodis; and to the south were Chimærium and Ephyra, near the lake Acherusia, through which ran the river Acheron, and into the latter flows the muddy Cocytus at no great distance from the lake Avernus.

Indeed

ed it is generally supposed, that Homer the names of his infernal lakes and ri- om those of Thesprotia.

LOSSIS, the country of the Molossi, lay north-east of Thesprotia. The most table town of this district was Dodona, foot of mount Tomarus, famous for ple and oracle of Jupiter.

other remarkable places in Molossis ecmon, and Passaron, where the kings country at their accession used to that they would govern according to ws; and the people, that they would their native soil.

AONIA. The chief towns of this district Dricum, situated in a champaign, north e Acroceraunian mountains (so called heir tops having been struck with thun- Palæste, where Cæsar landed when in it of Pompey; Cassiope; and Phala- Among the inland towns were An- a and Phœnice.

aonia is said to have received its name Chaon, the companion of Helenus, n of Priam, who was accidentally killed nting. The celebrated mount Pindus, consists of several ridges, ran partly gh Epirus.

THESSALIA.

cording to Herodotus, this country was y enclosed by mountains: on the east lion and Ossa; on the north by Olym- on the west by Pindus; and on the by Othrys and Œta. The intervening

champaign, constituting Thessaly, was watered by numerous streams; all of which, uniting in the river Peneus, emptied themselves into the Thermatic gulf* by a narrow passage, supposed to have been opened by an earthquake, between Olympus and Ossa.

Along the banks of the Peneus was the delightful vale of Tempe, the favourite theme of the poets. This was about five miles long, but of unequal breadth.

At the foot of mount Œta, and north of Thermopylæ, stood Heracleas so called from Hercules, who is said to have consumed himself in a burning pile on the top of Œta near this place. Lamia and Hypata, Larissa the city of Achilles, Pegasæ, and the post of Pheræ, the capital of the tyrant Alexander, whom Pelopidas conquered, also lay in this quarter.

About three miles from Pegasæ stood Iolcos, the city of Pelias and Jason; and not far from the latter, Aphetæ, whence the Argonauts set sail. Near Iolcos likewise was Demetrias, built by Demetrius Poliorcetes; which soon became very populous on account of its local advantages. North of this lay Meliboea, the city of Philoctetes; famous for the manufacture of purple.

At the bottom of mount Othrys, the abode of the Centaurs, stood Alos, washed by the river Amphrysus, along the banks of which Apollo used to feed the flocks of Admetus; and near the reflux of this stream lay Thebæ, which some have confounded with Thebes in Bœotia.

* Now the gulf of Saloniehi.

South

South from Larissa already mentioned, lay Pharsalus; near which the ever-memorable battle took place between Cæsar and Pompey, when the latter fled to Larissa.

Towards the confines of Macedonia was mount Pierius, sacred to the muses, and from which they are called Pierides. Many other places in Thessaly are mentioned by the poets and historians, but they do not deserve a particular indication in this memoir.

The Thessalian women were said to possess great skill in magic. By their charms or spells they pretended to perform the most wonderful things; to raise or allay tempests, to recall the dead, to destroy the living, and even to arrest the sun in his course.

Macedonia.

From the different form of government which for a long period prevailed in this country, it scarcely appears to be a legitimate Grecian state, though usually included within those limits.

Macedonia is made to extend from the mouth of the Peneus to the river Nessus in Thrace: including on the east the countries bordering on the Ægean sea, and surrounding the Thermaic, Toronæan, Singitic, and Strymonic gulfs; but its precise boundaries on the other sides are not ascertained.

The country lying between the mouth of the Peneus and the Ludias was called Pieria; the towns on this coast were Heracleum, Phila, Dium, and Pydna, near which last Paulus Æmilius defeated Perseus.

To the north of Pieria, the country obtained the name of Pæonia, or Emathia-Pella. The chief town of this district was the birthplace of Philip, and of his son Alexander. It was washed by the Ludias, and was a place of great strength. At some distance lay Edessa, once the residence of the Macedonian kings, and afterward their place of sepulture.

Near the mouth of the Axius and Chidorus stood Therma; which gave name to the Thermaic gulf, afterward called Thessalonica, and now Salonichi, where the illustrious Cicero spent the time of his exile. The principal towns mentioned in early periods of history on the north-east of the Thermaic gulf were, Ainea, Simila, Campsa, and in latter times Antigonia and Potidæa.

At the head of the Toronæan gulf stood Olynthus; a very considerable city, which was long either subject to, or in alliance with, Athens. Being treacherously taken by Philip, it was destroyed, and the inhabitants carried into servitude; which gave rise to the fatal war between the Athenians and the Macedonian prince.

Between the Singitic and Strymonic gulfs lies mount Athos, which projects many miles from the plain into the sea. On this vast hill stood several towns; the inhabitants of which received the appellation of Macrobii, from their longevity. Towards the western side of Athos the two gulfs approach each other within a mile and a half; and through this isthmus Xerxes dug a navigable canal, so wide and deep

ep that two ships could pass. In its vici-
y stood Stagira, the birth-place of Ari-
tle, whence he is called the Stagirite.
Near the place where the Strymon divides
o two branches, was built Amphipolis.
out 30 miles north-east of this city stood
apolis: and above it Philippi; in the plain
joining to which, Brutus and Cassius were
erthrown by Antony and Augustus.
The interior part of Macedonia, called Ma-
lonia Superior, was possessed by various
bes. This district was rough and moun-
nous, and consequently cold.
The country south of the Ceraunian moun-
ns, along the bottom of the Adriatic sea,
ng chiefly inhabited by Greeks, was named
ris Græca. The chief towns were Apol-
ia, a place where learning was much culti-
ed; and Dyrrachium, now Durazzo, the
mmon landing-place from Brundusium.
t far from this is Petra; where Pompey
ched his camp, and suffered a circumvalla-
n to be drawn round him for fifteen miles,
ner than venture an engagement with Cæsar.

GRÆCIAN ISLANDS.

To this geographical description of the con-
ent of Greece, it appears of manifest utility
subjoin a brief account of its islands.

CORCYRA, now CORFU, &c.

This island lies in the Ionian sea, and is se-
rated by a narrow strait from Thesprotia.
re were the celebrated gardens of Alcinous,
ich produced fruit twice a-year.
Corcyra contained a city of the same name,
which

which was the residence of Alcinous; and near the northern extremity of the island stood Cassiope.

A few small islands, called Sybota, lie between the south-east part of Corcyra and Epirus; and near Leucadia, which has already been mentioned, are the little islands of Paxæ.

Before the mouth of the river Achelous are scattered a number of small islands, called the Echinades; the principal of which is Dulichium. It was subject to Ulysses; and to the west of this lies Ithaca, the residence of that hero; which was about 25 miles in circumference, rocky and sterile, and contained a town of the same name at the foot of mount Neius.

Cephalenia.

This island, called also Same or Samos, lies about fifteen miles from Ithaca, and is 93 miles in circumference. The principal town, named Samos, was taken by the Romans after a siege of four months, and plundered. The other towns were of little note. Between Cephalenia and Ithaca is the small island of Asteria.

Zacynthus, now Zante.

South of Cephalenia lies Zacynthus, about 20 miles in circumference, sylvan and fertile, with a town of the same name. South-east from this were the Strophades, fabled to be infested by harpies.

Cythera.

This island was sacred to Venus, and its name is frequently used to designate that goddess. It lies about five miles from the promontory of Malea; and contained a city of

e same name, and another called Scandea, th excellently fortified, and furnished with mmodious harbours. Cythera was alter- ely under the power of the Lacedæmonians d the Athenians.

ÆGINA, &c.

The island of Ægina, about twenty-two les in circumference, lies in the Saronic gulf, ut ten miles from Attica. On account of hidden rocks, it was difficult of access on sides. The inhabitants were anciently ri- s of the Athenians by sea; and in the battle Salamis, the prize of valour was decreed to m. In the event they experienced many olutions of fortune, and submitted to vari- masters. They are famed for having been first people that coined money.

West from Ægina is Salamis, containing a n of the same name. It was the island of amon, the father of Ajax and Teucer. It bout ten miles long.

Around Salamis and Ægina are several small nds; but of no consequence.

EUBŒA, now NEGROPONT, &c.

This island lies along the north-east coast of ica and Bœotia; and is about 150 miles in gth, and 40 in breadth. It is separated from continent by the Euripus, remarkable for irregularity of its tides. Several of the montories of Eubœa are mentioned by his- ans; as Geræstus, Caphareus, Carystus, Amarynthus.

Chalcis was the capital of the whole island; t to this in importance ranked Eretria; and lastly

lastly Artemisium, near which the Gre first engaged with the fleet of Xerxes.

East from Eubœa lies Scyros, where Achi lay concealed, and where Theseus died in ex

The CYCLADES.

These islands received their Greek appe tion from lying round Delos in the form *circle*. Some authors reckon twelve of th others more: the principal are as follow:

DELOS. This island, called also Orty was the birth-place of Apollo and Diana. was fabled to have been anciently a floa island; and to have been chained by Ap who bound it to Mycone and Gyaros: D abounded in brass; and vases of that m fabricated here were held in high estimat To some of the desert islands in this vici the Roman emperors used to banish cri nals. CEOS, near Sunium in Attica, w small but fertile island; and deserves tc particularized as having been the birth-p of Simonides, the first elegiac writer.

South of Ceos lies Cythnos; and still fur in the same direction is Seriphus; Siphnus; and Melos. East of Seriphu PAROS, the birth-place of Phidias and Pr teles, and further celebrated for producin finest marble.

To the eastward of PAROS lies NA fruitful in vines, and therefore sacred to chus. Ios, Thera (now Santorin), and other small islands, lie in the same quart

CRETE, now Candia, is by far the la of the Grecian islands; extending 270 1

in length, and about 50 in breadth. It is extremely mountainous and woody, but has many fertile plains and valleys. In the middle of the island stands mount Ida; and at its eastern extremity is mount Dicte, in a cavern of which Jupiter is said to have been nursed.

The three chief cities of Crete were Gnossus, Gortina, and Cydonia. The harbour of the first was named Heracleum; and here the present capital of the island, Candia, is built. A number of inconsiderable islets surround Crete.

The Sporades.

These islands obtained their original appellation from their scattered form. They lie chiefly on the coast of Asia, to which quarter of the globe they belong.

Carpathus, which gave name to the Carpathian sea, stsnds eastward of Crete. In the same direction, and near the coast of Lycia, is Rhodus, about 125 miles in circumference; which contained the cities of Lindus, Camirus, and Rhodus,—the latter famous for its maritime force, and likewise for the brazen colossus or image of the Sun, about 105 feet high. This was the workmanship of Chares, a native of the island, and employed him twelve years. It was overthrown by an earthquake eighty-five years after its erection: and lay on the ground 430 years, till Rhodes was taken by the Saracens, A. D. 653; when the metal which composed it being sold to a Jew, it furnished sufficient to load nine hundred camels.

North of Rhodus lies Cos, now Lango, about

about 100 miles in circumference: it was native country of Hippocrates the physic of Apelles the painter, and of Philetas the p

PATMOS, now Palmossa, lies in this vicin Here St. John wrote the book of Revelati

SAMOS, the favourite island of Juno, the country of Pythagoras, stands opposit mount Myeale, on the coast of Ionia. W of this is ICARUS, which gave name to Icarian sea; and north of Icarus is CHI famous for its wine and earthen-wares.

About 60 miles north of Chios lies LESB an island of considerable extent, and fam for its wines. The chief city was Mityle by which name the island itself is now knov

To the north of this is LEMNOS, (n Stalimene,) the island of Vulcan, about 1 miles in circumference. It contained t cities, Hephæstia and Murina. On the for or market-place of the latter, mount Ath though 87 miles distant, casts its shadow certain seasons.

Upwards of 60 miles to the eastward Lemnos, and five from the coast of Tro lies TENEDOS, about 10 miles in circuit. had one town, where stood a temple of Apo Smintheus.

The other Grecian islands are scarcely wor an enumeration in this rapid survey*.

* The reader should now refer attentively to the m at the end of this volume; and fix well in his mind the lative positions of the chief places, as he will there find th down.

UN

NIVERSAL HISTORY.

HISTORY OF GREECE.

CHAPTER I.

n the earliest Accounts of Greece to the general Abolition of Royalty in that Country.

HE history of Greece, like that of every other country, has its origin clouded by fic-, and replete with errors and absurdities. The ess song, or the rude and shapeless monument, the only commemorative which man em-ed, in the infant state of society, to record his rtial exploits or the memorable destinies of his ion. To attempt, therefore, to trace and de-t the several monstrous and improbable ac-nts which the Grecian poets and historians of iquity have transmitted to mankind, would be sk not only useless but unworthy the serious-s of historical writing. Such fictions must not irp the page which was appropriated for the re-rds of truth. In an ignorant and barbarous age, ne degree of credit may have been, and cer-nly was, attached to them; but they have now en too long exploded to merit attention. Many deed are the writers, who, by the assistance of a rong and lively imagination, have endeavoured clothe fable in the garb of probability, to sepa-te truth from falsehood, and to describe in an ninterrupted series the history of Greece from ie most remote antiquity. But the affairs of the eroic ages present to our view such a motley and ythological picture, as explained by ancient au-ors, that every modern writer has been under the

necessity of adding some new conjectures of own. Unsatisfactory, however, and improbal after all, are most of the interpretations given those poetical and allegorical compositions; the former, no less than the latter, appear to merely the ebullitions of fancy, varied as to th object.

We shall therefore dwell as little as possible the fabulous age of Greece, for the reasons alre assigned. Facts that are more probable, and wh have been better substantiated, can alone dem the historian's attention.

Ancient Greece, which at this time constitu the south part of Turkey in Europe, lay betw the thirty-sixth and forty-second degrees of l tude: it extended about 380 miles from nort south, and 310 from east to west; and was boun on the east by the Ægean sea, now called Archipelago; on the south, by the Cretan s on the west, by the Ionian sea, or Adriatic gu and on the north, by Illyria and Thrace. It c tained the following kingdoms: In Peloponnes Sicyon, Argos, Messenia, Corinth, Achaia, Ar dia, and Laconia. In Greece Proper; those Attica, Megara, Bœotia, Locris, Epichnemi Doris, Phocis, Ozolæa, and Ætolia. In Epir were the Molossians, Amphilochians, Cassiopæa Dræopians, Chaonians, Threspotians, Almeni and Acarnanians. In Thessaly; it comprehen the countries of the Thessalians, the Estiotees, Pelasgians, the Magnesians, and the Phthiotes. the most considerable kingdoms were Argos, tica, Thebes and Sparta.

The Greeks are said to have derived their n form Græcus the father of Thessalus; and those nations are affirmed by the learned Boc

others, to have been descendants of Javan, the
f Japhet, and grandson of Noah.

reece is in general an excellent country, situ-
in a temperate climate, in which none of the
ssaries of life are wanting, and to which the
that surround it waft in abundance every su-
nity.

e manners of the first inhabitants of Greece
rude and savage; they fed on herbs, fruits,
oots. The time when they first began to lay
tore of acorns for a season of scarcity, to clothe
selves with the skins of beasts, and build huts
ell in, is pointed out as the era of civilization.
hat period they remained in the open air, or
d in caves. It is observed that the more
e retired to sterile places, that their enjoy-
s might not be envied; and thus Attica be-
peopled. The fabulists have endeavoured
nt out the age in which those lived who first
t agriculture, or attempted to make voyages
a; and it results from their chronology that
vention of these arts is of a very early date.
eir voyages and military expeditions, a num-
f the Greeks made their way into countries
advanced in the sciences and in every kind
owledge. They brought from Phœnice the
f alphabetic writing; and from Persia and
lon, geometry, astronomy, and magic.

r want of laws, the Greeks were long go-
d by oracles. The most celebrated oracle was

spired the priestess with a sacred fury. In this paroxysm she pronounced, with the tone and gestures of a maniac, answers almost always intricate and ambiguous, and the true sense of which was discoverable only after the event. It is to be observed, that the heroes, kings, and even sages, appeared to have a firm faith in the oracles, and consulted them with great solemnity. Those who may think that they only affected this credulity, must at least confess that they apparently considered it as necessary to inculcate it on the people by their example.

B. C. 2764. Sicyon was the most ancient kingdom of Greece, of which we have any account in history. Its first king was Ægialeus.

B. C. 1856. Inachus founded the regal government of Argos in Peloponnesus. Acrisius, one of his successors, transferred the seat of government to Mycenæ. After his time the Heraclidæ, or descendants of Hercules, made themselves masters of this kingdom, and of the whole peninsula.

B. C. 1556. Athens was formed into a regular government by Cecrops, an Egyptian, who carried thither a colony of people from the mouths of the Nile. He married the daughter of Actæus, king of the country, established a new monarchy, and founded the city of Athens, afterward so much celebrated. Cecrops is said to have taught the Greeks the several arts of peace and of war; to have instituted the laws and rules of marriage; and to have appointed religious and civil offices. He is also supposed to have been the founder of the Areopagus; a court of justice, on the plan of the Egyptian tribunals. The reign of Amphictyon, the third king of Athens, is chiefly remarkable for the establishment of the council of the amphictyons;

a deputation from the twelve Grecian
that assembled twice a-year at Thermopylæ,
sult on affairs relating to the common inte-
Greece. Theseus, one of the successors to
one of Athens, is said to have introduced
st the citizens a more perfect equality, by
of which the state rather resembled a repub-
a monarchy. Notwithstanding the many
and private virtues of this monarch, he
acrifice to the inconstancy of the people,
fered banishment by ostracism*, a mode of
ent he had himself instituted. Codrus was
t Athenian king. During his reign the
and Heraclidæ had regained all Peloponne-
id encroached on the Athenian territory.
elphic oracle declared, that the Heraclidæ
finally prevail, if they abstained from inju-
e person of the king of Athens. This being
known to Codrus, he disguised himself in
bit of a peasant, proceeded to the quarters
enemy, and, insulting one of the soldiers,
in by him in combat. The next day the

racism, (so called from a Greek word signifying
r tile,) was a kind of popular judgment or con-
on among the Athenians, whereby such persons
nished as had power and popularity enough to
any thing against the public liberty.
process in this condemnation was thus: the people
sembled, every man took a tile and carried it to

Athenians sent to demand their king; and Heraclidæ, despairing of success, suspende further hostilities. The inimitable merit of Cc was held in so much veneration by his subj that they considered no man worthy of succee him, and therefore abolished royalty.

B.C. 1448. Cadmus, we are told, founded the l dom of Thebes, in which the monarc form of government was more des than in any other of the Grecian states. prince is supposed to have been of Phœnicia traction. He is universally allowed to hav troduced into Greece the knowledge of alpha writing. To him are ascribed the sixteen nal letters of the Greek alphabet. But a order, names, and form of the Greek char greatly correspond with those of the Phœn there can be no doubt that the Greek letters formed from the Phœnician, and that Cadm not invent, but copy them. He is also s have taught the people navigation and comn the method of cultivating the vine, and the forging and working metals. Many of his de dants act no inconsiderable part in the writi the ancient poets; and the tragical occurr that befel them are universally known.

B. C. 1514. Sisyphus has been generally rec the founder of the kingdom of Co He is said to have been the son of Æ and grandfather of the celebrated Ulysses. successor Glaucus is commonly supposed tc instituted the Isthmean games. The Cori monarchy, however, did not long continue lineal succession of Sisyphus. His family b extinct; or, as others affirm, was driven fro throne; when the Bacchidæ seized the re

govern

ernment. Subsequent, however, to this, Co- i fell under an aristocracy; and a supreme istrate, whom they called prytanis, was an- lly elected from the body of the nobles. The ocratic government continued until Cypselus id means to usurp the regal power, and after- d to transmit it to his son.

The Spartan or Lacedæmonian govern- it was at first monarchical. Its founder Lelex. The little that is known of the in of this monarchy must be ascribed to the empt in which the Lacedæmonians always every kind of literature. Helen, the daughter yndareus the seventh king of Sparta, is famous tory for the ten years war which her beauty infidelity occasioned. She was first stolen y by Theseus; for which reason Tyndareus nd all her suitors by an oath, to allow her to e choice of her own husband; and that if she ld be carried off a second time, they would all their forces, and endeavour to restore her. reupon Helen married Menelaus, the son of eus and brother of Agamemnon. They had long enjoyed the sweets of conjugal union, en Paris, son of Priam king of Troy, universally ounted the handsomest man of his age, and rned with the frivolous accomplishments that ally captivate the female mind, arrived in rta. His person, attainments, and address, se- ed the affections of Helen; and she abandoned country, her husband, and relations, and was nsported with all her treasure to the Trojan land. nelaus, by the advice of his brother Agamem- n, demanded the performance of the promise de by the princes her admirers, and their as- ance in the expedition against Troy. It cost B.C. 1704.

the

the Greeks, however, much bloodshed, before ample revenge on the perpetrator and abettors of this dishonourable act could be executed by the destruction of Troy. The kingdoms of Argos, Mycenæ, and Lacedæmon, were afterward united under Orestes.

B. C. 795. Caranus, an Argive by birth, and a descendant of Hercules, established the regal government in Macedonia. Royalty, in spite of the dangers that had proved fatal to it in most of the Grecian communities, subsisted in this kingdom for the space of six hundred and forty-seven years.

Such are the general outlines of the Grecian nation, after it was first formed into regular administrations. Each particular state, assuming to itself the power of modelling its own form of government, might be properly considered as an independent sovereignty. The regal power, as we have seen, was the first that was established in Greece. In the manners of the heroic ages, superior opulence and extensive property were no marks or cause of individual distinction and preeminence. The warlike tribes knew no other difference amongst men, than what arose from personal merit and abilities. But if we examine minutely the power and authority of each sovereign, in matters appertaining to his own dominions; or if we carefully observe the influence of the chieftain over his people; we shall discover that the regal jurisdiction was, in general moderated by the wisdom of a mixed government. In each particular kingdom, the will of the prince was fettered by the prudence of his counsellors, or the voice of the people. It is however reasonable to infer, that, had the Greeks never known oppression

pression, nor experienced the insolence and tyranny of their kings, their regal power would have still continued. But the republican government, in most of the states of Greece, succeeded to monarchy: assuring more fully on the ruins of that establishment, the freedom (though not always the happiness) of man.

Besides the same language, religion, and interest which prevailed throughout the Grecian territory, and tended to unite the several small and independent states, and to consolidate them into one body politic; national games were instituted in different parts of Greece, and prizes adjudged to the victors. At these sports all the inhabitants of the Grecian communities assembled; and the youth were exercised in feats of activity and strength, and thereby enabled the better to endure the fatigues of war. The council of the amphictyons was, however, the most indissoluble bond of public union. The amphictyonic institution was at first established in the northern parts of Greece, for the purpose of repelling foreign invasion; and had been found equally useful in promoting concord and unanimity at home. In process of time, however, the amphictyons became a representative assembly of the whole Grecian nation. The states that sent deputies to this council were twelve. Each independent community deputed two members: one of whom was called the pylagoras, and had charge of all civil concerns; the other was named hieromnemon, and to him were committed the interests of religion. After the abolition of royalty, the number of amphictyons was increased to about a hundred. The vernal assembly was held at Delphi; and the autumnal meeting at Thermopylæ. After the deputies had met

met at the place appointed, they took an oath wi the most solemn imprecations, "That they wou never subvert any amphictyonic city, or stop th courses of its water; but would punish to the u most of their power all who should dare to comm these outrages, and would oppose every attem to depreciate the reverence of the Gods." T this council was committed every thing pertai ing to peace and war, to religion, and the interes of the state. The deputies who composed th august body had full powers delegated to the from their constituents, to resolve and execu whatever appeared most conducive to the cor mon welfare; and in virtue of this authority th could even raise troops and proclaim war.

CHAP. II.

ernment of Sparta, to the Subjugation of the Messenians.

Heraclidæ, or posterity of Hercules, hav-
expelled Tisamenes, the son of Orestes,
e throne, divided the countries they had
l into sovereignties among their principal
Temenes had Argos; Chresphontes,
ia; and Aristodemus, Lacedæmon. But
emus dying about this time, his two sons
enes and Procles succeeded to the govern-
f Sparta. These princes neither parted the
n between them, nor did they reign alter-
Whether this was owing to the commands
r father, or to some other cause of which
ignorant, certain it is they governed con-
and with equal authority; each of them
tyled king of Sparta, and acknowledged in
pacity. What renders this more astonishing
these two brothers entertained the strongest
n for each other; and their whole life was
n continual broils and disagreements. The
misunderstanding likewise prevailed be-
their successors. And nevertheless, this
r and seemingly inconsistent form of go-
ent existed for several centuries, until the
milies became extinct.

revolution which had driven the descend-
Pelops from the throne, had caused all the
s and miseries of war to be felt in Peloponnesus, and the inhabitants had been obliged to seek

seek an asylum in some of the neighbouring
In order, therefore, to repeople the kingdom
rysthenes and Procles bestowed on all str
that would fix their abode in Lacedæmo
rights and privileges of citizens. This decre
afterward reversed by Agis, the son and suc
of Eurysthenes, and a tax imposed upon al
saints. The Helotes were the only peopl
would not submit to this impost; but wage
against the Spartans. The citizens, however,
prevailed; and the wretched Helotes and
posterity were doomed to perpetual slavery.

Lycurgus, the tenth in descent from Her
received the Spartan sceptre upon the death
brother Polydectes. But his sister-in-law p
pregnant, he resigned his authority. The
of Polydectes, however, intimated to Lyc
that if he would consent to marry her, the
should be destroyed; and thus no posthumo
of his brother would prevent his succession
throne. Lycurgus was shocked at the pro
but, feigning to comply with her wishes, ex
her not to procure an abortion, for fear of in
her own health. He commanded some wh
could trust, to bring the child to him as soo
was born, if it should be a boy. This was a
ingly done; and Lycurgus receiving the i
whilst at supper with some of the principa
sons of the city, presented him to them, s
"Spartans, a king is born to us." Then p
the child upon the chair of state, he name
Charilaus. Thus did this great and good
sacrifice every proud and ambitious view t
performance of his duty; and, laying asi
regal authority, exercised that of protector
This conduct conciliated the esteem and ad

the people, but extremely irritated the
nd her partisans. Whereupon Lycurgus,
might suppress all the calumnies and in-
ns published against him by the faction of
en, determined upon a voluntary exile.
irst visited Crete; an island famous for its
nd for the admirable polity by which it had
overned in the most early ages. From it
eeks learned navigation, and derived many
r legal institutions. He afterward sailed to
and carefully examined the civil and re-
establishments of that ancient kingdom.
he passed over into Asia, and there found
uable works of Homer. In this interval
emon having become a prey to anarchy and
ion, he was requested by the people and
of Sparta to return to his native country,
s presence might quiet faction and promote
ıy.

n his arrival in Greece, finding all things in
ion, and the people weary of their present
he determined to execute the plan he had
esigned, and to substitute a more popular
f government. Having first, as a necessary
r insuring the success of his undertaking,
d the approbation and assistance of the
e oracle; he made his intention known to
ber of his friends, and explained to them
n he was about to adopt, and the method

their real views, he himself entered into ... sign, and gave his assistance towards its executio

B.C. 705. Thus was a form of government establish that has excited the admiration and applau of all subsequent ages.

In the political institution established by L curgus, the kings were permitted to rule, and h still the forms of royalty; but their power w greatly weakened and circumscribed. They h no considerable influence in the government, credit in public deliberations. They were men the first citizens in the state; and acknowledg the superior authority of the ephori and the peop to whom they were accountable for their condu But they possessed privileges sufficient to dist guish them from the mass of citizens; and th persons were held in the greatest respect and neration.

The senate, which was intended to serve a counterpoise between the kings and the peop consisted of twenty-eight members: whose p of policy it was to side with the people, when regal power appeared to preponderate too mu and, on the contrary, to espouse the interes the kings, when turbulence and licentiou prevailed. By these means the power was ec balanced, and neither the sovereign nor th pulace could obtain an undue superiority.

The ephori were a court consisting c members, annually elected out of the body people; with authority to arrest and impris kings if they acted improperly.

The people also had their political assemb possessed a nominal share in the gover Sparta. But, as the senate convened and

at pleasure, and they never held any offices
e state, it is evident their real power must
been very insignificant.

order, however, to depress the insolence,
, and luxury of the great and wealthy, and
nish misery and want from the dwellings of
oor, Lycurgus distributed the lands of Sparta
.aconia in nearly equal portions amongst the
itants of each district. The whole territory
divided into thirty-nine thousand shares, of
h nine thousand were assigned to the city of
a. The principal land-holders, from the
hension that resistance would not only be
ctual and vain, but might perhaps occasion
utter ruin, were easily persuaded to give up
property for this purpose. In this manner
Lycurgus effect that extraordinary division of
, which banished from Lacedæmon all di-
tion and pre-eminence except what virtue and
t naturally obtain.

his regulation, however, did not appear to in-
ice an equality sufficient between man and
. Lycurgus, therefore, withdrew all the silver
gold then in circulation, and permitted nothing
ron money to be given in exchange for every
modity. This coin was made of iron heated
e fire, and quenched in vinegar, in order to
ler it brittle, and unfit for any other use. From
time all commerce with foreign nations was
hilated, and the ships of another country never
red the ports of Laconia.

he next ordinance which the Spartan legislator
blished was, that all, even the kings them-
es, should eat at public tables only, where
deration and frugality were to be exercised;
that thenceforth no man should be permitted

to take his meals at h[illegible]. This law was in to destroy every the le[illegible] desire of wealth, stop the progress of luxury. This inno however, was opposed by the people wi utmost violence, and a tumult ensued. Ly found himself obliged to quit the assembly, flee to a sanctuary for protection. On th cander, a young nobleman of a generous bu disposition, pursued him, and struck out his eyes. Lycurgus exhibited to the multit face covered with blood; at the sight of they immediately relented, entreated his f ness, and delivered up Alcander to punis But, instead of condemning him, Lycurg affability and kindness, made Alcander bec most steady friend and strenuous partisan; change thus wrought in his opponent, engaged the people in favour of their legisl

Thus undaunted amidst the opposition w encountered, Lycurgus proceeded in the b of reformation. We must, however, attri to the ignorance and barbarity of the ag some of his laws so evidently militate aga feelings of humanity and the ties of natur children, as soon as born, were commande brought by their parents, and examined by appointed for that purpose. Those alone th well made and vigorous were preserved; such as were weak or deformed were exp perish at the foot of the mountain Taygetus that prejudice and partiality might not imp progress of reform, the children that were l and deemed worthy of preservation, wer mitted to the care of nurses provided by th As no Lacedæmonian was permitted to h children educated after any peculiar mann

at the age of seven years were sent to the
ic schools. Letters were taught them for use
, and not for ornament. They appreciated
s solely by their utility; rejecting all that
vain and specious. And therefore, if they
e what could be read, or spoke that which
t be understood, they judged it quite suffi-
, and after more than this they did not seek.
masters endeavoured to give their pupils just
of men and of things; to avoid all matters of
vial or abstruse nature; and to confine them-
s to points of the highest importance in civil
Harmless raillery was encouraged amongst
oys; and a quickness of wit and repartee was
lly commended. Their bodily exercises were
he most violent nature; and the youths were
cularly enjoined a fatiguing and laborious kind
fe. Every art seems to have been made use of,
nder them patient under the hardships that
ht happen to them. Theft was encouraged, in
r to prepare their minds for the stratagems of
; but if they were caught in the fact, they were
ished severely. Plutarch tells us of a boy, who
stolen a fox and hidden it under his coat, and
rather chose to suffer the animal to tear out
bowels than to discover the theft. At thirty
rs of age they were allowed to marry, to enter
the army, and to bear offices in the state.
The discipline enjoined the virgins was equally
ct with that of the boys. They were accustomed
running, wrestling, and throwing the quoit and
elin naked before all the citizens. Nor was this
med indecent or disgraceful; as it would serve
check every lustful and inordinate desire. An
ication so manly could scarcely fail of producing

manly sentiments. One of the Spartan wo
whose son was going to battle, gave him the
with this advice, *Return with it, or upon it*,
plying that she would rather see him borne
it dead, than that he should throw it from h
flight, or resign it to the enemy.

The cryptia, or secret act, was an instit
most inhuman and detestable; by which the
dæmonians were permitted to kill the Helot
slaves, whenever they became too numerous.
justly condemns this law. Plutarch denies t
was made by Lycurgus; but Aristotle exp
charges him with it.

Such was the general purport of the institu
of Lycurgus. If there be some laws among
which we cannot approve, there are others
appear highly meritorious; and they were
doubt, on the whole calculated to change an
liorate the condition of the Lacedæmonians,
make them a great and powerful people.

When Lycurgus had thus perfected, as he
gined, the form of the commonwealth whic
had planned, his thoughts were employe
rendering it fixed and permanent. For this
pose he obliged the Lacedæmonians by an
that they should strictly adhere to the laws h
promulgated until his return from Delphi, w
he was going to consult the oracle relati
something of which he would afterward i
them. When arrived at Delphi, he inquir
the oracle whether the laws he had given th
cedæmonians were sufficient to make them
py; and was assured by the priestess that no
was wanting to render them perfect. This a
he sent to Sparta, and then voluntarily s
hi

lf to death. Different accounts are, how-
given of the place and manner of his decease.
say, he died in Crete; and that he com-
d his ashes to be thrown into the sea, lest
hould be afterward carried to Sparta, and the
æmonians thereby consider themselves re-
from their oath.

e new-modelled state was soon at war with
essenians, a neighbouring people. The oc-
of this war is not certainly known; the
nians accusing the Lacedæmonians of pro-
g it, and the Lacedæmonians retorting the
. But as the assigned causes tend to mark
anners of the age, we shall briefly notice

Some Spartan virgins had repaired to
mple of Diana, situated between Laconia
Messenia, and to which the inhabitants of
states were accustomed to resort. These
s were violated by the Messenians; and
lus, one of the kings of Sparta, was slain in
pting their rescue. The Messenians, on the
ry, asserted that the pretended virgins were
l youths in disguise; who, with Teleclus,
ome thither to assassinate their chiefs. To
quarrel another provocation was soon after
l. Euphænus, a Lacedæmonian, had received
cattle into his pastures, belonging to a Mes-
n of high birth named Polychares. Euphænus
the cattle, and pretended they were lost.
chares sent his son to receive the money for
; whereupon Euphænus caused him to be
sinated. The father went several times to
a, to demand justice and redress; but ex-
nced only insults and derisions. He therefore
ated his wrongs upon the Lacedæmonians,

by

by killing all of that kingdom with whom h happened to meet. These private outrages na turally produced national animosity, and oc casioned an open rupture between the two state

B. C. 743. After several mutual expostulations ha passed, a public war commenced, whic private justice might have prevented. was carried on for many years with various succes At length the Messenians, prompted by the desi of freeing themselves from an oppressive state hostility, sent to consult the oracle at Delph The answer returned was, that a virgin of the royal family should be sacrificed to the God otherwise the utter ruin of the whole Messenia nation would inevitably follow. Upon this, lo were cast, and the daughter of Lyciscus was th virgin on whom the chance fell. The legitimacy her birth however being doubtful, Aristodemus v luntarily offered his own daughter to be the d voted victim. But her lover, who was presen asserted that the marriage between them w already consummated, and that she was with chi by him. This enraged Aristodemus so much, th he instantly slew her; and, that he might vindica the honour of his family, proved the falsehood the assertion by causing the body to be dissecte Public rejoicings followed the sacrifice of th virgin; and the Messenians concluded they shou now be victors. After a war, however, of twen years continuance, in which the Lacedæmonian and Messenians were by turns conquerors, Aris

B. C. 724. demus, finding the public affairs in a d sperate situation, slew himself on the gra of his daughter; and the kingdom of Me senia became tributary to Sparta.

Amor

g the events of this war, we must not
mention one, which, extraordinary as it
ear, is affirmed by many ancient writers
been authentic. The absence of the La-
ians from Sparta, (in consequence of the
n at the commencement of the war, not
until their designs were accomplished,)
long time supported by their wives with
titude. But after the lapse of several
d there being no prospect that Messenia
e shortly subdued, the wives sent to re-
o them how much they neglected the city.
quence of this message, the Spartans or-
at the Lacedæmonian youths who were
ge, and had not bound themselves by the
ould return to Sparta, and, associating
es promiscuously with the young women,
the race from falling into decay. When
was at length terminated, the offspring of
miscuous embraces found themselves
ed by the other citizens. They thereupon
n a revolt with the Helotes; some of
dreading the consequences, divulged the
cy. They were therefore permitted, under
duct of their leader Phalantus, to sail to
here they settled, and founded the city
n.

the Messenians had been tributaries to the
s for thirty-nine years, they endea- B. C.
o shake off the yoke; and the Ar- 685.
d Arcadians having promised them
e, the war was begun a second time.
enes was commander of the Messenian
He defeated the Lacedæmonians in the
gagement, which continued for a long
time,

time, and was obstinately contested. The orac being consulted, the Spartans were advised to se a leader from Athens. The Athenians, envious the glory of Lacedæmon, sent them Tyrtæ a schoolmaster and poet, lame of one foot, a suspected of insanity. As soon as the Spart kings appeared in the field, they offered the enet battle; and were a second time routed by Arist menes. A third defeat followed soon after. A the Spartans growing weary of the war, dissatisfi with their kings, and diffident of their own pow sunk into the greatest dejection and desponde cy. Now it was that Tyrtæus became useful them: he encouraged them by his poems; rected them by his counsels; and recruited th armies by men chosen from among the Helot The Messenians suffered a discomfiture soon aft in which their general Aristomenes was tak prisoner. With many others of his countrymen, was thrown into a deep cavern; and was the o person not killed by the fall. Perceiving a gnawing a body near him, Aristomenes seized animal by the tail and mouth, and followed h until he came to a small crevice, through whi he forced himself, and opened a passage to light. He was received with joy and amazeme by the Messenians; and falling upon the C rinthians, at that time the allies of the Sparta he put them completely to the rout. He w however, seized again by some Cretans; having made them drunk, he stabbed them w their own daggers, and returned to his troops. is said to have celebrated three times the hecato phonia, or sacrifice appointed for him who killed a hundred of the enemies with his o

ha

But he could not avert the ruin of his
The city of Eira was taken, and B. C.
annexed to the Spartan territory. 664.
æus, their general, the Spartans
the freedom of their city, the highest
they could confer; and Lacedæmon, by
ssion of the Messenian country, became
e most powerful states of all Greece, and
nly to Athens.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

The Government of Athens, from the Establishm of the Archons to the Expulsion of Hippias.

THOUGH the Athenians refused to have a other king than Jupiter (their great dei after the death of Codrus, they nevertheless m his son Medon their supreme magistrate with humbler title of *archon*. This office was, by its ginal constitution, to continue during the life-ti of its holder; but was afterward rendered decenni and the extinction of the family of Medon g the Athenians an opportunity of making the chonship annual. Nor did they commit the wh power to one person, but created nine chons yearly; and by these means m the supreme magistrate dependent on people. Before the time of Draco, who succee to the archonship in the year 623 before Christian era, the Athenians had no written la He therefore undertook to alter the judicature his country, and to compose a code of laws. E crime, the most enormous or the most trifling, considered as equally heinous, and therefore nished with death. The severity of such a sys defeated its own purposes. It used to be obser "that Draco's laws were not written with but with blood."

B. C. 634.

In this state of things, the character of S attracted the attention of all parties. Belove all for the private virtues, his wisdom and lear procured him the respect and admiration of fell

CHAP. IV.

Transactions of Greece, from the Expulsion of Hippias, to the Death of Darius.

HE Lacedæmonians were at this time at the head of the Grecian states. Obliged by the stitution of their government to submit to a sin- ar kind of perpetual poverty, their ambition w no bounds. The conquest of Messenia, their ient alliance with Corinth, and their superiority ower over the rest of the neighbouring com- nities, enabled them, in a great measure, to mand the whole of the Peloponnesus. Still, wever, they permitted no opportunity to pass, ich might serve to extend their influence and rease their dominion. Whenever the Grecian es were at war with one another, or internal se- ion agitated any of them, the Lacedæmonians e always ready to offer themselves as mediators ween the contending parties. Their interfe- ce was generally conducted with wisdom, and appearance of moderation. But they never lost ht of the great end for which their services were red; and always endeavoured to extend their hority, or the influence of their state. To every nmunity in which their assistance was for any rpose requested, they attempted to give an oli- chical form of government: for in almost every e of the Grecian states an aristocratical and a de- cratical faction existed; and the Lacedæmoni- s were sensible, that by setting up a small party ich should be wholly dependent on their assist- e for the continuance of its power, they would

take the most effectual and certain means c
cing the state over which it presided to a real
tion, under the more honourable name of al

The same policy it was proposed to pursu
respect to Athens; and the factions tha
there appeared to give a sufficient opportun
this end. By the late revolution in affairs,
thenes, son of Megacles, and the most emi
the Alcmæonids, became, of course, the fi
sonage in the commonwealth. Isagoras, hc
a man of birth and fortune, and respected
Athenian nobility, opposed Clysthenes.
latter, being a favourite of the people, conti
divide the establishment into ten tribes, in
four, of which it formerly consisted; and i
creased the number of the senate to five h
persons. Isagoras, perceiving the intent
change in the constitution, applied to Lace
for assistance. Cleomenes, king of Sparta,
diately commanded the Athenians to ban
the Alcmæonids, otherwise war should be d
between the two states. This requisitio
complied with, and Clysthenes obeyed the
Encouraged therefore by this proof of i
Cleomenes marched an army to Athens, a
nished at once seven hundred families. H
proceeded to dissolve the council appoin
Clysthenes, and to commit the commor
to the care of three hundred persons,
them partisans of Isagoras. But the Ath
being sensible they must now either re
Lacedæmonians or submit to a state o
plete dependence, flew to arms; and oblige
menes and Isagoras to retire to the citadel,
after being besieged two days, they surre
Cleomenes and Isagoras having departed fi

Clysthenes and the banished families were im-
itely recalled.

e Lacedæmonians now resolved to avenge
elves of the Athenians, by restoring Hippias
to the sovereignty. He was accordingly
for from Sigeium; and after a long voyage
d at Lacedæmon, where the Spartan kings,
he deputies of the states in alliance with
held a consultation. Sosicles the Corin-
however, harangued most eloquently against
storation of Hippias; and influenced the de-
s of the other states so much, that the Lace-
nians were finally compelled to abandon the
n.

e Ionians, being at war with the Persians,
o Athens to request assistance; whereupon
nthius, an Athenian nobleman, was dispatched
a fleet of ships to Ionia. By the help of these,
exploits were performed, and the Ionians
d Sardis. When the Persian king heard of
he declared himself the enemy of Athens,
arnestly wished for an opportunity of resent-
ie injury. The Ionians were soon after re-
l to the subjection of Darius.

ppias therefore, being disappointed of the hope
out to him by the Lacedæmonians, went
into Asia; and applying to Artaphernes, go-
r of the adjacent provinces belonging to the
n king, engaged that if this satrap would re-
him to his former authority at Athens, he
d thenceforth be obedient and tributary to Da-

The Athenians, meanwhile, not ignorant of
ourney and proposals of Hippias, sent am-
dors to Artaphernes, entreating him to give
tention to Hippias, but to suffer them to re-
free and undisturbed in their present situa-

tion. This nobleman, however, conceiving would be more advantageous to Darius if should be under a regal than a democratic vernment, told the ambassadors, that if the nians would be safe, they must receive Hip their king. The return of these ambassad casioned a violent ferment in Athens. Un indignation, not unaccompanied with a fear safety and liberty of their country, was imme excited.

When the news arrived, that the Persian view the conquest of Greece, the Athenia inhabitants of Ægina, with others of the C states, wisely compromised some differenc had arisen amongst them, and which had pr some inconsiderable hostilities, that they now exert all their force against their cc enemy.

In the mean time, Darius proceeded in sign of undertaking an expedition against C that he might gratify his revenge for the insu injuries he had received from the Ath Mardonius was accordingly appointed comi of a fleet and army destined to attack G but through his unskilfulness he lost many ships in a violent tempest, as they were round a point of land formed by Mount A and his troops, in passing through Thrace attacked by the inhabitants of that country night, and great numbers of them slain. T pedition having failed by means of these d asters, Mardonius was compelled to relinqu enterprise, and return home.

Darius now, wishing to know which of th cian states he might consider as friends o dispatched heralds to the several commun

C

o demand of them "earth and water*," of their submission to his government. naughty claim of the Persian monarch ns on the continent, and most of the ceeded. But at Sparta and Athens, not ermined refusal was given, but the pub- ation was vented against the Persian one of whom was thrown into a pit, the a well, and they were told to take their id water" there.

finding that in proceeding on his pre- ed plan he should have great obstacles to ith before Greece could be conquered, his armament to five hundred ships and ed thousand men, and gave the command nd Artaphernes. This expedition and Hippias, who was now an acted as its guide and conductor. B. C. 490.

uest of Greece being the only and the ject, it was resolved to avoid the cir- ute which Mardonius pursued. They drew their forces into the plains of Cili- hence passed through the Cyclades to As soon, however, as the Persian fleet ried by the inhabitants of Eretria, the to demand the assistance of Athens; that ediately ordered four thousand men to

But the Eretrians were divided amongst s; and after resisting the enemy six place was betrayed to the Persians, who nd burnt the city, and sold the inhabi- laves, according to the command of Da-

---

ient mode of claiming superiority on one side, wledging subjection on the other.

rius. Previously to this, Æschines, the son of Nothon, seeing that there was no prospect of defending Eretria with success, advised the commanders of the Athenian troops to return home, and reserve themselves for the defence of their native country. In consequence of this advice, they crossed to Oropus, and arrived safe in Attica.

The Persian generals allowed very little respite to their troops before they advanced against Athens. In this alarming situation, no measures had been concerted for general security; and the enemy passed into Greece before any common defence had been proposed. The Athenians mustered all their forces; which, when joined by one thousand Platæans, did not amount to more than ten thousand men. These troops were commanded by ten general officers possessing equal power; among whom were Miltiades, Aristides, and Themistocles, men of distinguished valour and abilities. But conceiving that it would be utterly impossible for this small number of forces to withstand the Persian army, they sent to Sparta, to request the immediate assistance of that state. The Lacedæmonians on this emergency readily consented, and ordered their troops to put themselves in a state of preparation; but at the same time declared, that, on account of a law prohibiting the commencement of an expedition except at the full of the moon, they could not depart within five days. In the mean time, Hippias having informed the Persians that Marathon was an extensive plain where their horse might be able to act with the greatest advantage, they marched thither. And the Athenians, being apprised of the enemy's motions, commanded their troops to the same place.

As soon as the Greeks came within sight of the Persian

ıd of his country, but would not engage till
ıis own proper turn to take the command.
that day arrived, without waiting for more
ce, he disposed his troops in order of battle,
his forces principally in the wings. Find-
: Athenians extremely animated, he com-
l them to lay aside their missile weapons,
nce down the hill with great rapidity, and
ge the enemy in close fight. This order
tantly and cheerfully obeyed. The Persians,
d not been accustomed to receive the onset
nemy, imputed this attack to the folly of
ıenians, and their ignorance of military dis-
; and what served to corroborate this opi-
ıs, that neither horse nor pikemen appeared
them. The effect of the shock, however,
the wisdom of the plan of Miltiades. For,
the Asiatic horse was reckoned formidable
ıpaign countries, yet in this confined plain,
:umbered with a numerous infantry, it was

immediately opposed to them. Then joining t
divided forces, they met the conquering centu
the Persian army, defeated it, and, following tc
shore the fleeing enemy, made a very drea
slaughter. The Persians hurried on board t
fleet; but the Athenians took seven galleys,
destroyed several others. The Persians lost,
cording to Herodotus, six thousand three hun
men, and the Athenians no more than one l
dred and ninety-two; but among the latter v
some of the most eminent men in the comn
wealth. Every one, indeed, seemed emulou
save his country, and to share the glory of the
tle; and the highest praise is due to the valou
the Athenian troops. "The Athenians
fought at Marathon," says their historian, "
the first among the Greeks known to have
running for the purpose of coming at onc
close fight: and they were the first who withs
(in the field) even the sight of the Median d
and of the men who wore it; for hitherto the
name of the Medes and Persians had been a t
to the Greeks." Justin says that Cynegyrus
brother of the poet Æschylus, having perfor
prodigies of valour in the battle, pursued the
sians to the shore, and laid hold of a ship w
was ready to sail, with his right hand. Som
the enemy seeing this cut off his hand, on w
he seized the vessel with his left; and being
prived of that also, he fastened his teeth into it,
in this posture expired. The same author tel
that Hippias, who expected to have been rest
to the kingdom of Athens by the power of the
sians, perished in this engagement; but o
relate that he escaped, and died miserabl
Lemnos.

collective accounts that are given of this
seem sufficiently consistent to engage us to
in the general veracity of the historians.
eatest inconsistency would seem in the
umber of the Athenians that are reported to
en slain, contrasted with the slaughter of
sians. But this is not improbable; and in
ic accounts of battles in different ages, as
disparity of numbers has appeared.
the battle of Marathon, however, the Per-
mament was still formidable; nor was
, by the effects of this glorious victory, de-
immediately from the danger with which it
naced. The Persian commander, in hopes
ing the city by a sudden assault, doubled
nium, and bore away for Athens. But
es, seeing the danger of his countrymen,
ving Aristides with a thousand troops to
he prisoners and spoils, marched, in all
he rest of the forces, and arrived at a small
from the city before the enemy was in a
on to attack it. As soon as the Persian admi-
notice that Miltiades and the Athenian
ere so near, he weighed anchor from Pha-
and steered for Asia, without attempting
ng further. The Eretrians who had been
risoners, Darius settled on an estate about
four miles from his capital.

ooner was Athens delivered, by the victory
athon, from impending destruction, than
enians meditated revenge on those islands
had exerted themselves in the cause of
For this purpose, they fitted out a fleet of
ships, to exact fines from them for their
ency, or to punish them in a different man-
cording to circumstances. Of this fleet
Miltiades

Miltiades was appointed commander. He first sailed to the island of Paros, and demanded a hundred talents to be paid him; threatening, in case of refusal, to besiege and plunder the city. The Parians, however, were not to be terrified. They even refused to deliberate on his proposals, and prepared for an obstinate and vigorous defence. Miltiades accordingly invested the city; but after encamping before it for twenty-six days, he accidentally received a wound, and was obliged to raise the siege.

On his return without success the whole city began to murmur. Xanthippus, one of the principal men in Athens, and father of the famous Pericles, accused him of having deceived the Athenians; and demanded that the general assembly of the people should pass sentence of death upon him. Miltiades could not appear in the assembly, on account of his wound; and therefore his brother pleaded for him. He was acquitted of any capital offence, but condemned in a fine of fifty thousand talents, the expense of the Parian expedition. Not being able immediately to pay so large a sum, he was cast into prison; and his wound mortifying, he died there. The glory of Miltiades, however, survived the life of that hero; and though the Athenians were unjust to his person, they were not unmindful of his fame. At the distance of half a century the battle of Marathon was painted by order of the state, with the figure of Miltiades placed in the fore-ground animating the trooops to victory.

After the Athenians were freed from all apprehensions of foreign invasion, they became, as is too frequently seen in the annals of nations in similar circumstances, disunited amongst themselves;

who commanded at the battle of Marathon.
interestedness of Aristides, on that memo-
occasion, has been already noticed; and a
d a promise of his future fame. Formed in
ebrated schools of moral and political know-
which at that time existed in Athens, he had
night to prefer glory to pleasure; the inte-
his country to his own personal safety and
ion; and the dictates of justice and humani-
every other consideration. His ambition
l to be rather that of deserving than of ac-
; the esteem and applause of his fellow-ci-
; and while he enjoyed the inward satisfac-
a pure and upright intention, he was little
ous to obtain the external rewards of virtuous
ns. The character of Themistocles was
lubious. The glory and fame which Milti-
ad acquired in the battle of Marathon dis-
his quiet, and excited his jealousy. He was
ed with ambitious designs, and was desi-
f performing great and martial exploits. He

abilities; and he was generally successful. W ever matter came before the public assembly was the first to discuss and deliberate upo and his advice, founded on a just knowledg men and of things, and assisted by all the ar eloquence, commonly prevailed. Neverthe with all these great and shining qualities, his was less smitten with the native charms of v than captivated with her splendid and extern tractions. Glory was the idol of his heart; divinity to which he paid unceasing homage.

Such were the two men who were then a head of affairs in the Athenian commonwe Aristides saw the danger of allowing to The tocles, whose virtue was equivocal, the sole nagement of the republic. He therefore o sed every measure that could contribute t elevation of a man, who, by means of his abi and thirst of glory, might possibly subvert the vernment of his country. But the interes Themistocles prevailed over that of his rival; he had the address to procure the command fleet destined to act against those islands in Ægean sea, that had put themselves under the tection of Persia, and to chastise which Milti had before attempted without success. W Themistocles gained honour and fortune abr Aristides increased in popularity at home. splendid eloquence and engaging manners o rival were not now opposed against the stern inflexible integrity of Aristides, who therefore came the chief leader of the people. His con was so exemplary and upright, that he acqu the surname of *Just*, and was considered by Athenians as the most worthy and virtuous cit in the state.

llow-citizens. He was therefore advanced B.C.
the office of archon, with full power to 594.
form the laws and constitution of the state.
lis friends advised him to endeavour to procure the
gal power: but this he at once refused; saying
at "tyranny resembled a fair garden: it is a
eautiful spot while we are within, but it has no
ay for us to get out." Rejecting, therefore, the
lea of royalty, he resolved to give the Athenians
e best laws which they were capable of receiv-
g. Wherever he found things tolerable in the
onstitution, he refused to change them*, and
as at considerable pains to explain the reason and
ecessity of the alterations he made; laying it
own as a maxim, that those laws will be best
bserved, which power and justice equally sup-
ort.

The first act of this great man, after he was ad-
anced to his high office, was to cancel the laws
f Draco, except those only which related to
murder. He next abolished the debts of the poor,
y a law of insolvency. To do this, however,
with the least injury, he lowered the interest, and
increased the value, of money. In the midst of
this transaction, some of his intimate friends, be-
traying the trust reposed in them by Solon, bor-
rowed large sums of money, with which they pur-
chased estates before the edict was published.
This fraud was, at first, supposed to have been by
the connivance of Solon; but the suspicions were
soon found to be without foundation, when he

* How vastly would it have redounded to the honour of reformers in all ages, and to the happiness of individuals who are the victims of their innovations, had they carried in their minds, and adopted in their practice, the prudent caution of Solon!

himself appeared to be a sufferer by the law he had made.

He next proceeded to regulate the offices, employments, and magistracies of the state; all of which he committed to the care of the rich. But as the desire of Solon was to act with moderation and prudence; while he intrusted the execution of the government to the nobles, the supreme power was placed in the people. For this purpose, he distributed the Athenians into four classes. Those that were possessed of five hundred measures yearly, whether of corn or liquids, were placed in the first rank, and paid an annual sum of money to the public treasury. The second class consisted of those who were worth three hundred measures. And those who had two hundred measures, and not more, constituted the third rank. The fourth and last class comprehended all those whose incomes did not amount to two hundred measures; and to them no office or employment in the state was assigned. They had, however, the power of voting in the general assembly of the citizens; and though this was at first considered as a matter of little or no importance, it was afterward found to be productive of the greatest advantages to the people. For, as Solon had for this very purpose drawn up his laws in obscure and ambiguous terms, an appeal from the decisions of the magistrates to the general assembly of the nation was always permitted; and therefore, in process of time, all affairs of importance came before them, and awaited their ultimate decision.

But, in order to guard against the influence of this democracy, he conferred greater power on the court of Areopagus, which had been deprived of much

its authority during the archonship of
Before the time of Solon, the Areopagus
posed of persons conspicuous in the state
wealth, power, and probity. But he passed
at none should be created members of
t who had not previously filled the office
n. This had the desired effect; and the
n of this tribunal was thereby raised to
ight, that for several ages the justice and
of its decisions were never called in ques-
e power of the Areopagus was very great;
said to have been the first court that ever
ied upon questions of life and death. It was
om to hold their sittings in the night only,
out light. The purpose of this singularity
have been, that the members might not
idiced for or against any accused person,
his gestures and looks. Truth only was
; and no attempt to warp the opinion of
ges was permitted. Solon also formed a
consisting of four hundred persons. These
nizance of all appeals from the Areopagus,
examination of all causes before they could
osed to the general assembly of the nation.
were the general institutions which Solon
ied for the government of Athens. The
ar laws which this legislator enacted were
merous. In the first place, all those who, in
rection or schism of the people, should retire
e evils which had fallen upon their country,
erve a neutrality, were condemned to perpe-
nishment, and their estates and property were
ited. This law has been highly and justly
nded, as tending to bring matters to a
and safe conclusion, and deterring the se-
from exciting discord and dissension in the

state. For, as honest and good men would naturally espouse the part of those who appeared to act conscientiously and uprightly, the wicked and factious would dread their opposition. And by making every man considered as an enemy to his country who should appear indifferent and unconcerned in times of public danger and tumult, Solon consulted the good of the state, and provided against the most pressing emergences.

He abolished the custom of giving portions in marriage with young women, unless they were only-daughters. The bride was to carry with her no more than three suits of clothes, and some household goods of trifling value. The intent of Solon by this was to render marriage no longer a traffic, but to promote an union of congenial minds and mutual affection.

It would be tedious and unnecessary to enter into any further details of the subordinate institutions of this famous legislator. They have since become the basis of the civil law of Europe; and we may with reason affirm, that many of his principles of polity are still in force.

After his laws had been promulgated, persons were coming to him daily to have them explained, to know the reasons on which they were founded, and to advise him to alter certain particular parts, according to their own humour or interest. Wearied therefore, with these importunities, and to afford means to his great work of settling into firmness, Solon determined to travel; and having bound the Athenians by an oath, that his institutions should be changed in no part for the space of ten years, he departed on his journey.

Soon after Solon had left Athens, three different parties appeared among the people: those of the highlands

s, the lowlands, and the coast. They
the minds of the citizens against one
and endeavoured to subvert and usurp
rnment. Lycurgus was at the head of
ry people; Megacles was the chief of the
its upon the sea-coast; and Pisistratus, in
s he pretended, to protect those in the
s from tyranny, declared himself their

se Pisistratus was the most powerful. He
teous and affable, generous without pro-
nd beneficent without ostentation. Two
slaves constantly attended him with bags
and gold; and when he saw any in a state
ss, or heard of a person dying insolvent, he
y to do every thing in his power to relieve
le appeared to be a lover of equal rights,
he constitution. Solon, however, saw
his dissimulation; and used to say to him,
it not for your ambition, you would be
citizen in Athens." This man was at
of success, and upon the very point
ing the summit of his ambition, when
fter an absence of ten years, returned to
All the factions pretended the greatest
e and respect for their legislator; and
d him to resume his authority, and to
the differences in the state. He left no
ntried to bring the chiefs and their fol-
reason, and to moderate the spirit of op-
; but in vain. Solon, now arrived at an
l age, was not able to quell the factions,
t the helm of government in the storm;
stratus, by artifice and duplicity, became
f the commonwealth. Having purposely

tic affairs. Retiring therefore to Eretria in Eubœa, with his two sons, he consulted the means of recovering the kingdom. Hippias proposed to his father to attempt Athens by force of arms. This was accordingly agreed upon; and some of the other Grecian states affording him their assistance, he defeated the Athenians in an engagement, and a third time possessed himself of the sovereignty.

Some anecdotes are related of Pisistratus which are creditable to him. Certain young men, who had been drinking at a feast, in their return home met the wife of Pisistratus, and grossly insulted her. The next day however, reflecting upon what they had done, they went in the most humble manner to entreat forgiveness. Pisistratus heard their apology very graciously, and then said, "Gentlemen, I would advise you to behave more modestly for the future; but as for my wife, she was not abroad yesterday." It happened once that Pisistratus, who, as prince of Athens, received the tenth part of every man's rents, and of the fruits of his ground, perceived an old man gathering something amongst the rocks. He inquired of the man what he was doing, and what were the fruits of his labours. "Troubles, and a few plants of wild sage," replied he; "and of these Pisistratus must have the tenth." Pisistratus said no more; but when he returned to the city he exempted him from paying this duty. This prince was eminent also for his love of learning and of the fine arts. He was the first that built a library for public inspection; and by him the poems of Homer were collected and digested into the order in which we have them at present. Cicero speaks of him as the first model of that eloquence in which Greece so eminently excelled. He adorned the city with

ost splendid buildings; and he continued to
the government of Athens with wisdom and
, and died at an advanced age in peace.

on the death of Pisistratus, Hippias B. C.
ipparchus, his sons, succeeded to the 527.
ıment. They appeared to inherit all
ather's virtues, and greatly favoured learn-
d learned men. Anacreon of Teos, and
ides of Cea, were invited by them to Athens,
naintained there. Hipparchus directed the
dists, or professional bards, to recite the
of Homer at the great feast Panathenæa,
ıe people might be instructed in the sciences,
ıe moral conduct of life. And so assiduous
ıis prince in cultivating the minds of the
ians, that he caused statues of Mercury to
up in different places, on which were in-
d short moral sentences. Hippar- B. C.
vas slain by a conspiracy. The circum- 512.
s that occasioned his death are wrapt
xplicable mystery. Certain however it is, that
otives which impelled to this act were of a
e, not a public nature. Aristogiton and Har-
ıs, two Athenians of middle rank, determined
ath of the two brothers. They resolved to
heir design in execution at the feast Pana-
a; when, as all the citizens were accustomed
armed, their own arms would not excite sus-
ı. Hippias was to have been slain first; but
; him engaged in discourse with one of the
irators, they dreaded that all was discovered.
ıg courage, therefore, from the supposed
rateness of their condition, they attacked Hip-
ıs, and dispatched him. Harmodius was
by the guard of Hipparchus; and Aristo-
giton,

giton, being taken by the people, was de
into the power of Hippias.

All those whom he suspected of being p
this design Hippias caused to be apprehende
as the supreme power was now lodged in h
hands, he treated the people with a severi
known before. The effects of this change
temper naturally fell, in the first place, o
concerned in the conspiracy. He comm
Aristogiton to be put to the torture, that h
extort from him the names of the other co
tors. This man, as soon as he felt the to
prepared for him, mentioned some of H
best friends; who were immediately put to
He then named more; who received the sam
and when Hippias asked him if there were
others, he replied smiling, "I know of
now, but yourself, that deserves to suffer
Leona also, a woman with whom he lived, h
with no less intrepidity. Hippias having
her to be tortured, she bore the pain very p
for a considerable time: but when she co
dure it no longer, she bit off her tongue,
might not be in her power to declare any t
jurious to the man she loved. The Ath
who always honoured virtue, would not per
memory of this action to be forgotten.
erected a statue, on which was represent
ness without a tongue.

This conspiracy being, as Hippias co
completely terminated, he endeavoured to
himself in the possession of his dignity, a
measure which his policy and invention co
fest. He contracted friendship and allian
foreign princes, and married his daught

the tyrant of Lampsachus. After having rengthened his power, he increased his re- by various methods, and obliged the Athe- o bring in their silver and gold at a certain These violent and oppressive modes of pro- g rendered Hippias and his government ulti- l detested.

he mean time the Alcmæonids, who had jected by Pisistratus, had become numerous ealthy, and resided at Lipsydrium. This fa- nd their partisans were always contriving for recovering Athens, and expelling the from that state. It happened that the at Delphi was burnt. They agreed with phictyonic council to rebuild it: and being ed of great riches, they executed their un- ing with more munificence than the con- equired, and fronted the temple with Parian . This liberality had the desired effect: the was corrupted; and engaged in all her oracles nclude her answers to the supplicants from æmon, with an admonition to the Spartans to re the liberty of Athens. The Lacedæmo- finding this advice incessantly inculcated, at undertook to invade Athens, though the fa- of Pisistratus was at that time their friends llies. Their first attempt was unsuccessful: ne severities of Hippias drove numbers to hem; and the Lacedæmonians, irritated by defeat, prepared in earnest for revenge. sent a larger army; which being joined by lcmæonids laid siege to Athens. The Athe- attempted to send their children out of the gar- to a place of safety; but the Lacedæmonians them prisoners. Hippias and his partisans, eing able by any other means to procure them their

their liberty, consented to surrender Athens, and leave its territory in five days. Hippias retired to Sigæum on the Hellespont; which had been conquered by his father Pisistratus, and was now under the government of Hegistratus: and Athens once more recovered its liberty. The Alcmæonids were chiefly instrumental in this change; but the Athenians considered themselves under greater obligations to the two friends who had first conspired against the tyrants. The names of Aristogiton and Harmodius were held in the highest reverence in all succeeding ages; statues to their memory were erected in the market-place, an honour never granted to any before: and from them the people caught that innate love of freedom, that deep hatred of tyranny, which neither time nor terrors could ever after efface.

B. C. 509.

CHAP.

h was the situation of Aristides, when The-
les returned triumphant from his naval ex-
n. Fully sensible of the caprice and incon-
of the people, he conceived it would be no
lt task to destroy a rival who had attained
o great a reputation as Aristides now pos-
. Insinuating, therefore, that Aristides had
ed an undue influence in the state, which was
istent with the liberty of the Athenians;
at, by assuming to himself the arbitration of
erences and disputes, he had silently and im-
tibly established a monarchy without the
al parade of one; Themistocles irritated the
against his rival. Suddenly, and when it
ast expected, the multitude flocked to the
, and demanded the ostracism against him.
les, trusting to the innocence and integrity
heart, disdained to employ any unworthy
for gaining the favour or averting the resent-
f his fellow-citizens. One of the country-
who could not write, brought his shell to
les, and said, "Write me *Aristides* upon
Aristides, astonished at the request of the
sked him if he knew any injustice done by
thenian; or, if he had ever received any in-
om him. "No," answered the country-
"I do not even know him; but I am
l to hear him so much praised." Aristides,
t making any reply, took the shell, and

Athenians may never be obliged to
Aristides."

After the banishment of Aristides,
nians were still more exposed to the da
this severe measure was intended to rem
mistocles, however, was called to t
fighting the enemies of his country ; w
probability tended to preserve the libe
state. Ægina, an island in the Ægean,
in alliance with Persia, covered the sea
fleets, and bid defiance to Athens. Th
therefore, advised his countrymen to
their navy, and endeavour to destroy th
insulting rivals. The proposal was app
immediately adopted ; a hundred ga
equipped ; and the naval strength of
broken. Success animating the Athenia
gaged the Corcyreans in a naval battle ;
ing victorious, obtained the empire o
Thus, by the prudence of her command
valour of her troops, Athens obtained a
over her foes on both elements, notw
her intestine broils.

CHAP. V.

The Grecian Affairs, from the Accession of Xerxes to the Throne of Persia, to the Return of that Monarch into Asia, after his Expedition against Greece.

THE Spartans had now long maintained an unrivalled superiority in Peloponnesus; and the unequal and unfortunate opposition of the Argives had no other effect than to confirm the pre-eminence of the Lacedæmonians, and to depress themselves. The Corinthians and Achæans, the inhabitants of Elis and Arcadia, had occasional hostilities with the Spartan state, and with each other; but their contests were not attended with any important or permanent consequences. Cleomenes and Demaratus, the kings of Sparta, had disagreed; and, by the intrigues of the former, the latter was unjustly deposed from the royal dignity. Leotychidas, his kinsman and successor, insulted his misfortunes; and Demaratus, unable to endure contempt in a country where he had possessed the crown, sought for that protection which the Greeks denied him, from the power and resentment of the Persian monarch. Of the republics beyond the isthmus, the Phocians had no other aim than to enjoy in tranquillity the splendor and riches which they derived from the celebrated temple at Delphos. The Thessalians, however, a numerous and warlike people, frequently invaded their territory. The Thebans maintained and extended their usurpations over the smaller cities of Bœotia; and seemed to rejoice that the command of the sea,

and the recovery of distant islands, eng
attention of the Athenians so much as
them from minutely considering the affi
continent. The smaller and less imp
publics followed the fortunes of their
neighbours. Persia had reduced the Asiat
and Macedon paid tribute to Xerxes.
African colonies maintained their indepe

Themistocles, who, according to Th
was not less sagacious in foreseeing t
than skilful in managing the present, d
to be his opinion, that the battle of Mar
not the end of the war, but only th
to new and more glorious contests. This
sequently verified. The Persian arms,
expedition against Greece, had been en
reducing the revolted colonies. The
years of Darius were spent in making pr
for a new and formidable expeditio
Greece. For the Persians, we are told
often experienced such insults as the l
Sardis, nor such defeats as the battle of M
Nine years had elapsed since this fami
and Xerxes, the successor of Darius,
fourth year of his reign, when he four
complete master of the East, and poss
fleet and army that flattered him with the
universal empire. After his accession to th
inheriting with the sceptre his father's
revenge against Greece, he had dedicated
years of his reign to the purpose of c
and augmenting the preparations aga
country; and amidst his various avoc
war and of pleasure, he employed all th
he could procure, in fitting out an armai
equate to the extent of his ambition.

d ships of war and three thousand transports
length completed. The former were stronger
er than any before seen in the ancient world.
them, on an average, carried two hundred
, and thirty Persians, who served as marines.
ips of burden contained each eighty men.
e whole, amounting to four thousand two
d ships, and about five hundred thousand
were ordered to rendezvous in the most
roads and harbours of Ionia; whi- B. C.
ey proceeded. We are not informed 481.
exact number of the land forces; but
rtain that they were extremely numerous,
re probably increased on the march between
nd Sardis by the confluence of tributary
to the imperial standard of Xerxes.
said, indeed, that when the army had at-
its full complement of men, it consisted of
llion seven hundred thousand infantry, and
undred thousand calvalry; which with the
ade the whole forces amount to near two
s of fighting men. Besides these, an im-
crowd of women and eunuchs followed the
of this effeminate people, which, with the
equalled, or perhaps exceeded, the number
soldiers. Thus, according to the universal
ny of ancient historians, the army of Xerxes
e greatest ever collected.

xes, having wintered his forces at B. C.
, sent messengers early in the spring, 480.
a Greek interpreter, to the several
ies of Greece, to demand "earth and water"
ens of submission. The Athenians seized
erpreter, and caused him to be put to death,
suming to publish the decrees of the Persian
the Greek language. Arthemius also, havi

received large sums of money from Xer
endeavouring to corrupt some of the
persons of Athens, was banished from the
by sound of trumpet, and his family d
When it was evident, however, that the
Persia was about to enter Greece in perso
prodigious army, a general assembly of the
states was held at the isthmus, and the f
resolutions were unanimously agreed to
the states of Greece would unite to defe
liberty against the Persians; that all
among themselves should at present be sus
and that of those who abandoned the
cause a tenth part should suffer death
mercy."

When the news arrived at Athens,
Persians were about to invade Greece by th
of Thermopylæ, and that for this purpo
were transporting their forces by sea;
tocles advised his countrymen to leave th
embark on board the galleys, and meet the
at a distance from the Grecian coast. To
pedient the Athenians would not conse
therefore put himself at the head of the
forces, and, joining the army of the Lac
nians, marched toward Tempe. In the me
the Thessalians, who would first be encoun
the forces of Xerxes, had sent to request a
of the other states, and to beg of them t
their preparations. This they according
but Thessaly being an open country, the
be no hopes of opposing such multitudes
with a handful of troops; especially as the
of Thessaly were not to be depended on, a
of the passes in that country were in th
of the king of Macedon. But, as the allie

quainted with only one pass by which the could penetrate into Greece, they were n, that a body of eight thousand pikemen as capable as a larger proportion of troops d it against the invaders. This narrow as the straits of Thermopylæ, and was ed as the gate or entrance into Greece. It nded on the west by high and inaccessible s, which joined the lofty ridge of mount nd on the east terminated by an impracpotass, that was bordered by the sea. Near of Trachis, a Thessalian city, the passage feet in breadth; but at Alpene was so narwo chariots could not pass. These pasre defended by walls formerly built by the to protect them against their Thessalian ; and the Greeks had strengthened them resent occasion, with as much care as the l other circumstances would permit. The nt to defend the straits of Thermopylæ l chiefly of Peloponnesians, under the d of Leonidas, the Spartan king; who, ience to the demands of the oracle, was l to devote his life for the safety of his

Leonidas being asked by some of the l persons, if he had not some secret dewered, "I pretend to defend the straits mopylæ; but in truth I go to die for ntry." And when they still wondered took only three hundred Spartans with turned to those to whom he had comed his secret, and said, "Considering the on which we go, this number is suffi-

e, however, these vigorous measures of cian confederates had been adopted and

put

put in execution, Xerxes had marched his a
from Thrace in three divisions; but did not a
on the extensive plains of Trachis, which wer
jacent to Thermopylæ, before the Greeks
reached these straits. The Persian monarch
derstanding that an army of Greeks, headed by
king of Sparta, had taken post here in ord
dispute his passage, assembled his troops, an
camped on the plains of Trachis. But as X
had no particular quarrel with the Spartans, w
opposition, though it could not prevent, n
probably retard, the punishment of the Athen
he sent messengers to desire them to lay d
their arms; to which the Lacedæmonians l
ly replied, " Let Xerxes come and take th
The messengers then, according to the direc
they had received, offered them lands, on c
tion that they would become allies to the Pe
monarch. This proposal they treated with
tempt; and answered, " that the custom of
republic was, to conquer lands by valour
to acquire them by treachery." The messe
returned to Xerxes equally astonished at what
had seen and what they had heard; and decla
him the unexpected event of their commission
the extraordinary behaviour of the Spartans.
which the Persian monarch demanded Dema
their countryman, whom he had obliged to ac
pany him in this expedition, to explain th
tention of the Spartans. He replied, that
whole carriage and demeanour implied a d
mined resolution to fight to the last extremity

On the evening of the seventh day after X
had arrived at the straits of Thermopylæ, tw
thousand chosen men, commanded by Hyda
and conducted by the traitor Epialtes, (whc

d to lead them through another passage in
ountains,) left the Persian camp. The next
ng, however, they beheld the glittering
es of spears and helmets; and soon after
ved a thousand Phocians, whom the foresight
gilance of Leonidas had sent to defend this
ant, but generally unknown, pass. The
se shower of darts from the Persians com-
the Phocians to abandon the passage, and
tired to the highest part of the mountain.
ave the Persians an opportunity to seize the
hrough which they marched with the greatest
tion.

he mean time, by means of a deserter from
ersian camp, the Greeks under Leonidas
gn informed of the treachery of Epialtes,
e march of the enemy across the mountain.
las, therefore, immediately called an as-
, to deliberate on the measures to be pur-
consequence of this important and alarm-
formation. All the confederates of Pelo-
sus, the Spartans alone excepted, declared
necessary to abandon a post, which, on
nt of the double attack that would now be
against, it, could not be maintained with any
ble hopes of success. They considered it
most prudent measure they could adopt, in
esent situation of affairs, to return to the
ls of Corinth, and join their confederates,
end the Grecian peninsula from the fury of
rbarians. Leonidas explained the sentiments
Spartans; and said, that as glory was the
oject they had learned to obey, they were
pined at the price of their lives to purchase
ir country immortal renown. The Thespi-
eclared they would never forsake Leonidas;

and

and the Thebans were obliged to follow t
example.

It was now the dead of night, when the Spa
with unanimous consent, headed by Leon
and full of resentment and despair, marche
close battalion to surprise the Persian camp. Dr
ful was the fury of the Greeks; and greatly
structive to the Persians, on account of their
of discipline in having no advanced guard or w
Numbers fell by the Grecian spears: but far
perished by the mistakes of their own compani
who, in the confusion that now prevailed, c
not distinguish friends from foes. Wearied
slaughter, the Greeks penetrated to the royal t
but Xerxes, with his favourites, had fled to
further extremity of the encampment.

The dawn of day discovered to the Persia
dreadful scene of carnage, and the handfu
Greeks by whom this terrible slaughter had
made. The Spartans now retreated to the s
of Thermopylæ; and the Persians could sca
be compelled by menaces, stripes, and bl
to advance against them. The Greeks h
where the pass was widest, to receive the ch
of the enemy. The shock was dreadful.
the Greeks had blunted or broken their sp
they attacked with sword in hand, and made a
credible havock. Four times they dispelle
thickest ranks of the enemy, in order to obtai
sacred remains of their king Leonidas, whc
fallen in the engagement. At this crisis,
their unexampled valour was about to carry of
inestimable prize, the hostile battalions, unde
conduct of Epialtes, were seen descending
hill. All hopes now vanished; and nothin
mained but the last effort of a generous des

Colle

ecting themselves into a phalanx, with minds ute and undaunted, the Greeks retired to the west part of the strait; and, on a rising nd, took post behind the Phocian wall. As made this movement, the Thebans, whom alone had hitherto hindered from defection, ted to the Persians; declaring that their re- e had sent earth and water in token of their ission to Xerxes, and that they had been tantly compelled to resist the progress of his

In the mean time the Lacedæmonians and pians were assaulted on every side; the wall eaten down; and the enemy penetrated the h. But instant death befel the Persians that ed. In this last struggle, the most heroic determined courage was displayed by every an. What however they were able to do, had already performed, collectively and indi- lly; and it became impossible for them r to resist the impetuosity and weight of the and other missile weapons continually poured them. They therefore fell; not conquered, estroyed, but buried under a trophy of Per- arms. In this dreadful conflict the Persians wenty thousand men.

ro monuments were afterwards erected to the ory of these brave defenders of their country the spot where they fell. The inscription of ne announced, that four thousand Peloponn Greeks had arrested, in that place, the pro- of the whole Persian force: the other, in r of Leonidas and his three hundred fol- s, was characteristic of Spartan brevity, and ined only these memorable words: "Go, ger, and declare to the Lacedæmonians that ed here in obedience to their laws." The he-

roism

roism of the Greeks at Thermopylæ con
not a little, according to the opinion of I
Siculus, to the advantages which their natio
ward obtained. For the Persians, astoni
the desperate valour of the Spartans, co
it was scarcely possible to subdue a peop
undaunted a resolution; nor did it less ins
minds of the Greeks with courage, who fr
time became sensible, that valour and d
are capable of vanquishing the greatest tun
force.

While the military operations at Ther
were carrying on, the Grecian fleet hac
under the command of Eurybiades, a S
and had proceeded to Artemisium, the r
promontory of Eubœa, where it was st
The fleets of Persia, too numerous to be cc
in any harbour on the Grecian coast, had a
in the road that extends between Castar
Sepias, on the shores of Thessaly. The fi
of their fleet were sheltered by the Th
coast; but the others, amounting to s
number, rode at anchor, with their p
the sea. The vessels had been thus arrangc
the waters were still, the sky serene,
weather calm and favourable. On the
morning, however, after their arrival
Thessalian coast, a dreadful storm of thur
rain commenced; and the Hellespontin, a
east wind that blows in those seas for seve
together, raised the waves to a tremendous
The nearest vessels were saved by hauling
the shore; but the more remote, being
from their anchors, foundered at sea, sp
the promontory of Sepias, or were lost
shallows of Meliboea; and thus four hu

rsian galleys were destroyed. In a few days, ore, they quitted the dangerous station at Se- and with eight hundred ships of war that had d the storm, besides innumerable vessels of , sailed into the Pagasæan bay, and anchored road of Aphetæ, opposite to Artemisium.

soon as the Greeks perceived the dreadful of the storm upon the fleets of their ene- they poured out libations to "Neptune the er." The near approach, however, of such rior force damped the ardour of their reli- festivity, and they determined immediately re southward. But the defence of Eubœa ling entirely on their continuance at Arte- n, they were with much importunity pre- on to remain there.

he mean time the Persians, having recovered he terrors of the storm, prepared to engage recian fleet; and, as they doubted not of s, sent out two hundred of their swift-sailing to intercept them. These vessels, shaping ourse by the promontories of Cephaneus and tus, escaped the observation of the Greeks. is stratagem of the Persians was discovered n by Scyllias, a native of Sicyon, who deserted countrymen. The Greeks, therefore, deter- to continue in the harbour until midnight, en sail in quest of the fleet sent out to prevent escape. This project, however, was not put cution; for the boats that had been imme- dispatched to observe the progress of the ns returned before evening, without having ny of the enemy.

strength of the adverse parties being thus d nearer to an equality, the weaker seized portunity to display their courage in battle,

and their superior knowledge of naval
About sun-set the Greeks approached the
fleet that remained in the Pagasæan bay
offered them battle. And as the numbers
latter were, in their own opinion, very sul
for still enclosing and conquering the G
fleet, they did not decline the engagement.
Greeks formed their ships into a circle,
expected the Persians would surround them
then commenced the action. Though coop
a very narrow compass, and hemmed in
sides by the enemy, the Greeks in a shor
routed the Persians, took thirty of their shi
sunk many more; and had not the night co
few would have escaped. Immediately a
storm of thunder and rain succeeded, ar
Greeks entered the harbour of Artemisium
the Persians were driven to the coast of Th
The dead bodies and wrecks were driven
the sides of their vessels; and the barbarian
struck with consternation and dismay. The g
part of their fleet, however, again reached
gasæan bay. The ships that had been sent
the island of Eubœa, to intercept the Grecian
encountered the storm; and after having
driven about at random, either by the force
winds or the impetuosity of the currents, p
miserably amidst the shoals and rocks of
known coast.

The morning arose with different hopes a
ferent prospects to the contending parties.
Persians became sensible of the extent of the
fortunes; and the Greeks received a reinfor
of fifty-three ships from Athens. They deter
therefore, to attack the enemy again at s
They sailed at the appointed time; and,

l the squadron of the Cilicians from the
ally destroyed it, and returned again to
inm.

Persian commanders were deeply affected
: several disasters and disgraces, which
: all probability excite the indignation and
ce of their monarch against them. The
ges gained by the Greeks appeared to have
casioned by art or stratagem, or by favour
ght. They, therefore, resolved to choose
proper time for engaging. They sailed
: the third day at noon, formed in the
f a crescent. Animated by their former
s, the Greeks, though they probably would
se have chosen a more favourable opportu-
termined to hazard an engagement. The
ontinued for a longer time, and was more
, than on any former occasion. The
ns particularly signalized themselves;
five Grecian vessels, and destroying many
At length, however, the valour of the
triumphed; and the Persians, acknow-
their superiority, left them in possession of
. But this victory cost the Greeks very
Soon afterward they received an account of
tle of Thermopylæ, and of the glorious
f Leonidas; and found that the sea and
ngagements had both taken place the same
several reasons now conspired to induce the
to sail southward. Having therefore passed
he shore of Attica, they entered the strait
Saronic gulf, which divides the island of
: from the harbours of Athens, and there
st anchor.

es considered the departure of the Grecian
om Artemisium as equivalent to a victory:

he therefore commanded his naval forces to the coasts of Eubœa, and afterward possess selves of the harbours of Athens; while, head of his numerous and irresistible arn marched into the Attic territory. Many states of Greece now submitted to the au and power of the Persian king; and the d of liberty was left chiefly to Athens and S After ravaging and plundering the citi countries through which they passed, the army of Xerxes arrived in the Attic territory months after their passage over the Helle They proceeded to lay waste the country; ing the cities, and levelling the temples wi ground.

Notwithstanding the prodigies of valour had been achieved, the Athenians found it i sible to oppose the army of Persia, and to the coasts of Greece against the ravages hostile fleet. The inhabitants of Peloponnesu spairing likewise of being able to contend w enemy in the open field, had begun to erect across the isthmus of Corinth. Under the ficulties, the Athenians, by the advice of mistocles, embraced a resolution worthy of nerous and free people; they abandoned Persian fury their villages, their territory, walls, their city, and their temples, with t vered tombs of their ancestors. Their children, and aged parents, were transpor places of security; and all the Athenians c of using arms, or that might be in any n serviceable, embarked on board the fleet sta at Salamis. The Grecian armament, great creased since its engagements with the Pe amounted to three hundred and eighty ve

leet of Xerxes, which now took possession
thenian harbours southward of the strait
by the Greeks, having also received a
reinforcement, was restored to its ori-
nplement of twelve hundred sail.

s, notwithstanding the disasters and dis-
hich had hitherto attended his naval arma-
as still desirous of making another trial of
ne by sea. Against this, however, some
arty advised him, but in vain. When the
commanders perceived that the enemy
eparing to hazard another naval engage-
hey deliberated whether they should re-
their present situation, or proceed further
ulf, toward the isthmus of Corinth. This
inion most of the confederates embraced;
hat means they would be more able to
in any emergency, their respective cities.
mistocles, the Athenian admiral, sensible
atal effects that would thence ensue, and
possible it would be to prevent the disper-
the Grecian armament if they sailed from
, opposed this measure with all his in-
Eurybiades however, the Spartan admiral,
s chief in command, dissented from the
of Themistocles; and being provoked at
ession which the latter had made use of
him, endeavoured to strike the Athenian
s batoon. Upon this, Themistocles cried
Strike, but hear me." Another of the
monians observing, that the Athenians,
l no city to defend, ought to have no voice
council; Themistocles replied, "The
ns have indeed abandoned all their private
and possessions, for the general safety of
; but nevertheless they have two hundred

ships of war, which no Grecian state can re
and should the confederates persist in their pre
dangerous resolution, the Athenians will seek
themselves as fair a country, and as large and
a city, as that which they have left." The fi
ness of this discourse at once shook the inten
of the Greeks; and they resolved to remai
Salamis.

But the Peloponnesians, nevertheless, were
ready to return to their first determination. T
mistocles, by a master-stroke of policy, theref
sent privately to Xerxes to inform him, that
Greeks, seized with consternation and disma
the approach of danger, had determined to n
their escape under cover of the night; and
this was the time for the Persians to achieve
most glorious of their exploits, and, by intere
ing the flight of their enemies, accomplish t
destruction at once. Xerxes believed the rep
and the several passes were immediately secu
Aristides, who seems now to have availed him
of a general act of indemnity that had passed,
the first that brought intelligence of the block
made by the Persians. A battle was thereu
instantly resolved.

Confiding in their strength, and under the
cessity of using vigorous efforts, the Persians v
eager to engage. Accident, however, seem
have made the Greeks the assailants. At
break their order of battle was arranged.
Athenians were placed on the right, opposite
Phœnicians; the Lacedæmonians on the left,
posite the Ionians. As soon as the morning ar
sacred hymns and pæans began; the trum
sounded; and triumphant songs of war v
echoed through the fleet. The two armam

me

to engage. A Phœnician galley, decorated
han the rest, and eager to meet the Grecian
utstripped her companions; but being met
Athenian galley, at the first shock her sculp-
prow was shattered, and at the second she
ried in the waves. The battle soon became
l, and was vigorously maintained on both
Xerxes, seated upon a lofty throne, beheld
he shore this bloody and destructive scene.
ither the hope of acquiring the favour, nor
r of incurring the displeasure of the despot,
mpel the Persians to the performance of ac-
qual to those which the love of liberty and
r country excited in the Greeks. The fore-
f the Phœnician ships were soon dispersed
s; and the rest of the enemy's vessels being
into confusion, the Athenians surrounded
compressed them into a narrower space,
us increased their disorder. They were at
entangled in each other, rendered inca-
of acting, and, to use the expression of the
Eschylus, who was himself present in the
" were caught and destroyed like fish in a
In the mean time the Lacedæmonians, who
d the Ionians on the left, rendered the vic-
mplete. Many of the Asiatic Greeks desert-
Persians, and joined the Lacedæmonians;
declined to engage; and the rest were sunk
to flight. The sea is said to have been per-
overed with the quantity of the wreck and
ating carcases. Forty Grecian galleys were
in this engagement; but their crews were
saved aboard other ships, or by swimming
friendly shores of Salamis. When the rout
come total, Aristides with a body of Athe-
anded on the rocky isle of Psytalia, when
wer of the Persian infantry had been station

in order to destroy the shattered remains o
Grecian armament, and put all the Persians t
sword. As Xerxes beheld this dreadful havoc
started from his throne in wild agitation, ren
royal robes, and, in the first moments of retu
tranquillity, commanded his forces to their re
tive camps.

An anecdote is related of the queen of Ha
nassus, which is too remarkable and too celeb
to be omitted here. This princess had acce
nied Xerxes as an ally in the expedition a
Greece; and while pursued in this battle b
Athenian galley, she met a Persian vessel
manded by a tributary prince of Calydna in
with whom she was at variance. She darte
beak of her galley against the Lycian vessel
great dexterity, and buried it in the waves.
Athenian galley, deceived by this measure, e
artful and audacious, believed the vessel c
queen of Halicarnassus to be one of those th
deserted the Persian interest, and therefore q
the pursuit. Xerxes, who was a spectator
conduct, is said to have been so well please
it, that he cried out, "The soldiers behav
women in the conflict, and the women
soldiers."

In the mean time the confederates pursu
Persian fleet on every side: many were sun
more taken. Two hundred of the Persian
were burnt, and the rest dispersed; and thos
had allied themselves to the Persian monarch
ing the indignation and vengeance of the G
made the best of their way to their own co
To hinder any of the barbarians from escapir
Greeks, in the first emotions of triumph,
mined immediately to sail northward, to
down the bridge raised over the Hellespon

ıreept them on their return. This advice ven by Themistocles. Upon mature con- ion, however, it appeared that the Persians still sufficiently numerous to afford just ls of terror. To the cowardice and inexpe- of the Persians, and not to their want of th, the Greeks were indebted for the several ages obtained over them. But if the Per- hould be driven to despair, and to their for- alamities were added the impossibility of a , they might probably exert themselves han they had hitherto done, and retrieve past errors and misfortunes. These weighty ions suggested themselves to Eurybiades the n, and were immediately adopted by The- les and the Athenians. When Themisto- ıreeived that the Grecian chiefs were about niesce in this reasoning, he formed another e, which was put in execution. He sent his confidants to inform Xerxes, that the s intended to break down the bridge over the pont; and promising to delay, as much as ld, this project of his countrymen, advised rsian monarch to return into Asia with the t speed. Herodotus insinuates, that in act- us Themistocles had in view the safety of rsians, rather than the interest of Greece. seems plain from the nature of the action, his scheme was intended to oblige Xerxes to on the war of his own accord.

: situation of the Persian monarch was now that the least repulse might be sufficient to him abandon his Grecian expedition. Mar- was too well acquainted with the disposi- f his master, to suppose that he would con- much longer in a country that had been to him

him the scene of so many and great calami
which might probably be the destruction
self and all his forces. This artful courtie
fore, represented to Xerxes, that he had
fight against the Greeks, not with rafts of
but with soldiers and horses; that the Pe
lour had surmounted all difficulties, and
vincible sovereign was now master of Atl
main object of this expedition; that ha
complished the principal design of the e
it was time that the king should return
fatigues of war to the cares of governme
that with three hundred thousand chosen
would himself undertake to prosecute th
of Xerxes, and to complete the conquest o
An assembly was held the same night,
the rest of the courtiers coincided with M
and urged Xerxes to return into Asia.
sian monarch, therefore, while he foll
dictates of his own pusillanimity, pret
leave Greece with reluctance, and to obe
xious solicitude of his subjects.

The remains of the Persian fleet, dri
the coast of Greece, returned to the ha
Asia Minor; and afterwards assembled
dezvoused during the winter at Cumæ.
and his troops arrived in forty-five da
Hellespont, whither the transports had
dered. This journey was performed wit
hardship and fatigue. The rapidity of t
occasioned the deaths of many of his f
and, to fill up the measure of their cala
mine and pestilence prevailed amongst th
cepting, therefore, the three hundred
chosen men committed to Mardonius,
ment of whom guarded the Persian mon

arcely a remnant of so many millions sur-
The bridge erected over the Hellespont
much ostentation, had it remained entire,
ave exhibited a mortifying monument of
nity, and lost greatness; but this mag-
and stupendous fabric had been destroyed
ipest. And such is the obscurity and in-
with which this mighty monarch quitted
ian territory, compared with the grandeur
nphal entry displayed on his arrival, that
certainly known whether he crossed the
in a Phœnician ship of war, or in only a
oat. Xerxes travelled thence to Sardis;
n endeavouring to compensate for the dis-
nents of ambition, he buried himself in
s more infamous and degrading than all the
s which he had incurred in Greece, and
alamities that his subjects had inflicted on
r had suffered themselves. It must, how-
observed, that all the narratives of these
ions are of necessity taken from the Greek
ns; who would doubtless in some respects
al to their country, and prejudiced against
:s.

CHAP

CHAP. VI.

From the Retreat of Xerxes into Asia, to the Event of the Persian Invasion.

THE joy and elation of the Greeks afte victory at Salamis, so glorious, so impo and so unexpected, and that occasioned the retreat of such an immense army whiel seemed wholly irresistible, may be easily ceived. They soon understood, however, notwithstanding the return of Xerxes, Mar was left with three hundred thousand men, he had cantoned in Thrace, Macedon, and saly, for the winter, and with whom he int to take the field early in the spring, and try the fortune of war. This intelligence de the Athenians from bringing their wives anc dren home, as they intended, from Trœzen lamis, and Ægina; because their country probably be again exposed to the fury and n ment of the barbarians. But a few famili turned; while the rest remained on boar fleet, or went to reside with their friends i loponnesus.

It would naturally be expected that the G under the apprehensions of another form campaign, would have employed themselve ing the winter months in raising contribu levying and disciplining new forces, and conc proper and judicious measures for opposin troops of Mardonius. They, however, took of these steps. The winter was spent by th di

the spoil; assigning to the different com-
, the prizes of conduct and valour; per-
the last offices to those who had fallen in
nce of their country; celebrating their
nd festivals; and offering to the gods their
ivings and presents, for protecting them
e myriads of Xerxes. These last consisted
, statues, and other ornaments of silver and
The rewards bestowed on the generals were
eaths of pine, laurel, or olive; which made
s the Persian exclaim, "Heavens! against
ave we come to fight? Insensible to in-
hey fight only for glory!" The states of
being assembled in the temple of Neptune,
to confer the customary honours on him
the free votes of their leaders had deserved
ch chief was directed to write the name of
he supposed most worthy, and also of
om he thought deserving the second re-
Each commander put his own name in the
ce, and that of Themistocles in the second;
nstance which evinced the superior worth
duct of the Athenian admiral, who went
to Lacedæmon, where he was received with
atest honour and respect. The Spartans,
s they were to their own leaders, after
decreed the prize of valour to Eurybiades,
d that of prudence to Themistocles, and
d him with a wreath of olive. They also
ed him with the most magnificent chariot in
; and when he returned to Athens, he was
d by five hundred horse, a honour never
paid to any stranger.

many of the islanders had again become ob-
s by their forwardness and zeal in the cause
ia, the Athenian commander sailed with a

small squadron to the Cyclades, laid th
heavy contributions, and, as it is said, w
participation or knowledge of his col
command, enriched himself with the sp
Parians avoided all public payment, b
Themistocles. The Andrians alone,
islanders on the European side of the A
fused to pay any thing. "I come," said
nian, "to you, accompanied by two po
vinities, Persuasion and Necessity." "
plied they, "we also have divinities on
Poverty and Impossibility." In consec
this reply, siege was laid to their princ
but without effect; and the fleet was
to return.

On the approach of spring, Mardonius
B. C. 479. to take the field. His army co
Medes, Persians, Scythians, and
and though greatly inferior in n
the myriads which Xerxes had brou
Persia, it was not on that account the l
dable. But before the Persian general l
saly, he determined to try what he could
negotiation. He sent therefore Alexan
of Macedon, a tributary and ally of X
treat with those Athenians that had re
their city; and in the name of the Per
narch, to offer them proposals of peac
his arrival, the Athenians received him in
friendly manner; but delayed to call an
to hear and answer his discourse until the
who had been apprised of the intentions o
nius, should send ambassadors to assist at
sultations. When the parties were all c
Alexander opened his commission; and
the Athenians, that Mardonius had receiv

the Persian monarch, intimating his will
em in possession of their territories, their
and laws, provided they would desert
l cause of Greece, and enter into an alli-
him. And to induce them to embrace
ing though fallacious offer, Mardonius
ed to add weight to these considerations
ng, how impossible it would be for the
ever to conquer, or *always* to resist, a
possessed of so much power and un-
esources.

acedæmonian ambassadors spoke next.
that Sparta having engaged in a bloody
ictive conflict to avenge the quarrel of
ian allies, it would be unjust and dis-
e in the Athenians to abandon their
l confederates, when hostilities had been
ver all Greece on their account. They
regret which the Spartans felt for the
s of the Athenians, who had been de-
heir houses and their harvests; and as a
ieir regard, offered, in conjunction with
to maintain their wives and children
continuance of the war, and afford them
tance in their power. The Athenians
iberated on these propositions, answered
s by the voice of Aristides; who, as ar-
ief magistrate, presided over the assem-
the Macedonian they said, "that as
well acquainted with the strength of

desert the cause of Greece, or forget the inju which the Persians have done them; but tl trusting to the protection and assistance of th gods whose temples and altars the impious tyrant polluted and destroyed, we will resist him to last extremity. And you, Alexander, be not ag the bearer of such messages as these; lest we l get the respect we owe you as our friend, and c sider not the sacred ties of hospitality by wh we are reciprocally connected." To the La dæmonians they replied, "That they were s prised the Spartans should entertain so mea opinon of them; that neither the richest pos sions on earth, nor all the wealth of the Per king, should seduce them from the common fence of Greece; that without being troublesc to the allies, they hoped to provide for their fa lies; but requested that the army of the L dæmonians might march with all expeditior wards Bœotia, and being joined by that of Athenians, endeavour to stop the progres of M donius, who would immediately proceed so ward, and invade Attica."

Mardonius did not deceive the expectation the Athenians. According to the orders o master, he marched directly towards Attica, by same road that Xerxes had before taken. In mean time, an habitual hesitation and tardi prevailed in the councils of the Spartans. Ma nius had advanced into Bœotia, and the Athen in vain expected the Lacedæmonian army. Athenians were therefore once more compelle desert their country, and to retire with their ef to Salamis. This measure, however, was prob not so grievous on the present, as on the former ca

Grecian fleet now commanded the seas.
l of Salamis the Persian army could not
. Thither all their families and effects
ed; and Mardonius, in the tenth
the departure of Xerxes from the Gre-
y, retook Athens.
uct of the Peloponnesians, and espe-
the Lacedæmonians, on this occasion,
ngrateful, and dastardly. They had for-
thmus with additional walls and ram-
believing themselves secure behind the
y had raised, they equally disregarded
s or resentment of their northern allies,
enians exhibited the greatest magna-
heroism. Fugitives in the island of
l deprived of their allies, the Persian
ught the opportunity favourable for
nother negotiation, to draw the Athe-
the general confederacy of Greece.
rms which the Macedonian king had
ed, were now repeated. The minister,
ıtian Greek, named Murichides, was
an audience by the council of five
ycidas, who promoted the referring of
l to the people, was stoned to death,
e and family, by a tumultuous crowd.
ıe popular zeal against tyranny, and
ering enmity against Persia. The law
nowever, was observed as to the person
des; and he was permitted to depart
eiving injury or insult. Mardonius,
g laid waste and plundered, a secon
thenian territories, cities, villas,
urned into Bœotia.
had now been sent from Salami

Sparta, in behalf of Athens, Platæa, and M
These ambassadors remonstrated warmly wi
Lacedæmonians, on the shameful neglect of
engagements. The Spartans were at that
celebrating the solemn feast of Hyacinthia;
furnished them with a pretext for delaying a
swer for several days. The Athenian ambas
thinking themselves insulted and their c
betrayed, determined to depart immediately.
they previously expressed to the Spartans
sense of such treatment; declaring that the
nians would join the Persians, and then the
ponnesians must become sensible, when too
that the wall across the isthmus would only
a partial and feeble defence; and, though it
secure them on the side of the land, coul
protect their coasts from the Persian arm
reinforced by the Athenian fleet.

This threat, or the returning sense of
utility, urged the Lacedæmonians, at leng
take the field. Five thousand Spartans, ea
tended by seven Helotes, thus composing an
of forty thousand fighting men, left the city si
in the evening, under the command of Pau
the guardian and kinsman of Pleistarchus, s
Leonidas. Having marched beyond the ist
they joined the army of the Athenians an
allies: and the whole heavy-armed troops am
ed to nearly forty-thousand; while the light-
were the thirty-five thousand Helotes atte
on the Spartans, and about as many more
to each soldier) attended the other divisions.

The Greeks having marched into Beotia,
post at the foot of mount Citharon, directl
posite to the enemy. Here the hostile armi
mained eleven days encamped, before the
ter

any thing of moment against each other.
is had judiciously left the passage of the
s open to the Grecian troops, to draw
ossible into the champaign country; where
ic horse would be able to act with most
, and make the victory more easy. But
would not quit his situation; and the
general durst not attempt to force his
He therefore gave orders to Masistius,
nander of the Persian cavalry, to advance
he horse, to harass the Greeks, and en-
to make some impression upon them.
ian cavalry used missile weapons; darts
, or both. They generally attacked by
lies in succession. They were vehement
and never continued the contest long;
ie enemy remained firm and impregnable,
to prepare for another charge.
side most exposed to the enemy's cavalry,
ee thousand soldiers from the rocky di-
Megara. These Masistius attacked; and
vearied them by the succession of fresh
ho approached sufficiently near to throw
ts and use opprobrious language and then
he Megarians were compelled to send to
s for succour. The Spartan general ad-
he whole army, to know if any of their
ould exchange situations with the Mega-
The Athenians alone offered themselves,
d not long occupied this post, before they
tacked by the enemy's cavalry; whom
elled, killing Masistius. Hereupon a ter-
flict took place for the dead body; but in
, the Persian cavalry were obliged to

reeks, finding themselves in want of fresh
water,

water, determined to decamp. They proc
therefore along the foot of mount Cithæron,
they came to a plain in the vicinity of the
of Hysia in Platæa. Near this place were
gentle eminences, and the copious fountain
phia. This last possession was a necessary re
to the Greeks; as the enemy, by the great su
rity of their cavalry, commanded both sides
Æsopus.

It might have been expected that men
to hazard every thing in defence of their c
would have preserved in the field perfect
ment and unanimity among themselves. T
cedæmonians, as the most considerable peo
Greece, were universally allowed to take the
wing of the army. The Athenians, unque
ably the next in consequence, thought them
entitled to the left wing; but the Tegeans,
were acknowledged to be excellent soldiers
had always obtained the second honours
field, disputed this point of honour with
This quarrel, ridiculous as it may appear,
have been attended with serious consequen
the general safety of Greece, had not the
nian commanders acted with wisdom and di
The Tegeans, in a studied oration, vindicated
claim to precedency: and supported it by
detail of the great and honourable actions of
ancestors. Upon which Aristides, the Ath
commander, replied, "We understand th
Greeks are here assembled to fight again
enemies of their country, not to dispute abou
cedency. But were we inclined to boast
glorious deeds of our ancestors, we might p
make mention of actions equally honourable
those which the Tegeans have related. L

of Marathon efface any suspicions that we
erior to them. In a moment like the pre-
owever, we consider all contests on such a
t as unbecoming and unseasonable. Place
efore, O Spartans! wheresoever you think
. And, wherever our station shall be, rest
i that the Athenians will defend the cause
eece, like brave men and lovers of their
y. Command, therefore; and depend upon
bedience." These words were scarcely
, when the whole Lacedæmonian army cried
iat the Athenians were worthy of the post of
r, in preference to the Arcadians; and ac-
gly they assumed it without opposition.
army was then marshalled in the following
Five thousand Spartan citizens, attended
ty-five thousand light-armed Helotes, held
st place: next to these, were five thousand
æmonians of the other towns of Laconia, ac-
mied by five thousand Helotes. The Te-
, in number fifteen hundred, held the next
: then five thousand Corinthians, fourteen
nd two hundred from the inferior states of
e, and eight thousand Athenians.
soon as Mardonius was informed that the
:s had filed off towards Platæa, he moved and
ıped over against them; still keeping the
ıs in his front. Having summoned the prin-
officers of his army, he informed them
intention to attack the enemy on the next
and directed them to prepare accordingly.
news was brought to the camp of the
derates by Alexander, king of Macedon;
the Greeks thereupon held a consultation,
ıe manner in which they should resist
attack of the Persian general. Pausanias
proposed

proposed a change in the order of the G army; and that the Athenians, who alor experienced the onset of the Persians, shoul the right wing, and the Lacedæmonians tl Aristides and his countrymen embraced th with joy and exultation. At day-break Mar perceiving the confederates in motion, he d the intended attack. Changes were also m the order of the Persian army. This day pa evolutions; and the enemy's infantry neve into action against the Greeks. Their c however, harassed the more accessible p the Grecian line without ceasing. They approached to discharge their arrows, and hastily retired: but they thereby maintai constant alarm; and, while they inflicted wounds, afforded little opportunity for re But they directed a more serious attack again part of the Lacedæmonian line which guard Gargaphian fountain; and made themselves m of the place.

The Grecian army, therefore, being thu prived of water, and provision also begin fail them, a decampment was rendered ind sable. It was determined to occupy a n slip of ground towards the source of the Æ and confined between that river and mou thæron. The obscurity of midnight was c as the most convenient time for effectin purpose; but the Greeks were by no mean nimous in this measure. Anompharetu Spartan, the next in command to Pausania declared that neither he nor the division wh commanded should ever flee from the e The confederate army was therefore disper so many different directions, that the next m

ated the appearance rather of a flight, or a
an of a regular march.
lonius, having received intelligence of the
re of the Greeks, doubted not that they
ndoned their camp, and made this preci-
etreat, through fear of the Persian arms.
orders, therefore, to his soldiers to pursue
ing foe, and to complete the conquest. The
monians and Athenians were still within
h; the former at the foot of mount Ci-
, the latter on the plain. Having sent his
auxiliaries against the Athenians, he ad-
at the head of the Persian troops to attack
edæmonians. No contrast could be greater
t which the two hostile armies afforded.
rbarians hurried on with all the haste and
n of an ill-disciplined multitude, eager to
certain victory: the Lacedæmonians,
y covered with their shields, silently ob-
he sacrifices. As soon as Pausanias per-
that the sacred omens were favourable,
pitions to the Grecian interest, the Lace-
ians proceeded with intrepidity to close
. The Persians, who had been reinforced
ie Sacæ, a Scythian tribe, sustained the
vith great courage. The Greeks slew im-
numbers; but fresh troops still succeeded
ght, making a most hideous noise. Mar-
mounted upon a white steed of great
and swiftness, signalized himself by his
nd determined bravery. A thousand horse-
onsisting of the flower of the Persian nobility,
us of imitating his example, and of emu-
is fame, constantly attended him. Had
l o. the Persians been equal to their cou-
: had their troops been regularly and pro-
perly

perly disciplined, the victory would either been against the Greeks, or must at least been obtained with more difficulty, and a gre loss of men. But the Persians acted witl union or concert; and attacking the Lacedæ nians by parties only, were easily defeated. Athenians, endeavouring to join the Spartan an engaged the Bœotians and other Greeks, wh Mardonius had sent against them. The num and courage of the Persian troops, however, k the battle doubtful, until Mardonius was sl The death of the general was immediately f lowed by the defeat of the Persians, and by flight of the barbarian army. The Athen also routed the Greeks who were allied with fought under the Persian banners. Artaba the next in command to Mardonius, and aga whose advice these measures were pursued, de ing all lost, retired with forty thousand m marched with great expedition to Thrace, a arriving at the Hellespont, passed over into As

The rest of the Persian army withdrew into t camp, strengthened the works before thrown and defended themselves with great bravery aga the Lacedæmonians. The Athenians, howe coming up, vigorous efforts were used on b sides; but an assault at length succeeded, and attended with a horrid slaughter. Of three hun thousand men, whom Mardonius brought into field, scarcely three thousand escaped, exclusi of those who retreated under Artabazus. number of the Greeks that fell in this eng ment is uncertain, but must have been c siderable.

The event of this battle not only comple freed the Grecians from the terrors of servit

made them masters of greater wealth than could ever have hoped to possess. When es left the army for Asia, he gave most of ches and valuable furniture to Mardonius, his al and brother-in-law. The rest he divided g his inferior favourites. Couches magni- ly embroidered; tables of gold and silver; n bowls and goblets; stalls and mangers of ; chains, bracelets, scymitars, some of solid others set with precious stones; and many s of Persian money, which began after that and continued several years, to be current eece; all came into the possession of the con- rs. The tenth of the whole spoil was con- ted to the Gods. Peculiar presents were d to Jupiter at Olympia, to Neptune at the us, and to Apollo at Delphi. A tenth of the inder was divided amongst the generals. After h prizes were distributed among the bravest of rvivors, according to their respective achieve- s.

ving buried their dead with all the circum- es of funereal pomp, and raised trophies to nemorate their success, the confederates, as been customary after a victory, determined anish those who had deserted the cause of ce and allied themselves with the Persian rch. With this view Pausanias marched im- ately to Thebes, and laid waste the country. Thebans at first attempted to make a de- ; but, after mature deliberation, capitulated, surrendered the leaders of the Median faction. e thought to have purchased their ransom with ey: but in this they were disappointed; for sias, disdaining their proposals, carried them orinth, and caused them to be put to death.

The battle of Platæa is said to have happe
the twenty-second of September. The sa
another battle, neither less glorious nor le
sive, was fought between the same nations
promontory of Mycale in Ionia, opposite to
of Samos. After the shattered remains of t
sian armament had been driven from the
coast, and obliged to seek protection in the
Asia Minor, the confederates were encour
the Ionians to send their fleet into those parts
expectation that all the Asiatic Greeks woul
upon revolt from the Persian interest, and
the cause of Greece. The Grecian fleet, th
steered eastward; under the command of
chides the Spartan king, and Xantippus the A
admiral. The commanders of the Persian arr
as soon as they were informed of the arriv
hostile fleet in those seas, wishing to avoid
naval engagement, stood in for the shor
sought the protection of an army of sixty t
men, which had been left for the defence
The Greeks, perceiving their intent, res
attack them on shore; while Leotychides
towards the coast, endeavoured to occasion
amongst the Ionians. After this, the Greek
barked their whole force capable of acting
which consisted of the greatest part of the
The Persians, having received information
Samians had been intriguing with the Gre
armed them; but confiding very much
Milesians, they intrusted to them the ca
passes through the mountains, by whic
emergency they could retreat. These dis
being made, they prepared to defend thei
cations. The Grecian forces marched in
lums: the one, consisting of the Athenian

Sicyonian, and Trœzenian troops, held the long the shore; the other, composed of the emonians and their allies, made a compass e hills. The former arrived first, and, after inate and bloody conflict, forced the Persian about the same time that the Lacedæmo- attacked them in the rear. The Samians, unarmed, exerted themselves against the s; and the Milesians, who were to have d the passes, attacked the Persians as soon fled, and killed them, or made them prison- Tigranes, the general of the Persian troops, vo of the principal naval commanders, were the slain. When the slaughter had ceased, ersian ships and camp, and all the valuable es contained in them, became the prize of tors. Ionia regained its freedom, and the Asi- st was abandoned by the Persian monarch. the Greeks had taken every thing of value the enemy's camp and fleet, they set fire to ips.

er this signal blow, which completed the f the Persian expedition against Europe, and d liberty to the fairest portion of Asia, the n fleet returned to Samos. Here they de- ed whether the Ionians should be transport- Greece, and have those countries bestowed hem which had sided with the Persians. But thenians opposed this measure; and insisted as they were Athenian colonies, no other n state had a right to interfere in their dis-

The Greeks then determined to sail to the pont, and destroy the bridges; but they them already broken down by the weather e current. Winter approaching, Leotychi- e Spartan commander, with all the Peloponnesians,

nesians, returned to Greece; but the Athe under the command of Xantippus, determin make other attempts before they laid down arms. They therefore sailed to the Chers and besieged Sestos, where the Persians ha lected all their force. This siege continued time; but a famine prevailing among the ga they endeavoured to make their escape, a place was given up.

The Persian expedition against Greece wa concluded; after two campaigns which cover Greeks with glory, and which will ever be re among the most memorable in the annals o

C

CHAP. VII.

airs of Greece, from the final Overthrow of ie Persians to the Thirty Years' Truce

common fears which had formed and up- ld a partial confederacy of the Grecian states, spelled by the decisive victories obtained at and Mycale; and the symptoms of jealousy cord between the two principal communi- Greece, which had already appeared in the ion of the Athenian and Spartan fleets, broke h fresh virulence after they returned home. Athenians brought back their families to ; but when they came to resume possession r city, they found the walls destroyed, and few houses remaining, which had been re- for the use of the principal Persian officers. herefore determined to rebuild the city with eatest expedition, and with some degree of ficence. The events of the late invasion not fail to impress the Athenians with the ity of providing for their future security in a mple manner: what others, however, con- l as only the means of indispensable precau- nd defence. Themistocles viewed as the cer- sage of the political greatness of Athens, to he probably looked for the foundation of his uture fame. According to his suggestion, thing else was postponed, until the fortifica- which were put under his direction, should mpleted. A larger space was marked out for ew walls, and the work was prosecuted with nce and vigour.

While the Athenians were thus employe
pairing the ravages of war, and fortifying t
against all future attacks, the Lacedæmoni
an embassy, to remonstrate against a desig
culiarly dangerous and alarming to the otl
cian states. The ostensible reason allege
this undertaking of the Athenians, was, t
the late invasion the Greeks had posses
town of impregnable strength, they have
impossible to drive Xerxes from their
B.C. 477. As it was the avowed policy, not Lacedæmonians only, but of all t ponnesians, to deter the Athenians f ecuting their purpose; the latter apprehen those states, on finding their arguments ine might recur to arms, while Athens was yet dition so utterly incapable of opposing them. therefore judged more advisable to tempori the conduct of Themistocles on this occ been considered as a master-piece of policy Spartan ministers who brought the remon it was replied, that the Athenians would s bassadors to Lacedæmon, who would sa Spartans on the subject of their message this answer the ambassadors were dismiss apparently satisfied.

Themistocles and some other Athenia accordingly charged with this commission t the former hastened his journey to that c previously intimated to the Athenian sen it would be proper to detain one or both of leagues, until the walls of Athens were r the full height. When he arrived at Lac he delayed to open the business of his emb leging that he waited for his colleagues, w

pected daily. In the mean time, the Athenians osecuted the work with the most diligent appli- tion: the citizens toiled with the slaves; women d children assisted all that they were able; nei- er night nor day was the business intermitted; d materials were procured from sepulchres and blic buildings. The Lacedæmonians being in- rmed that the building of the wall was still carried n, and that the colleagues of Themistocles had length arrived, summoned the ambassadors be- re them. Themistocles argued that it did not come a great state to regard vague and idle ru- mours; that his colleagues had assured him of the ontrary to what the Lacedæmonians affirmed; nd that the Spartans might send deputies with the Athenian ambassadors, to take cognisance of the eal state of things, whilst he himself would re- main as a hostage, and be answerable for the vent. The Spartans, therefore, agreed to dispatch a second embassy to Athens, consisting of some of their most respectable citizens. These men had no sooner arrived at their destination, than they were taken into custody as pledges for the safe re- turn of Themistocles, who by this time was in- formed that the walls were completed. Throwing off the mask, therefore, Themistocles now appeared in the Lacedæmonian assembly, avowed the whole transaction, and declared that the Athenians were most competent to decide what their own interest and the general welfare of Greece demanded. Athens was now in a condition to repel any foreign or domestic foe; and if the Spartans entertained any resentment for this measure, which, while it conduced to the public interest, was indeed calcu- lated to displease private ambition, their anger would be equally unjust and useless; and conclu-

ded with intimating that the Athenians
dismiss their ambassadors until he was

Whatever might be the indignation o
dæmonians on this occasion, they deem
prudent to suppress their feelings. Th
dors of each state were then permitte
home; but the conduct of Themistoc
affair laid the foundation of that unrelen
with which he was afterward persecu
Lacedæmonians.

The next concern of Themistocles wa
the Athenian harbours. He observe
port of Phalericum was small, narrow,
venient; and therefore advised his fell
to render Piræus the largest and mos
haven in Greece, and to unite the city t
walls. His address, eloquence, and bi
seasonably applied in diverting the re
the Spartans; who, though less jeal
than of military power, were scarcel
from entering Attica with an armed
the Athenians persuaded the Lacedæm
their allies, that the common interest
cian confederacy required that a large ar
harbour should be formed; in which th
fleets of Greece might rendezvouse, to
designs of the enemy. In the mean tin
was carried on with great spirit and ac

B.C. 470. in less than twelve months the l
der the care and direction of Th
became the best and most com

arsenal that the world had his thereto
new walls were sufficiently broad to adn
riages abreast: and were formed of l
of marble, squared, and exactly fitt
cement; and the outer stones were f

l by cramps of iron fixed with lead. The
ians also determined, by the advice of The-
cles, to increase their fleet yearly, by the ad-
of twenty ships.

is great politician was not, however, very
ulous with regard to the means employed for
enting the power of Athens, and lessening
of Lacedæmon and the other Grecian states.
lay he declared that he had a design to com-
cate which was of the greatest importance;
hat, as it would require secrecy and dispatch
ry it into execution, he could not reveal it to
people. He desired, therefore, that a proper
n should be chosen, to whom his proposal
t be made known, and who might direct by
dvice, and confirm by his authority, the project.
ides, as the best and wisest of the citizens, was
imously appointed to decide on this proposal.
nistocles therefore informed him, that his de-
was to set fire to the fleet of the other Grecian
s, which was at that time in a neighbouring
, and thus procure to Athens the unrivalled
reignty of the seas. This project Aristides dis-
ed; and, returning to the Athenian people, told
n that the proposal of Themistocles was highly
ul to Athens, but that at the same time
ing could be more unjust or dishonourable.
Athenians, therefore, at one rejected it.

bout this time, the Lacedæmonians proposed in
council of the Amphictyons, that every city and
e of Greece which had not fought against the
sians, should lose the right of sending deputies
that assembly. This motion was particularly
nded against the Argians and Thebans; in
es that, by thus removing two of the most pow-
ul states who were greatly inimical to the Spar-
tan

tan interest, the Lacedæmonian influence i thenceforward govern the assembly. Ther cles, perceiving the intentions of the Spart making this motion, opposed it as much as pos and obtained a decree, that it would be im and unjust to deprive a Grecian state of its inh rights, on account of the crimes and misco of those who at any particular time directe councils.

Aristides, having nothing more at heart tha honour and advantage of his country, endeav to quell the spirit of faction, which now pre much among the Athenians. He proposed every citizen should have an equal right to th vernment; and that the archons should be c from the body of the people, without prefere distinction. This measure was agreeable t parties. The states of Greece, finding it req to be always upon their guard against the P monarch, proposed a general taxation, propo ed to the maintenance of a regular and ade force, and levied according to the abilities of community. Aristides was intrusted with commission; which he executed with so fidelity and activity, that all the Greeks satisfied with his conduct, and his taxatior universally styled, "The happy lot of Gre When this business was finished, he obliged a Grecian states to swear that they would obser articles of their grand alliance.

As many Grecian towns, not only in Asia M but also in Europe, were still under the dom of Persia, a fleet was assembled, to the pri command of which Pausanias the Spartan ad was appointed. Aristides, and Cimon the s Miltiades, commanded the Athenian squa

as the first time that Cimon, who was yet
oung, was placed in a situation in which he
xhibit the virtues and courage of which he
ssessed. He had formerly suffered himself
nprisoned until he could pay the fine impo-
n his father; and by this filial act of duty,
resages of his magnanimity and goodness of

After he was liberated from prison, he
d himself to Themistocles, and seems to
upplanted him. The fleet sailed first to
; the garrison of which being cut off from
port and assistance from the Persians by the
superiority which the Greeks had at sea,
more solicitous to obtain for themselves
ible terms of capitulation, than to defend the
or their king. Most of the Grecian cities
lso rescued from the Persians, with very
rouble. The fleet then proceeded to the
ont and the Propontis; and took Byzan-
he of key communication between Europe
a, and the grand deposit of the Persian arms.
ge of this place was obstinate; but at length
lls were stormed, and an immense booty,
everal persons of the royal blood, fell into
ids of the conquerors.

haughty disposition of the Spartan admiral
en elated with his victory at Platæa; and
success against Byzantium still further aug-
l it. The tenth of the spoil, which had
llotted him as general, raised him above the
y required by the institutions of his country;
e wealth and riches found in Byzantium, not
contributed to occasion his ruin. Conceiv-
mself to be too great to continue a subject,
ed at the regal power, through the assistance
Persian monarch, the enemy of his country.

An

An Eretrian of the name of Gongylus; well acquainted with the Persian language and customs, became his principal confidant. To him he intrusted the Persian nobles taken in Byzantium This man, with his prisoners, escaped across the Bosphorus; and carried a letter to Xerxes, in which Pausanias, after mentioning his restoration of the captive princes as an indubitable mark of his sincerity, offered the Persian monarch to assist him in conquering Greece, provided he would give him his daughter in marriage, and allow him to hold that country as a dependent province. As the subjugation of Greece was an object which Xerxes had greatly at heart, he is said to have been greatly pleased with these proposals; and to have sent Artabazus, a nobleman of consequence, and in whom he could confide, to treat and cooperate with the traitor Pausanias.

The Spartan admiral, however, acted with the inconsistency and precipitancy of a man under the delusion of ambition, or guided by evil counsel. He became difficult of access to his colleagues, disdained to concert measures with them, which they were to execute; the conquered barbarians were his guards; and he punished the slightest offence in the allied army with a rigour hitherto unknown, and therefore insupportable to Grecian troops. He kept the fierce spirits of the Spartans indeed in subjection, but without any degree of moderation; for the distinctions shown to them served only to exasperate and inflame the minds of the confederates, whom he would not permit to forage, to draw water, or cut straw for their beds until his countrymen had been supplied with these articles.

The intolerable pride and insolence of Pausanias disgusted and provoked all the Greeks: but more especially

ly the Ionians: who complained, that they
sooner been delivered from the yoke
ia, than they were made to suffer under
e galling tyranny of Sparta. On the con-
he justice of Aristides, and the candour
nerosity of Cimon, won the affections both
ers and men. The allies saw that the
ns were far more powerful at sea than the
monians; and therefore applied themselves
Athenian commanders for redress and pro-
promising for the future to acknowledge
as the first city of Greece. Upon this
s told them, that he was convinced of not
e reasonableness but the necessity of their
l; yet, as he wished not to hazard the
or honour of his country, by attempting to
a what might not succeed, he would not
with their request, until by some public
they had proved their sincerity, and fixed
ncurrence of all the troops beyond the pow-
etracting. After this declaration, Uliades
ntagoras, the commanders of the fleets of
and Chios, the bravest of all the mari-
lies, insulted the galley of Pausanias, at the
f the Grecian fleet; and when the Spartan
l reproached and threatened them, they de-
im to thank Fortune for her favours at Pla-
e memory of which victory alone restrained
eeks from punishing his arrogance and cru-
These words reechoed through the fleet; and
he signal of general revolt. The different
ons of Asia and the Hellespont sailed from
tations, joined the ships of Uliades and An-
, abjured the tyranny of Sparta and the in-

neering conduct of Pausanias, did the Lacedæmonians lose that pre-eminence which they had hitherto maintained, while Athens obtained the supremacy by the prudence and virtue of Aristides.

On being apprised of the conduct and treachery of Pausanias, the Spartans recalled him to be tried for his life: but his immense wealth enabled him to corrupt the judges of his country; and the ephori pretending there was not sufficient evidence against him, he was only degraded from his office. This censure, however, did not deter him from the traitorous designs in which he was engaged. He still continued to negotiate and correspond with Artabazus; and at length began to temper with the Helotes and Messenians, those oppressed slaves who were ever ready to rebel against the capricious and tyranny of their unrelenting masters. But as it exceeded even the opulence and effrontery of Pausanias, to corrupt and influence the whole public, he was again impeached of treason to Greece; and his accusers, in consequence of an event that took place, had it in their power to make good their charge against him. An unhappy youth, named Argilius, who lived with Pausanias as the minister of his pleasures, was intended to be the victim of that monster's ambition. Pausanias appointed this man to carry a letter to Artabazus, in which, after having as usual, explained the state of his affairs, he hinted to him to put the bearer to death. The youth, having observed that none of the messengers of Pausanias ever returned, determined to open the letter. Finding by the contents the fate he was to have met with, he was filled with resentment; and carried the letter directly to the enemies of Pausanias, who prudently advised him to take refuge in the temple of Neptune, [illegible]

[illegible] pect

that his master would soon follow him. In
an time, a double tent was set up, in one
which certain Spartans were concealed, and
other Argilius received his master, who
expostulate with him. By their mutual
hes, the Spartans who heared them became
witnesses against Pausanias, so that when he
d to Sparta the ephori resolved to imprison
But some of his friends giving him intelli-
f their design, he fled for protection to the
of Minerva. It being unlawful to take a
from that asylum, the Lacedæmonians were
ss how to act. The mother of Pausanias,
er, taking a tile in her hand, came to the
, and placed it at the door. The Spartans
the hint from her conduct, followed the ex-
and blocked up the entrance; and in this
starved him to death.

fate of Pausanias, in a short time, involved
Themistocles. He was fast advancing to the
ient of the same authority at home, which
egrity and merit of Aristides had procured
for his country and himself; when com-
arrived from Sparta, charging him with
conspired with Pausanias against the liber-
Greece. The known resentment of the
monians against Themistocles sufficiently
s the reason why they who had been so
in convicting Pausanias, should be ready to
to justice his supposed accomplice. But
we reflect upon the abilities and courage
ed by Themistocles in the decisive victory
mis; his counsels and address in fortifying
y with impregnable strength; his foresight
tivity in procuring the Athenians a fleet
which no nation could contend; and his
ism and merit in saving Athens from the

formidable invasion recorded in history; we not conceive how his countrymen could adn accusation of this nature, made against him l avowed enemies. He had not indeed the int and virtue of Aristides; but he was not perh heinously guilty as the Lacedæmonians repres him. In fact, Pausanias had really communi his designs to Themistocles; but the Athenia jected his proposals with the utmost indign Themistocles, however, had concealed the d either because he considered it base and disb able to divulge the secret intrusted to him, cause be imagined it impossible for such ill-co ed schemes to produce and effect. Be that may, the Athenians, upon the accusation Spartans, banished Themistocles by the ostra He retired to Argos; and it is not improbabl he might have been recalled to Athens befo expiration of the term to which he was sente had the Lacedæmonians given his countryme sure to reconsider what they had done.

Pausanias having suffered, the Spartans infc the Athenians, that from the papers found possession of that traitor, the guilt of Themis was fully authenticated: that it was not suffi therefore, to have driven him from Athens decree which might at any time be repealed crimes against the general confederacy of G ought to be brought before the amphictyonic cil: and that the punishment should be dea perpetual banishment. The Athenians dis fully complied with this demand; and Them cles, being informed of his condemnation, sai Corcyra. His enemies still continuing to p him, he fled to the opposite coast of Epiru took refuge amongst the barbarous Molo

Adr

king of that country, had on a former
ought the assistance of the Athenians,
mistocles was in the plenitude of his
it had been rejected. Admetus was
e when Themistocles came to implore
on; and, on his arrival, was surprised
adversary a suppliant to him for an asy-
hen the king appeared, Themistocles
oung son of the monarch in his arms, sat
ng the household gods, and besought the
and hospitality of Admetus. The king,
th sorrow and compassion to see the
an of Greece in this humiliating condi-
him immediately from the ground, and
o afford him every relief in his power.
Lacedæmonians and Athenians, therefore,
nand Themistocles, he refused to deliver
Thus did the Athenian exile continue to
close of life in indolence and retirement;
learned to pardon and despise the ingra-
his country, he expected that he should
at least forgotten by them. But the
and Lacedæmonians would not permit
nain in quiet; and still required Adme-
render him, under pain of their dis-
his prince informing his unhappy guest
emma to which he was thus reduced by
. Themistocles resolved, without hesita-
tire to a still greater distance from his
ungrateful countrymen. He accordingly
oard a vessel for Ionia, concealing his
rank with the utmost precaution. But
sing, the ship was driven near the island
at that time besieged by the Athenians.
nent danger he was now in, of falling
nds of his enemies, obliged him to make

himself known to the pilot, who was thus prev
on to steer for Asia. The Persian monarch, l
ing heard that the Greeks had proscribed
illustrious exile, set a price upon his head;
commanded that every person who should ar
in any part of the coast of his dominions sh
be strictly examined. Themistocles, howe
found means to reach Cuma in Æolia, undi
vered; and by the assistance and friendship o
host, a man of considerable property, he was
ducted in a covered waggon to Suza. The la
in Persia being kept always from public view,
conductor of the waggon reported that The
tocles was an Ionian lady whom he was carr
to a nobleman at the Persian court. He
therefore, permitted to pass without further
quiry.

When the unfortunate Athenian arrived at
voluptuous palace of Artaxerxes (who had
succeeded his father in the kingdom), he told
guards that he was a Grecian stranger, and
quested an audiece of the monarch. The offi
informed him of a ceremony that they knew
insupportable to some Greeks, but without wh
it would be impossible to have an interview
Artaxerxes: this was no less than to fall prost
before the Persian monarch, and to worship hi
the living image of the Gods on earth. The
tocles being admitted into the royal pres
prostrated himself accordingly, and made a
moving speech, relating his name, his country,
misfortunes. "You see at your feet," says
"Themistocles: a man who has indeed inj
the Persians much, but who has it in his powe
render them very important services. My li
at your disposal. If you save it, you will eter
ol

ne, who now beg it at your hands; if you
iway, you will destroy the greatest enemy
Greeks." The king was struck at his in-
y and eloquence: but made him no an-
He soon, however, gave a loose to his
id told his courtiers, that he considered
val of Themistocles as the happiest of in-
, and wished his enemies would always
the same destructive methods, and banish
mong them all that were good and wise.
h says, that Artaxerxes was so well pleased
m, that in the night after the audience, he
ut three times in his sleep, "I have got
tocles, the Athenian." The next morning
g sent for him; and, as soon as the first
nents were over, said, "I am two hundred
n your debt, for so much I promised to
it should bring Themistocles." Artaxerxes
ed upon him three cities for his support,
lived in all the splendour and magnificence
rsian grandee.

is situation he continued, in contented de-
ce, until the Persian monarch pressed him
rtake an expedition against Greece. Al-
Themistocles professed himself an enemy
country, yet he was not so void of patriotic
, but that he nourished a latent spark of
n for Athens, which no resentment nor
could wholly efface. He felt inexpressible
the thoughts of being instrumental in the
d destruction of a city, which had flourished
counsels and exertions. He found himself
either to perform that duty and gratitude
d to the king, or to erase from his heart the
his country. The only means left to ease
him

B. C. 470. reign enemies. Cimon immediately obeyed and reduced the place; and the inhabitant being sold for slaves, the island was re peopled from Athens.

Those great and urgent necessities which ha given birth to the Grecian confederacy again Persia, now ceased to exist. In Europe, the onl place which was under the government of th Persian monarch was Doriscus. Every other garriso in Thrace, and on the Hellespont (a name unde which the early Greek writers often included th whole tract of water from the Ægean to the Euxin sea), had yielded to the Grecian arms. It coul not therefore be supposed that Greece was an longer in imminent danger from the ambition an resentment of the Persian monarch; but it wa nevertheless highly necessary that a navy shoul be maintained, sufficiently powerful to deter, o repel, any future attacks of an enemy still formi dable if put in motion. Many, however, of th inferior states of Greece, when danger no longe pressed, first became lukewarm in the cause, an then averse to the continuance of a war whic burthened them with the expenses. The citizen grew weary of serving in the fleet, under wha they considered, in some measure, a foreign com mand; and which seemed to promote in no shap the interest and advantage of their own common wealths. The several administrations, accustomed always to a perfect independence, would still de termine, each for itself, when it could not exer the irksome and invidious office of taxing th people for the support of the navy, nor enforce the still more invidious office of compelling per sonal service. The Athenian government, o the other hand, at first modest, and under the ad

on of Aristides, scrupulously just in the
f supremacy, grew afterwards rigid and
. Some of the subordinate common-
influenced by views of a public or private
concurred in the measures of Athens,
ne jealous of the defection of others, and
join in compelling adherence to the con-

habitants of Naxos, a rich and populous
nd one of the Cyclades, were the first to
pposition against the grand alliance. Con-
that strength with which they had for-
ffled the force of the Persians under the
l of Datis and Artaphernes, they sustained
for a considerable time against the arms of
derates. They, were, however, at length
d to capitulate on terms that deprived
their liberty and independence. Thus
island, contrary to the express articles of
nant agreed on by the Grecian states,
to the subjection of Athens. This ex-
eing made of the Naxians, it became ne-
or the states to exert themselves against
mon enemy, that clamour and faction
ease, and vigour and courage once more
the confederates. In those communities
ordered on the Persian empire; all who
o be tyrants, whom faction had banished,
were discontented with the government
hich they lived, still looked to Persia for

government; and in Caria the arms of the
derates had never yet been seen; while the
of Phaselis, a Grecian settlement in the ad
province of Pamphylia, made no scruple
fessing their preference of the Persian allia

With the formidable and numerous arm
which Cimon had now under his comma
stretched towards the coast of Caria; an
was the terror which the fame of his tro
spired, that many of the Greek cities in that v
province were deserted by the Persian tro
fore any enemy appeared. Seconded by the
of the natives, Cimon successively besieg
reduced all the walled towns and fortre
many of which were numerous and powerfi
risons; and the Persians were expelled from
He then entered Pamphylia, the whole c
which submitted to him. Phaselis alone
to admit the Grecian fleet, or to renounce t
minion of Artaxerxes. The place was imme
besieged; but such had been their ancien
nection with the Chians, who served under
that a treacherous correspondence was estal
between them. After other means of inte
had been cut off, the Chians shot arrows i
place, by means of which they conveyed
gence of every measure adopted by the ass
Wherever the confederates made an attac
garrison and the townsmen, having thus re
previous notice, were prepared to resis
length, however, by the perseverance of
Phaselis was reduced to capitulate. The vi
resistance of the garrison was not followed
particular punishment. The Chians, who
universally allowed to be the best sailors
Athenian fleet, prevailed on the lenity of Cir

m them only the payment of ten talents,
condition of adding the whole of their
ength to the Grecian armament.
listracted state of Persia at this time hin-
rtaxerxes from making any vigorous efforts
the European invasion. But as soon as
ice had crushed the ambition of his com-
and quieted domestic faction, he assembled
on the banks of the Eurymedon in Pam-
and sent a fleet to co-operate with it. A
ement of eighty triremes from Phœnicia
) expected, upon the arrival of which he
d to begin his operations.
n, having notice of these circumstances,
l to quit the objects he had in view on the
at, and to attack the hostile fleet before the
d squadron should arrive. Among the an-
naval operations were almost always con-
with those by land. Cimon, therefore,
ed a considerable part of his forces, and
for the Eurymedon. On his arrival, the
fleet, already much more numerous than
the Greeks, advanced to meet him. An
ment immediately ensued: and, after an
te and bloody battle, many of the Persian
ere sunk; a hundred were taken; and the
l in disorder toward the shores of Cyprus. A
ul detachment of the Grecian fleet pursued
essels, which the terror of their crews aban-
to the victors. Thus did the mighty pre-
ns of Artaxerxes, instead of annihilating,
hen in one day the hostile navy of Greece
ree hundred sail.
from being intoxicated with this flow of pro-
, the great and vigorous mind of Cimon
red only how to improve the advantages

already obtained. As the soldiers encamp the Eurymedon were entirely ignorant of battle, Cimon resolved to put in execution for surprising the Persian camp. On the eve therefore, of the same glorious day, he str his prisoners, amounting to twenty thousand of their Persian habiliments, with which he di his own soldiers. The bravest of the Greeks descended, himself, to assume the tiara and the mitar; and thus disguised they sailed up the Eurymedon. When the Persians beheld in this attire, supposing them to be their exp companions, they received them with open into their camp. But the confederates we sooner admitted than, on a signal being given, drew their swords, and attacked, with the co of disciplined valour, their defenceless and asto ed adversaries. Consternation and dismay s this numerous and unwarlike host; nor did recover form their surprise, until Cimon hac vanced to the camp of their general. The few had more presence of mind betook themsely flight; but the rest remained without power, fell an easy prey to the conquerors. Thus did C erect in one day two trophies, for two victories ed on different elements by the same forces. this, receiving intelligence that the Phœn galleys which had been intended to reinforce hostile fleet lay in the port of Hydras in Cypru sent a squadron of his best ships thither, w destroyed or took the whole of that armament

By these great successes, the naval streng Persia was so broken, the troops so much heartened, and the spirit of enterprise which formerly animated its councils and excited its c manders was so weakened and depressed,

offer

ensive operations against Greece were imme-
tely intermitted. It became the boast of the
eks, that no Persian ship of war now appeared
stward of the Chelidonian isles on the coast of
mphylia, or of the Cyanean rocks at the en-
nce of the Euxine; and that no Persian troops
proached within three days' journey of the Gre-
n seas.

Cimon returned in triumph to his country, B.C. 468.
h such trophies as Greece had never
ore won in a field so distant. Of the
alth that was the fruit of these victories, part
deposited in the public treasury, part rewarded
individuals who had accompanied Cimon, and
arge proportion became the property of the
mmander. In order to obtain and ensure the
ctions of the people, Cimon spent with libe-
ty and profusion what he had acquired. He
ew down the fences of his gardens and or-
rds, and permitted all to partake of their pro-
e; a table was daily spread at his house for
poorer citizens; and he assisted with his wealth
only his own particular friends, but the greatest
t of the Athenians. In going about the city
was generally accompanied by a large retinue,
ndsomely dressed; and when he met an elderly
zen ill clad, he directed one of his attendants to
nge clothes with him. In his youth, Cimon
l affected a roughness of manners, and a con-
mpt for the elegances of life; but in his riper
he discovered, that no natural connection
sisted between grossness and virtue. He raised
first of the Athenian porticoes, where the
ple were wont to assemble and to hold
miscuous discourse. He founded the fame of
celebrated groves of Academus, by forming

commodious and elegant walks in the woo
adorning them with running water. He
palm-trees in the forum, which afforded an
able and salutary shade to those who freq
this spot for the purposes of trade. The
with which his victories enriched the tr
furnished the sums employed upon the
executed under his direction, and especi
completion of the fortifications of the citad
the riches which these conquests had prod
Athens brought with them their constant
dant, corruption: yet still Aristides, in th
of a voluntary poverty, and Cimon, wh
with the greatest splendour and magni
equally escaped the general venality, an
never charged with peculation or avarice.

While Cimon, by a splendid and princ
rality, endeavoured to confirm his interest
people, he was not unmindful of the gene
fare. The citizens of the Grecian confedera
more impatient of the requisitions mad
them for public service; and longed to
home, that they might enjoy peace and
happiness. But that the maintenance of
was necessary so long as the Persian
existed, or the Grecian seas offered a ter
for piracy, could not be denied. Most
allies, therefore, agreed to compound for
sonal service of their citizens by furnishi
and paying a sum of money to the comm
sary; and the Athenians were to man t
While, by the consequences of this ag
Athens greatly strengthened herself, and re
impotence many of the allied states, she
less scrupulous of using force against th
disputed her sovereign authority.

reduction of Eion by the confederate arms
Cimon had made her better acquainted with
ne of the adjacent country. It abounded
nes of silver and gold, and a lucrative com-
was carried on with the Thracian hordes.
xcited the avidity of the conquerors; but the
nts of the neighbouring island of Thasus
ciently possessed the mines and commerce
country. When, therefore, the Persians
ercome by the arms of Greece, the Tha-
sserted their rights, which they insisted
be restored to them entire. The Athenians,
contrary, claimed the principal share in
conquest. The Thasians, irritated
onduct of their allies, renounced the
racy; and Cimon received orders to
against them. The Thasians, venturing a
ngagement, were defeated; and Cimon,
his forces, reduced all but the principal
o which he laid siege. In the mean time
henian government sent a colony of ten
d men to inhabit the country around Eion.
Thracian tribes, attacking the Greeks, over-
d, and cut them in pieces, and annihilated
ny.

B.C. 465.

ng these transactions Cimon carried on the
f Thasus with great vigour, but met with
tinate resistance from the besieged. The
s, however, not depending upon their own
h for success, requested the assistance of
cedæmonians. The Spartans, sensible of
cessity of interfering in this dispute, and
giving a check to the growing and already
able power of Athens, determined to send
to invade Attica. But a sudden and de-
e earthquake overturning the city of Sparta

at this crisis, and in its consequences threate
ruin to the state, they were compelled to aba
the enterprise. The Thasians, therefore, h
withstood the confederate arms for three y
were obliged to capitulate; upon terms, in
sufficiently severe, but by which they avoide
wretched condition of slavery. Cimon,
successful, did not meet, on his return h
that reception which his merits and vict
entitled him to expect. Like other great me
predecessors, his glory had excited envy. Thr
the prevalence of faction, he was prosecute
having received bribes from Alexander, king of
cedonia, to stop the progress of the Grecian
against that country. Cimon, indignant at th
grateful return for the services he had perfor
declared to the people, that he had never s
any connection with the Macedonians, but
fessed he considered them as a brave and virt
nation; nor would he ever prefer wealth to
qualities, though he had enriched Athens
the spoils of its enemies. The popularity of C
was yet great; and this defence procured hi
honourable acquittal.

B.C. 462.

In the mean time, Lacedæmon had been i
greatest consternation, and on the brink of
The earthquake occurred suddenly at mid
Twenty thousand persons lost their lives;
only five houses remained standing in Sp
The Helotes assembled from all parts, with i
to destroy such of the Spartans as survived, a
seize the country; but the prudence and fore
of Archidamus saved Lacedæmon. In the
of the general confusion, while some were e
venturing to preserve their most valuable effects
others fleeing different ways to avoid destruc

caused the trumpet to sound to arms, as if an emy had been at hand. The citizens immeately obeyed the signal, and armed themselves; d the Helotes seeing a regular army, instead of confused and scattered multitude, desisted from eir meditated attempt. But, quitting the city, ese slaves spread themselves over the country d excited their fellows to rebellion.

They seized Ithome, and made it their principal st. But they so far outnumbered the Lacedæonians, that though deficiently armed, they were midable even in the field. Application was erefore made to the neighbouring allies for suc-nr; and the Æginetans and Platæans immedily went to their assistance. Thus reinforced, e Spartans obliged the insurgents to retire within e walls of Ithome. But that place being natully strong, and the Lacedæmonians inexpert in ges, the assistance of the Athenians was reested, who were esteemed the most skilful and perienced in this kind of warfare.

This last measure seems to have been, on many counts, very imprudent and unseasonable; and d, not indeed immediately, but in its direct sue, to the Peloponnesian war. Cimon, thinkg it ungenerous to take advantage of the misfornes of a rival city, persuaded the Athenians to nd assistance to Sparta; and a considera- B.C. e body of troops, under his command, 461. arched into Peloponnesus. Being arrived the camp of the besiegers, they made an attack on Ithome, but without success. The Spartans, specting that the Athenians favoured the interest the insurgents, dismissed them, on pretence at their help was no longer necessary. But, as ey still retained the troops of the other allies,

the

the Athenians were justly incensed against t
and disposed more than ever to endeavour to hu
the Spartan greatness. As soon as the Athe
had returned home, they passed a decree, ren
ing the confederacy with Lacedæmon; and
an alliance with Argos, the inveterate ener
Sparta, to which also the Thessalians accedec

In Athens, as in every free government,
was always a faction adverse to the ruling p
matters had been for some time ripening
change; and the renunciation of the alliance
Sparta was the triumph of the opposition. C
had always professed himself a friend to the
dæmonians, and an admirer of their institut
and he had acted in the character which he
fessed. His eldest son he named Lacedæmo
as a proof of his partiality to that state. He ha
been the chief promoter of sending succou
Sparta, when that city desired the assistar
the Athenians. All these circumstances wer
turned to his disadvantage, with the violenc
acrimony of the spirit of party. The epithe
lolacones, or Friends to the Lacedæmonians
used as the mark and opprobrium of the pa
power. Whilst the public mind was in th
tation a favourable opportunity was seized
ostracism was proposed against Cimon and ca
and by his banishment the adverse faction b
possessed of the reins of government.

The ostensible head of this party was Ephi
but Pericles, the son of Xanthippus, had c
obtained an ascendency in the popular f
Pericles possessed many advantages, derive
from nature and fortune. His father, a n
one of the first families in Athens, and of
pr

had been instrumental in the prosecution
es ; but had chiefly distinguished himself
ery and conduct in the battle of Mycale.
d Agariste, the niece of Cleosthenes,
principally concerned in expelling the
* from Athens. Their son, born with
abilities, had studied under the most ce-
asters of Greece. Damon had taught him
of his country, and Anaxagoras instructed
ral philosophy and eloquence. In person,
nd voice, he remarkably resembled Pi-
This circumstance for a long time obliged
ceal the shining qualifications which he
In his youth, therefore, he employed
hours in the exercises of arms, and his
study. But when Aristides was dead,
les in banishment, and Cimon absent
service, Pericles applied himself very
to public business. His eloquence is
e been so nervous and elevated, that it
him the surname of Olympius. His
erest and party-connexions led him to
popular favour, and to oppose the aristo-
tion; though his natural disposition and
clinations would have inclined him to
lifferent conduct.
position of the Athenians appearing now
emely favourable to those who inclined
ulace more than to the nobility, Ephialtes
to contract the powers and reduce the
the court of Areopagus. The propo-
ich the people passed into a decree,
most of the causes cognizable by that
ld be transferred to the assembly of the

* The sons and favourers of Pisistratus.

people ;

people; and this assembly was to direct, wit control, all expenditures from the public treasu

During the confusion in which the Persian vernment was involved after the death of Xe Inarus, an African chieftain on the western bo of Egypt, had caused the greatest part of country to rebel: but fearing the power of taxerxes, he requested the assistance of the Gr The Athenians accordingly sent a fleet, wh having performed great exploits, enabled Egyptians to defeat the Persians in the field, to subdue two districts of the great cit Memphis. The third, which was called White-wall, could not be reduced; and Persians who retired thither, having carried them great quantities of provision and ammuni sustained a vigorous siege. In the mean t an ancient dispute between Megara and Cor respecting the limits of their territories, had l hostilities between these states. They both allies of Sparta: but the Megarians, apprehen the superior influence of their rivals with city, put themselves under the protection of Athenians, and requested assistance from th The Athenian government immediately comp and sent troops to garrison some of their prin towns. In the descent on the Argolic coast, Corinthians and Epidaurians defeated the forc Athens; but the Athenian fleet soon after tained a victory over the Peloponnesians. Æginetans then joined their fleet with th Corinth; and the Athenians having assemble the naval force of their confederacy, a battle fought; seventy ships of the Peloponnesians their allies were taken, and siege was laid to capital of Ægina. The Athenians were fi victori

s; and Corinth was so weakened by this
be incapable of any considerable exer-
some time.

emon, enfeebled by misfortunes and in-
cord, had not been induced by the revolt
a, or the sufferings of so near an ally as
to come to a rupture with Athens;
his republic had evinced great enmity
Sparta, an styled itself the *Protector of*
Doris, however, the mother-country of
onnesians, having been attacked by the
, and several of its towns taken, the
dispatched an army, under the command
nedes, to its assistance. The Phocians,
resist this force, surrendered the Dorian
nd submitted to the conditions imposed
acedæmonians. But when Nicomedes
ave returned to Sparta, the Athenians,
ie Argives and Thessalians, shut up the
o Peloponnesus. Nicomedes was much
what to do; but having well considered
er, he resolved to wait an opportunity,
fore wintered in Bœotia.

thenians and their allies, having in vain
that the severity of the season, and the
e of the troops, would have compel-
medes to attempt the passage of the
s, resolved in the spring to attack him
lain. Collecting, therefore, their auxi-
ps, they formed a body of fourteen
heavy-armed foot. These, with the ca-
d the attending slaves, made an army
ly less than thirty thousand men, with
ey marched into Bœotia. Nicomedes
n at Tanagra, and a severe action en-

sued

B.C. 456. sued, in which neither of the conte parties could claim the victory. Th day the battle was again renewed; an Thessalian horse treacherously deserting allies, the Athenians were compelled to the Peloponnesians masters of the field, a terrible slaughter on both sides. Previous this battle, Cimon met the troops of Athens they quitted the Attic border; and, as the his exile did not absolutely forbid it, reques fight as a volunteer amongst them. His re however, was denied, and he was comman leave the army. But before he retired, h dressed himself to Euthippus, and the rest friends, who had been considered as acce with him in the conspiracy against the state desired them to act in such a manner as to off all aspersion, and convince the Athenian they had not among them either more bra more honest men than Cimon and his friends. made him no other answer than by requestin to leave his armour with them, since their ge would not allow him to fight at their head. Ac ingly, when the army was routed, the frie Cimon continued to combat around his pa until they were killed to a man.

Neither the force nor the spirit of A however, was broken by the defeat at Ta Myronides was appointed general of their now. On the sixty-second day after the f unfortunate battle he met the Thebans and allies, composing a numerous and well-disci army. After a long and obstinate engage with these troops, Myronides prevailed, an tained a glorious and complete victory.

Ath

general then marched to Tanagra, the town, and, to make even the defeats untry terrible to its enemies, razed it to id. He then plundered all Bœotia; and ed an army which had been drawn toge- rder to compel him to retreat. He after- l upon the Locrians, entered Thessaly, g chastised the inhabitants of that country treacherous conduct to the Athenians, home loaded with riches and glory. This of Myronides, though no detail of it n the time of Diodorus Siculus, was equal to, if not surpassing, the most chievements of the Athenian arms.

this time also the little barren island of rrendered to the Athenians. Cut of from y the powerful armaments which Athens , the Æginetans were obliged at length ate: their ships of war were given up, ifications demolished, and they bound s to the payment of an annual tribute. ne summer the great work of the long ich connected the city with the Piræus leted.

es, the Athenian admiral, sailing oponnesus with a strong squadron, nd burnt Gythium, a naval arse- Lacedæmonians. He then proceeded into thian gulf, disembarked his forces, and, tained a victory over the Sicyonians by Chalcis in Ætolia. In the tenth year of he Lacedæmonians were obliged to turn t Ithome into a blockade: and at last to terms of accommodation; by which it d, that the Helotes should depart from sus, never to return. The Athenians

B.C. 455.

collected these fugitives, and settled them a
pactus, on the northern shore of the Cor
gulf. Having resumed the name of Mess
which indeed they had never entirely los
became a free republic, under the protec
Athens, and were once more reckoned a
people.

While success attended the Athenian fo
Greece, their troops engaged in the distant
tions in Egypt experienced various turns
tune. Grecian valour and Grecian disci
first triumphed over all opposition, and the
government was driven almost to despair.
bazus was sent with large sums of money t
dæmon, to endeavour by bribes to obtain t
ance of that state, and to procure the inv
Attica by a Spartan army. An Athenian
however, nearly contemporary with this
action, informs us that the Lacedæmoni
fused to accede to a proposal, to which, i
have been supposed, resentment, ambitic
political intrigue, would have contribut
powerfully to engage them.

At length, therefore, the Persians asse
numerous and powerful army on the con
Cilicia and Syria; and a fleet was prep
Phœnicia and other maritime provinces.
B. C. 456. bazus led his troops into the field
the spring: and the Egyptians vent
battle were defeated. The little
Greeks being compelled to raise the siege,
into an island of the Nile, where their fleet
them. The Persians could not act against
this situation. Megabazus, however, having
dikes and water-courses, drained the cha
which the Athenian galleys lay. The fleet b

ans rendered unserviceable, the Grecian
s left open to attack; and after a siege of
months, the island was taken; B.C.
e Grecian troops forcing their way 454.
but the greater number perished.
-galleys also, sailing to Egypt at this
to relieve an equal number there, en-
mouth of the Nile, ignorant of what had
l. The Phœnician squadron instantly
them, and, being assisted by the army on
y few of the Athenians were saved.
onciliation between the aristocratical and
tical parties in Athens appears to have
ice about this time. Pericles proposed, in
ably of the people, to recal Cimon from
ent, after the expiration of only five years
ile. A cessation of hostilities between the
s and the other states of Greece was an
te consequence of his restoration. Where,
, there were so many jarring interests,
reconciliation could not be easily effected.
ny treaty of peace with the Peloponnesian
acy could be brought to a conclusion,
ars of intermitted war elapsed; and even
y a truce for five years was agreed on.
had become the constitution of the Athe-
mmonwealth, and so great were the effects
he continuance of war had produced on
ds of the people, that in order to preserve
lity at home, Cimon saw the necessity of
he spirit of enterprize towards foreign con-
nd against the common enemy of Greece.
efore determined to make an attack upon
that his countrymen might desist from
war upon the Lacedæmonians, or op-
their allies. Two hundred galleys were

equipped, of which he took the command, s of these were detached to Egypt, to diver attention of the Persian government. Wi remaining force he attacked Citium and M of both which he made himself master. A this success, he defeated the Phœnician fleet; tained a victory over the Persian army encampe Cilicia; and, re-embarking his troops, returne Cyprus and laid siege to its principal city. in the camp, before that place, Cimon died in arms of victory. It is not known whether death was occasioned by sickness, or by a wo he had received. His remains were carried Athens, and buried there; and a magnificent n nument was erected to his memory.

The death of this great man was not less nourable than his life had been. When he fo that he was about to expire, he gave suit directions to the principal commanders; on ing them to conceal his decease, and to emb immediately for Athens. Great as was the litary character of Cimon, his wisdom, integ moderation, and conciliatory conduct, were tues for which his loss was most severely felt deplored. Others might command fleets and mies, and obtain victories; but they could or did not, free Greece from civil feuds and mestic wars.

After the death of Cimon, Pericles became principal person in the state. But the aristocra party never ceased to molest and oppose h Thucydides, the brother-in-law of Cimon, the chief leader of the party in opposition. He a man of very respectable character, not with reputation for military talents, but more kn as an experienced statesman, and able speal

Peric

es, however, obtained the ascendency in
ng the affairs of government.
des conceived an idea of improving the
ution of the Athenian state, or rather that of
ece. For this purpose he proposed to form
several little republics one great common-
of which Athens should be the head,
pride of the Peloponnesians, and parti-
of the Lacedæmonians, who opposed the
with all their power, compelled him to
the project; and he was reduced to the
y of adhering to the former policy of the
states.
Megarians having revolted from the Athe-
nd entered into an alliance with the Lace-
ans, this occasioned a war between Athens
rta. The Eubœans also having revolted,
marched an army into their island, and
uickly reduced the whole of it. The
Hestiæans were ejected from their city,
nd an Athenian colony was settled in it.
iation between the Athenians and Lacedæ-
was soon after proposed, and a cessation
ities was concluded for thirty years.

CHAP. VIII.

The Affairs of Greece from the Truce for Years to the Peace of Nicias.

SCARCELY had six years of the truce e when Athens, by the dissensions of th mians and Milesians, was led into another The inhabitants of Miletus applied to Athe redress against the Samians; and the Atheni vernment, in consequence, required the inhal of Samos to appear and answer to the charges against them. On their refusing to do s Athenians sent a fleet of forty galleys, brought them to submission; and their g ment was changed into a democracy. Peric said to have engaged the Athenians in thi merely to gratify his mistress Aspasia, the somest woman of her age; who had such cendancy over him, that for her sake he weak wickedly sacrificed his family and his tranq The democratical form of government, hov being overturned soon after the return of Pe a second expedition was fitted out; and aft sieging Samos for nine months, the place rendered. Pericles razed the fortifications, the inhabitants to the payment of a certain su the expences of the war, and received ho for their fidelity to Athens. Elated with hi cess he returned home, buried the dead with solemnity, and pronounced their funeral o with so much eloquence and pathos, that wh descended from the rostrum the women cro him with chaplets.

From a spark excited in a remote corner of the country arose that general conflagration in Greece, distinguished by the name of the Peloponnesian war. The island of Corcyra, originally occupied by a colony of Corinthians, had become independent, and a rival and enemy of its parent-state in maritime commerce. The Corcyreans, however, intending to settle some of their people on the Illyrian coast, requested for this purpose a leader from the Corinthians, who was granted them. In process of time, Epidamnus (for this was the name of the colony) grew populous and wealthy, asserted its independence, and maintained this claim. An intestine war breaking out amongst the citizens of Epidamnus, one party requested the assistance of the Illyrians, whilst the other made application to Corcyra. The Corcyreans, however, refusing to intermeddle in the dispute, the Epidamnians sent to desire succours from Corinth, and acknowledged that city as the founders of their colony. The Corinthians, more actuated by hatred to Corcyra than good-will to Epidamnus, sent a numerous and powerful fleet to the assistance of the party making this application, and reinstated them in possession of the island. As soon as the Corcyreans were made acquainted with the proceedings of Corinth, they equipped a still larger and more powerful fleet, and expelled the friends of the Corinthians.

Corinth, not being possessed of so great a naval force as Corcyra, now applied to her allies. When the Corcyreans received advice of these proceedings, they immediately dispatched messengers to Athens, to request the interference of that state; while the Corinthians also did the same. The Athenians entered into a defensive alliance with the Corcyreans,

and sent them assistance; but an engagemei suing the Corinthians were victorious.

The Corcyrean war was followed by the of Potidæa, a town in Macedonia, founded l Corinthians, but joined in alliance with A The Athenians had sent orders to the inhat of Potidæa to demolish the fortifications, to back the magistrates they had received fron rinth, and to give hostages for their future conduct and fidelity. The Potidæans, very : to obey, yet afraid to dispute these comm attempted to impose upon the Athenians b plicity. But being detected, a battle follow which the Potidæans were discomfited. I engagement, Alcibiades, who was but a very man, and Socrates his master, chiefly distingu themselves. That philosopher was observ endure the fatigues of war with an ease that have been a consequence of the sober and perate life to which he had inured himself he acted with a courage and resolution that have done honour to a veteran in arms. W to inspire his pupil with a love of glory, he ob the prize of valour to be adjudged to Alcil though Socrates himself was much more des of that reward. After this victory, the Ath besieged Potidæa.

The Corinthians now applied to Sparta accompanied by the deputies of the seven publics which had experienced the arrogai Athens, pleaded their cause before the La monian assembly. They urged the several w they had received, and inveighed against the c and injustice of that state. The Spartans, h heard all the complaints made by the several munities of Greece against the Athenians, ser

bas

Athens to demand reparation of injuries; f refusal, to denounce war against that The Lacedæmonian embassy required ns to raise the siege of Potidæa; to ohibitory decree against Megara; to eir garrison from Ægina; and, in fine, he independence of their colonies.

emands were heard at Athens with dignation and terror. The inconstant who had hitherto approved and admired nd actions of Pericles, now trembled on f the precipice to which he had con- a. The factions averse to the govern- mbraced the opportunity which these d murmurs afforded, to traduce the nd administration of that statesman. aluable friends were impeached in the justice; and the accusation of them preparatory to that of himself. Un- d undismayed, however, amidst the icles pleaded the cause of his friends; ted his conduct in a very eloquent and nt fatal, discourse, which unalterably e war of Peloponnesus.

med the Athenians, that whatever the nians might pretend, with respect to the of the allies, the true reason of their was the prosperity of Athens, a city lways hated, and to destroy which they t an opportunity; but as, from reasons and judiciously stated by him, it ap- Athenians were more able than the sians to support an expensive and pro- r, he urged, that it would be scarcely in of fortune to rob his countrymen of He therefore advised, as the most just

and

and equitable satisfaction which could be to answer the Peloponnesians, that the At would not forbid the Megareans their po markets, if the Spartans and other Grecian abolished their exclusive and inhospitable that they would restore independence to th and communities, provided the Lacedæm would engage to do the same; that future c should be submitted to arbitration; and tha though these condescending overtures sho rejected, they would not commence hos but would repel them with vigour. This moderate as it seemed to the Athenian stat was considered by the Spartans and their a nearly equivalent to a declaration of war.

While matters were in this situation, th bans, who were the most powerful and th daring of the Spartan allies, undertook a r enterprise against the small but magnanim public of Platæa. This state had been alw markable for its fidelity to Athens, whose t triumphs it had shared in the Persian war Thebans conceiving that this republic wo the event of a war, be a troublesome and dan neighbour, sent Eurymachus with three h men to surprise the place. The town was b to the Thebans by a factious party of the ; but the Platæans, perceiving the small num the enemy, attacked them, killed many, and ed the rest to surrender themselves prisc discretion. In the mean time, a considerab of Thebans advanced to co-operate with th low-citizens. The Platæans, foreseeing th the Thebans would do to their country, herald to command them to leave the te and to denounce, in case of refusal, th

death that should be inflicted on their comrades. This stratagem, not less audacious than artful, induced the enemy to repass the Æsopus. The Plataeans, however, lost not a moment to assemble within their walls their scattered inhabitants; and braving the Theban resentment, massacred the prisoners, to the number of one hundred and eighty. The Athenians, on being informed of the conduct of the Thebans, caused all the Boeotians to be arrested. They afterward supplied the Plataeans with provision, and a considerable reinforcement of troops; transported their wives and children to the islands of Athens; and greatly strengthened the works of the place.

The league being now broken on both sides, each party prepared for war. Both the Spartans and Athenians solicited the assistance of Persia; and both summoned their confederates to arms. Most of the Grecian states were inclined to the Lacædæmonians; because they professed, on this occasion, to be the deliverers of Greece. All the Peloponnesians joined the Spartans, the Argives and part of the Achæans only excepted; and north of the isthmus, the Megareans, Phocians, Locrians, Oetians, Ambracotes, Leucadians, and Anactorians, declared themselves on the same side. On the other hand, the Athenians numbered among their allies the Chians, Lesbians, Plataeans, Messenians, Acarnanians, Corcyreans, Zacynthians, Cephallenians, Dorians, Thracians; most of the islands; all the Cyclades, excepting Melos and Thera; Euboea and Samos. Such was the order of preparation, that only a few weeks after the surprise of Plataea the Lacedæmonians and their confederates assembled an army of sixty thousand

men at the isthmus of Corinth. The several appointed a leader for their own troops; b general conduct of the war was entrusted to A damus, the Spartan king.

In a council of the chiefs, this prince w
B.C. 431. approved the alacrity and readiness troops in taking the field; and extoll greatness and formidable appearance army, the most numerous and best provide had ever followed a Grecian standard. But he great their exertions and preparations, they not more than proportionable to the difficu dangerous enterprise in which they were ab engage. The people with whom they had to war were powerful, active, and daring. had discernment to perceive, and ability t prove, every opportunity of advantage. Thei would be wounded, and their resentment infl by the approach of hostility and invasion. Athenians were little likely to suffer their and property to be wasted and destroyed, w endeavouring to defend them. It was the necessary, that the confederates should be prepared and on their guard; and that the cipline should be strict, regular, and unifo they hoped to elude the skill, and oppo strength and vigour, of Athens.

Pericles, in the mean time, having enga countrymen in the war, found it requisite to utmost exertions against an enemy far supe numbers, and with whom he feared to con the field: he therefore advised, that they abandon their villas and gardens; and, in themselves in Athens, with their cattle, fur and valuable effects, they should employ their

ing a fleet, and in fortifying and de-
ie city. This singular plan of defence,
id boldly traced by the lofty genius of
obtained universal approbation, and was
ely put into execution. The numerous
s of the country towns and villages,
more wealthy Athenians used to spend
, flocked to the capital. Athens, how-
agh furnished with the means of sub-
could but ill afford accommodation for
flux and increase of families, with their
nd slaves. The public halls, the groves,
les, with the walls and battlements,
occupied by many people of the lower
ife. The dwellings of persons of dis-
ere mean and confined. Yet such was
tment against the common enemy, and
he public spirit of the people, that not a
rmur was heard among them.

amus, at the head of his numerous army,
nto Attica; and penetrated within a few
Athens. Being still desirous to avoid the
possible, he dispatched a messenger to
; but the Athenians commanded him to
ithout hearing his proposals. The enemies
amus insinuating, that from his friendship
et for the Athenians it was evident he
ing and betraying the cause of the con-
, the Spartan king immediately ravaged
ste the Eleusinian and Thriasian plains,
desolated these fruitful and valuable
vith fire and sword, the army advanced
ne. The people of that borough formed
than three thousand heavy-armed foot;
y could not but have great influence in the
assembly, Archidamus thought the im-

pending destruction of their property and
would make them eager to leave the city an
battle to the confederates. His judgment i
respect proved to have been correct. No
did the Peloponnesian army appear in sig
Athens, and it became known that the
Acharnian plain was to be the next object
devastation, than the city was filled with t
and uproar. Some were vehement for marchi
and defending their property. Others w
contended against a measure which woul
danger the commonwealth. But all cond
Pericles as the author of their misfortunes.

Amidst this popular commotion, the Atl
statesman remained firm and immovable; h
resisting the storm, or eluding its force. T
determined to risk no general engagement
the confederate troops, he omitted no oppo
of beating up their quarters, intercepting
convoys, and surprising their advanced parties
Athenian and Thessalian cavalry generally f
these detachments. A fleet of a hundred g
with a number of land forces on board, r
the defenceless coast of Peloponnesus. A
squadron invaded Locris. The inhabita
Ægina were driven from their possessions, a
island was repeopled from Athens. These
enterprises tended to divert the public min
to appease faction.

Intelligence of the proceedings of the Ath
in Peloponnesus, but still more a scarcity th
vailed in the army, induced the confeder
disperse, and return to their respective rep
Having entered Attica on the east, they
along the western frontier, and spread des
over the whole Athenian territory. Aft

P

Peloponnesian army had retreated, Pericles led out the Athenians, who ravaged and despoiled the neighbouring and hostile province of Megara. The fleet also returning from the coast of Peloponnesus, perceived the invading army, and the sailors hastened to share the danger and the plunder of the place. The whole Athenian force amounted now to nearly twenty thousand men. Thus in the end of the year, the Athenians retaliated the insults and ravages which, at the commencement of it, the confederates had committed in Attica.

The winter was not distinguished by any important expedition on either side. During the inactivity of this season, the two hostile parties employed themselves in celebrating the memory of the dead, with much funeral pomp, and high encomiums on their valour and martial exploits. They also distributed prizes and rewards among the survivors who had distinguished themselves in battle; cemented the alliances and friendships they had formed with other states; and fortified those places in the frontiers of their country which seemed most defenceless and open to attack.

The spring of the next year was doubly fatal to the Athenians. The Peloponnesian army returned to commit its ravages in the territory about Athens; and a destructive pestilence, imported, as was afterwards supposed, from Egypt, desolated the city. It appeared first in the Pirærus; and the inhabitants conjectured, that the enemies had poisoned their wells. It soon spread over the whole adjacent country, and raged with peculiar violence in the populous districts that surrounded the citadel. This disease appeared in various forms, according to the constitution of the person attacked with it, but its specific symptoms were invariably the same.

A burning heat in the head was the sure indication of its approach. The eyes then became red and inflamed; and the tongue and mouth assumed the deep colour of blood. The pain and inflammation descended to the stomach and lower parts of the body; the skin was covered with ulcers; and while the external heat was not sensible to the touch, the internal was so violent that the slightest covering could not be endured. The patients were attacked with an insatiable thirst, the indulgence of which increased the disorder. Some existed seven or nine days under this distemper, and then expired with apparent remains of strength. Others, whose bowels were attacked, died in the most miserable state. Those who once recovered were never dangerously attacked with it again. The disorder, which was always accompanied with an extreme dejection of spirits, frequently impaired the judgment and the memory. All remedies, human and divine, were employed to stop the raging malady, but in vain. The crowds rushed to the temples and implored the assistance of their Gods, but without effect. Near the fountains, whither they had come to quench their thirst, and around the altars of their divinities, were seen the dead and the dying. At length all medical assistance was despised, and all ceremonies of religion were neglected. Wherever the doctrine of retribution in a life to come is believed, a general calamity strongly tends to check the passions, to inspire serious thoughts, and to direct the attention to a future state of existence; but in Athens, where the Deity was considered only as a dispenser of temporal good and evil, it was otherwise. The fear of offending the divine power immediately ceased. For to worship or not to worship the Gods, to obey

o obey the dictates of morality, equally
othing. All died alike; and if there were
erence, the virtuous and the good, who
themselves for the sake of others, were
and the surest victims. A licentiousness
iers succeeded; and the only pursuit
of pleasure. To beings whose existence
thought to be protracted beyond the
moment, the dread of punishment form-
estraint, and the scruples of conscience
o terrors. The prevailing maxim was,
eat, drink, and be merry; for to-morrow
Athens thus exhibited a spectacle the
tressful and alarming that can possibly be
d; for wretchedness and vice, disease and
d passions were united. This relaxation,
st dissolution of morals, was a lasting and
le effect of the pestilence at Athens.
the plague thus raged in the metropolis,
ponnesian army was ravaging and deso-
e whole Attic territory. The firm mind
les, conscious of wisdom and rectitude,
rcely, however, to be depressed by any
s that befel either his country or himself.
itude was still superior to the public and
sufferings by which he was surrounded.
adful and rapacious pestilence snatched
ccessively his numerous and flourishing
and he beheld with a magnanimous com-
ts baneful and unhappy effects. At the
however, of the last of his sons the
nind of Pericles appeared dejected; and
approached to place a chaplet of flowers
head of the corpse, he dropped a few re-
ars of paternal tenderness; but ashamed
veakness, he immediately bent his whole

study to the affairs of his country. He
the command of an armament destined to
against Peloponnesus; and making descents
cessively upon the Epidaurian and Argian co
ravaged all the neighbouring countries.

In the mean time the Peloponnesians, l
informed of the force that Pericles had ca
against their country, and not unacquainted
the terrible havoc which the plague was at
time making in Athens, withdrew their tr
from Attica. The Athenian armament, w
had returned home, again sailed to coöpera
the siege of Potidæa with the army of Phorm
which at that time blockaded the place.
measure seemed to be ill-judged, and was
tainly unfortunate. The fresh troops carr
with them the plague from Athens, not only
rished themselves in great numbers, but infe
the army on that station which had been hitl
healthy.

Accumulated evils, public and private,
irritated beyond sufferance the minds of the A
nians. Popular discontent always finds some
ject on which to vent its spleen and resentm
and that object in the present case was so
for in Pericles. The bulk of the people de
peace, on whatever terms it could be procu
Ambassadors were sent to Sparta to endea
to negotiate with that republic; but in pro
tion as the Athenians were depressed by the
cumstances in which they were placed, the
cedæmonians and their allies became arrog
and the ambassadors were not admitted to
audience. Hereupon a popular ferment was r
in Athens; and the orators clamoured, and
duced Pericles. In his capacity of general o
commonw

wealth, he had full powers to convene
mbly of the people whenever he deemed
ble. He, therefore, summoned the people;
r the last time, mounted the public

e speech of Pericles, though excellently
to the occasion, did not produce the
vith which he had flattered himself. It
l, however, with the people, to determine
o more proposals of peace to Sparta. But
ation excited by the private sufferings of
nians could not be so easily appeased.
f the poor were reduced to total want:
bore not without extreme uneasiness and
ction the loss and destruction of their
and the popular ferment did not subside
ricles had been deposed from his military
d, and sentenced to a heavy fine.
eople, however, had no sooner vented
en and resentment against Pericles than
nted. There was no other person, whose
nd integrity were equal to the great and
t charge of directing the public affairs.
, therefore, as their immediate anger had
d Pericles was re-elected general, and
with the same power which he before
l. He restored, by his manly and in-
conduct, the fainting courage of the

But though the Athenians rescued the
f Pericles from the popular tumult, they
ot preserve his life from the infectious
r of the pestilence. This disease de-
ain by degrees, and preyed at once on
itution of his body and the faculties of
l. Two years and six months after the
mencement of the war, Pericles died. He

was

was inferior to none in wisdom to ascertain abilities to explain and enforce, what was and advantageous for the state. He was a si and ardent lover of the republic; unbiassed b dictates of selfishness, unseduced by any part sinister views, and superior to the temptation allurements of avarice. During his last mor many of his friends surrounded his death-bed, supposing him to have lost all knowledge an collection, dwelt with complacence on the and illustrious exploits of his glorious life. they recounted the wisdom and incorruptic his administration, and his victories by se land, the dying statesman, raising himself c bed, said to them, "You forget the best noblest part of my character; no one of my fe citizens was ever compelled, on my accou wear mourning." He expired, teaching a portant lesson to the human race; that in the awful moment, the hour of death, when all oth jects fade and disappear, or lose their value, t collection of those parts of life, which seem t been most innocent and inoffensive, will be p to the mind. His trophies and victories, his and prosperous government, the depth of h litical wisdom, the perfection of his nava military knowledge, his unrivalled eloquence all his other attainments could not give or p to Pericles a consolation equal to that of the more valuable, but less dazzling virtues.

By the death of Pericles, the dignity and of the Athenian state seemed for some time perish. In the third spring of the war the ponnesians changed their plan of offensive tions. They found that, by invading and ra Attica, though the Athenians were greatly in

ressed, little advantage had ultimately ac-
themselves. The plunder they acquired
equivalent to the expences of the war.
my could not be compelled to hazard an
ent. It was, therefore, deemed expedient
an attempt upon some of the continental
nces of Athens; and as none appeared so
ttack, and so completely excluded from all
otection, as Platæa, it was resolved to di-
r principal efforts against that place.
dingly, Archidamus, with the confede-
, entered the Platæan territory, and be-
vage the country. The Platæans sent mi-
deprecate the hostilities and invasion of
onnesians. They urged their exploits and
n the defence of Greece against the Per-
narch, and the privileges granted to them
famous battle in their territory. Archi-
herefore, offered them neutrality. The
professed, that they would most willingly
raced his offer; but that if they offended
nians, they could have no assistance
e Thebans, their declared and inveterate
when the Peloponnesian army was de-
To this objection Archidamus replied,
n inventory of all your effects, and trans-
selves whither you think proper, during
nuance of the war: and we will engage
lands shall be cultivated, yourselves sub-
nd, when hostilities shall finally cease,
ng be restored." The Platæans agreed to
e conditions, provided the consent of the
s could be obtained. But when they ap-
thens for leave to accept these offers of
onnesian general, that republic required
bide by the terms of their alliance, and
promised

promised them support and assistance. I
sequence of this, the Platæans resolved to
to the proposals of the Athenians.

Archidamus, having first invoked the G
witness that he was not the first to transgr
articles of the Grecian league, prepared to la
to the place. The town itself was small ; a
garrison amounted to no more than four h
Platæans and eighty Athenians ; and these
one hundred and ten women, who were reta
prepare provision, formed the whole of the
lation. The first proceeding of the besiege
to erect palisades ; and for this the forest of
ron afforded them sufficient materials. Th
broke ground for making approaches. The
cipal object now was to fill the ditch of the
and to raise a mound of earth, upon wl
mount for making an attack. The extrem
the mound were made firm with interwover
and the interstices were filled with wood,
and earth. For seventy days did the Lace
nian army employ itself unremittingly
work ; but their chief reliance was still
great superiority of their numbers.

To oppose this mode of attack the b
raised, upon that part of the wall opposite t
the mound was forming, a wooden frame,
in front with leather and hides. Within tl
also made a rampart, formed of bricks fr
neighbouring houses. The wooden frame
the whole, and kept it firm to a considerable
and the covering of hides protected both th
and the workmen. But as it was necessary
ment this superstructure on their walls in
tion as the mound of the besiegers was raise
this superstructure became weaker through

ng height, it was necessary to devise other means of defence. Accordingly they built a second wall n the form of a half-moon, within the other, and o the extremities of which it was connected. These extended, on both sides, beyond the mound. f, therefore, the besiegers should scale the outer wall, they would have to renew their work in a ess favourable situation.

In the mean time the assailants began to batter, rom the mound, the elevated structure upon the Platæan rampart; but though they shook the wall violently, and alarmed the garrison, no serious effect was produced. The ram and other machines of the same kind were also employed against different parts of the wall, but to little purpose. The Platæans, by means of ropes, dragged some out of their directions, and others were broken by beams thrown down from the walls. Their adversaries put in practice every invention they could advise for effecting their purpose; but after consuming great part of the summer in this siege, they found their efforts so completely baffled by the vigilance and activity of the garrison, that they began to despair of success. Before, however, they had recourse to the tedious operations of blockade, they determined to try another expedient. They filled the town-ditch, in the parts adjoining to their mound, with faggots, on which were put sulphur and tar, and then set the whole on fire. The conflagration was such as had never before been prepared by the hands of man. Had the wind favoured, this last contrivance would have been fully effectual; but, fortunately for the garrison, a heavy rain, brought on by a thunder-storm without wind, extinguished the fire, and relieved them from this most formidable attack.

The

The Peloponnesians now turned the siege blockade. A further line of intrenchment was round the town; and to these new works w pointed a sufficient number of troops, of half were Bœotians, and the others were from the Peloponnesians. The rest of the derate forces returned home. The Platæans thus cooped in, began to be distressed. stores were nearly consumed; relief cou be expected; and their besiegers would them no mercy. It was therefore propose tempt an escape, by forcing a passage acr enemy's walls. This measure was at first j agreed to by the whole garrison; but the prise appearing more difficult and hazardou was expected, many retracted. Two hundr twenty, however, persevered. Ladders were, fore, prepared, equal to the height of the The interval between the two lines of int ment was sixteen feet, which, being formed barracks for the besieging army; had the appearance of one thick wall, with pet and battlements on each side. There also occasional towers, in which the lodged,

In a dark and stormy night the adve left the garrison. They were compactly a and had the right foot bare that they migh the more surely. They kept at a distanc one another, to avoid the clashing of arms. march was directed to the space betwe towers. The ditch being passed, they pla ladders, and twelve of the light-armed m the wall. When they had reached the top ; and six marched towards each tow ed. Others, in the mean time ha

ed to their assistance; and had their shields by those behind, that they might climb the nimbly. Many of them had already mounted all unperceived, for the noise of the storm e darkness of the night prevented a discovery. , however, which had been accidentally n from a battlement, fell with so much that it alarmed the nearest guard. Imme- there was a call to arms, and the whole of sieging army was presently in motion. The nder of the garrison, according to the plan rted, sallied from the opposite part of the and made a feigned attack upon the first line enchment. The besieging army, distracted onfused amidst the darkness and tempest night, knew not whither to move; and a of three hundred men only went beyond the es, and directed their march according to amour which they heard. Fire signals were , to give notice to Thebes; but in order to r these ineffectual, the garrison also set up s in different parts of the town.

the mean time, the Platæans who had reached op of the wall killed the guards in both s, and discharged missile weapons against that attempted to hinder the ascent of their ades. The parapet between the towers was n down to make their passage easier; rs were placed on the outside; and each, as ssed the outer ditch, formed successively on ounterscarp, and assisted those upon the rs in protecting the rest. The water in the was frozen, but not sufficiently firm to ad- passage over it; and it was therefore crossed ly and with difficulty; and the three hundred who acted as a reserve approached before

those upon the towers had descended to
it. The torches which this party carried in t
hands did them, however, very little servi
while they enabled the Platæans to see the num
and position of the enemy, and to direct mis
weapons against them with so much effect, as
afford to the last of their comrades an opportu
of crossing the ditch. This was no sooner do
than they hastened off, and struck directly i
the Theban road, which they knew they wo
be the least suspected to take. The stratag
was crowned with the completest success; i
they could perceive the Peloponnesians w
torches pursuing along the Athenian road.
Platæans, having followed the way to Thebes
some time, turned off into another direction,
gained the mountain, and arrived safe at Athens

The number of those who engaged in this
rilous but well planned and ably executed ent
prise, and who profited by its success, amoun
to two hundred and twelve. None were kill
One only was taken upon the counterscarp; i
six or seven returned without attempting to s
the wall. These informed the garrison, that
their comrades who persevered in the undertak
were cut off to a man. In consequence of this
herald was sent to demand the bodies of their co
panions, in order to have them buried; but
besiegers candidly undeceived him, and acquain
him with the success of their enterprise.

The garrison in the town, however, was at len
compelled by famine to think of capitulating. Th
proposal was first made by the Lacedæmon
general; who assured them, that if they would
luntarily submit themselves to the Spartans
their judges, none should be punished withou

al, and the innocent should be set free. The Pla-
ans, utterly incapable of contending for better
ms, acceded to these; and the town and the
mnant of its inhabitants were accordingly sur-
ndered to the Lacedæmonians. Soon after com-
issioners arrived from Sparta, authorized to de-
le, or rather to pronounce their doom; for the
ode of trial promised nothing equitable. The
ly question put to them was, whether they had
ndered the Peloponnesians any service during
e present war? Startled at such a question, they
ged their confidence in the justice of the Lace-
monians, and the expectation of a different
id of trial, which had induced them to surrender.
ey pleaded the acknowledged merit of their com-
nwealth with Sparta and with all Greece in the
rsian wars; and they made particular mention
their assisting that state in the rebellion of the
lotes. They alleged, that the refusal of the
cedæmonians to protect them against the The-
ns had obliged them to seek the friendship and
alliance of Athens; and they therefore expatiated
the cruelty of punishing them for not having
erted a confederacy, to abandon which would
e been a mark of the basest ingratitude. They
ought the Lacedæmonians not to lay waste
se temples, in which thanksgivings had been
ered up to the Gods for blessing Greece
h liberty, and freeing it from the dread of the
rsian yoke. And if their commonwealth should
destroyed, the solemn and sacred rites of united
reece, which had been appointed to be performed
the Plataean people, would immediately cease,
l be abolished. Finally, adjuring the Lacedæ-
nians by every thing human and divine, they
precated being delivered up to the vengeance of

their ancient and inveterate enemies the Th
whose treacherous and insidious conduct the
successfully resisted, and justly punished
requested that the Spartans themselves
rather take possession of the town according
terms of capitulation.

The Thebans, whose hatred of the Platæans
not be effaced by time, replied by asserting
ancient claim of sovereignty over Platæa
affirmed that the connection with Athens
not excuse the Platæans for their defection
the general confederacy of Greece. "With
gard to the attempt to surprise your city,"
tinued the Theban orator, "the most
table of your citizens invited us, opened
gates to us, and under their authority we
Nothing hostile was meditated against you
sole aim was, to detach you from a foreig
nection, and reunite you to the body of the B
people. Nevertheless our citizens were but
contrary to the promise you had given.
fathers of those youths whom the Platæans
dered after they had submitted to mercy
the very men that rescued Bœotia from th
yoke, and restored it to the Grecian confe
Their lamentations and tears demand of you,
dæmonians, the punishment of these me
that justice to which, by the laws and cust
Greece, we are entitled."

The Lacedæmonian commissioners, accor
the instructions received from Sparta, insiste

The number of the Platæans amounted to ndred, and that of the Athenians to twenty- The women were condemned to slavery; e town and territory given to the Thebans. Platæan refugees, however, of the aristo- party, and some Megarean exiles, were ed to inhabit the place during one year. this the lands, being confiscated to the nse of the Thebans, were leased out for ten the citizens of that state: the town was with the ground; but the temples were ly preserved; and an inn, two hundred nare, not unlike the modern caravanseras East, was built with the materials. Such was of Platæa, in the ninety-third year after nce with Athens.

At this time happened a revolt in the Lesbos, which had been subject to . The Athenians thereupon sent a B.C. 427. f galleys to reduce the island; which after me was effected. We have already seen the tions in Corcyra, which gave rise to the nesian war. The Corinthians had taken a number of Corcyrean prisoners; some of were sold for slaves; but the rest were ated, and had their freedom promised them, dition of endeavouring to influence their men to espouse the interest of the Co- ns and their allies, and to prejudice them Athens and democratical administrations ral. The Corcyrean nobles readily acceded roposal; and the Corinthians accordingly set t liberty. Every Corcyrean was examined ly by them, relative to giving support, in eral assembly, to a proposal for renouncing nce with Athens, and renewing the ancient tion of Corcyra with Corinth, its metropolis.

Success in these overtures was various; but
soon grew warm, and the whole island was
sently in commotion. The aristocratical par
first prevailed, and destroyed great numbe
those who inclined to a democracy. The A
nians, however, sending two powerful flee
the assistance of the distressed faction, the Pelo
nesians, who aided the aristocracy, were ob
to leave the island. The democratical party
mediately prepared to revenge the injuries
had received from their antagonists. One o
most horrid massacres recorded in history
sued. Neither temples nor altars afforded
tection. The miserable victims were dragge
the most revered and sacred fanes; the
and pavements of which were, for the first
stained with human blood. Many withdrew th
selves, by a voluntary death, from the fur
their enemies. In every house, and in e
family, scenes of bloodshed were exhibited
numerous and too tragical to be described.
rents, children, brothers, and pretended fri
seized the desired moment to gratify their l
malignity, and to perpetrate the most s
enormities. Eurymedon, the Athenian adm
showed neither ability nor inclination to sto
carnage. For six days did the Athenian fleet
main in the harbour of Corcyra; during w
time, the actors in these horrid scenes h
aggravated the excesses of their guilt, and
proved in the refinement of their cruelty.

A dreadful calm succeeded this violent c
motion; and five hundred of the aristocratica
tion escaped to Epirus. They procured a
ance from Corinth and Lacedæmon; and the A
nian fleet having retired, the party that inclin
democracy was in its turn persecuted by its r

other armament arriving from Athens ena-
ıe former again to obtain the ascendancy.
of the aristocratical faction, being thus once
›bliged to submit to the justice and mercy
r enemies, were confined in a dungeon;
e they were dragged by parties of twenty at
; and compelled to pass in pairs, with their
ied behind their backs, between two ranks
r enemies, who tortured them with whips,
›ointed iron bars, and every instrument of
ns and disgraceful torment. As soon as the
es that had been left in the prison under-
what ignominious cruelty was inflicted on
›mpanions, they refused to quit their con-
nt, but desired the Athenians to destroy
n their present situation. This favour, how-
was refused; and the populace, not daring
e a passage guarded by despair, unroofed
ison, and overwhelmed those below with
darts, and arrows. The miserable pri-
attempted, at first, to defend themselves;
ıding all their endeavours vain and fruitless,
ıat the animosity of their enemies did not
they determined to finish their existence
ir misfortunes at once. During the night,
›re, they destroyed themselves; and when
›rning arose, the Corcyreans found them all
The bodies, piled upon waggons, were
out of the city, and no funeral services
ted for them. Eurymedon, after acting a
onspicuous part in these tragical occur-
again set sail, and quitted the Corcyrean
r.

s ended the sedition of Corcyra; but the
uences it produced had a much longer du-

Almost all the states of Greece expe-
rienced,

rienced, in their turn, the like commotions every republic, and in almost every city, ambitious and the intriguing found means o curing the assistance of Sparta or of Athens cordingly as they favoured the aristocratic democratical interest. A virtuous and mo oligarchy, or a pure and perfect liberty, we specious pretences under which these parti spectively acted. Sheltered by these names prodigal assassin freed himself from the cla and the threats of his creditor; the parent unnatural cruelty punished the extravagan dissipation of the son; the son avenged, b ridicle, the severity and inflexibility of t rent. Public assemblies, that met to consu welfare of the state, decided their debates b sword; men universally thirsted for blood this general disorder overwhelmed all laws h and divine. Such are the wretched and dete delusions by which individuals ruin the p and themselves.

The picture of the Peloponnesian war w be more agreeable if diversified by scen a milder and more pleasing nature. But, the occurrences and transactions of this p present us only with a dark and melan prospect; and the episodes commonly reflec same colour as the principal action. At this tim

B. C. 426. pened innumerable earthquakes in Gr and the pestilence returning swept off numbers of the Athenians. An army the command of Demosthenes, an Athenian ge undertook an expedition against Ætolia. B operations necessary for this purpose wer structed by the jealousies and dissensions confederates; each state in alliance with A

in

ıg that the whole force of the war should be
d against its particular enemies. Demo-
s, however, after having been defeated in
, obtained some very considerable victories
ıe Ambracians, a brave and warlike people;
hich he returned with honour to Athens.
ugh the term of the command of Demo-
s had expired, his mind could not brook in-
y; and he requested leave to sail as a vo-
r with the armament which was about to
for the coast of Peloponnesus. By a decree
people, therefore, this permission was grant-
him; together with authority to employ the
nians as he should think proper. While the
oasted along the Peloponnesian shores, De-
ənes advised the Athenian commanders to
nd rebuild Pylus; which, though it enjoyed
enient haven, and was strongly fortified by
, the Spartans had abandoned. He was
ed, however, 'that there were many barren
on the coast of Peloponnesus, which those
fortify who wished to entail a useless ex-
on their country.' He desisted, therefore,
ıy further entreaties; till a storm accidentally
the whole fleet towards the Pylian harbour.
ircumstance induced him to renew his re-

At length the soldiers and sailors, weary
ness, began the work; and carried it on
ıch activity and zeal, that they fortified the
n six days. The fleet then sailed to Corcyra;
emosthenes remained with five ships, to
this new acquisition.

sooner were the Spartans informed of this
e, than they immediately withdrew their
from its annual invasion of Attica, and
d their fleet from Corcyra. The citizens

flew

flew to arms, and marched to Pylus; but th
was so well fortified, that nothing could b
against it until the whole Spartan army
arrive. As soon as all the forces were asse
Pylus was vigorously assaulted by sea an
The walls being weakest at the entrance
harbour, the most furious attack was made
and the resistance was no less obstinate.

Demosthenes encouraged his men by hi
and action. The gallant Brasidas exhort
Lacedæmonians to save the honour of their c
and commanded the pilots to drive thei
against the beach. In endeavouring, howe
enforce these commands by his own ex
he received a wound, and fell into the sea,
cently without life. But some of his atte
recovered him; and when his senses return
perceived that his shield was gone. The sh
Brasidas, however, was lost more glorious
ever shield was defended.

Demosthenes, with few troops, and v
equal strength, resisted the attack of the en
three days. At length, however, the fleet,
had been apprised of his danger, returned fro
cyra, and terminated the incredible labours
small and exhausted garrison. The Athen
Lacedæmonian armaments immediately e
and the latter was defeated. An event, h
which arose principally from a want of vi
and foresight, was calculated to depress th
of the Spartans, even more than the loss
ships that were destroyed in this battle, t
dispersion of their fleet, and the unexpecte
of the place.

Before the harbour of Pylus lies an islan
two miles in circumference, called Sph

is barren, woody, and uninhabited. In
nd the Spartans had imprudently posted a
nent of four hundred and twenty heavy-
men, with a much greater number of
. They did not reflect, that as soon as
enians obtained the command of the neigh-
g sea, these forces must be at their mercy.
nsideration did not occur to them till their
as defeated. It then produced the most
t affliction; as the Spartans in the island
f the first families of the commonwealth.
ediate notice of this disaster was dispatched
ta. The annual magistrates, with a depu-
rom the senate, hastened to examine matters
pot. The misfortune appeared to admit of no
; and such was the value of this body of ci-
to the community at large, that it was uni-
resolved to solicit a truce, until ambassa-
uld be sent to Athens to treat for a general

The Athenians accordingly agreed to a
sion of hostilities; provided the Spartans, as
ge of the sincerity of their intentions, would
t to deliver up the whole of their fleet,
ting to sixty vessels. This mortifying and
ating condition was accepted. During the
of twenty days consumed in this embassy,
cedæmonian troops intercepted in Sphacteria
supplied with a stated proportion of food
ne.

en the Spartan ambassadors entered into the
sion respecting a permanent treaty, they re-
d the Athenians of the advantages which
result to all Greece, and in a more particular
r to Athens, if they embraced the proffered
e of the Lacedæmonian republic. The propo-
conciliation, if accepted in the moment of
victory,

victory, would greatly redound to the gl
Athens; but, if rejected, would complete
certain who were the real aggressors and pro
of the war, and to whom the calamities that
thence ensue ought in justice to be imputed

The meek and submissive spirit of this di
tended to discover to the Athenians the full
of their victory. Cleon, a clamorous demagog
stigated the people to demand, as the prelim
of peace, that the Spartans in Sphacteria sho
sent to Athens, and that many fortified a
portant places belonging to the Lacedæm
should be surrendered. These lofty prete
did not appear to the Spartan negotiators ju
by the military events which had taken
and they returned with disgust. The Athen
varrour, and groundless pretences, refused to
the fleet which had been surrendered as a ph
the treaty; and both parties prepared to r
mence hostilities,—the Athenians, that they
vindicate the arrogance of their pretensions
the Spartans, that they might avenge it.

It was determined to attempt the reduc
the soldiers in Sphacteria by famine, rath
by the sword. The Athenian fleet, the
guarded the island night and day. But n
standing its vigilance, supplies were often
into the place during storms and darkness.
blockade was fruitlessly protracted for
weeks; and the besiegers began to suffer
with the besieged. In the mean time, ma
murmurs were raised in Athens against Demos
who blockaded Sphacteria, and Cleon, w
prevented an advantageous peace. The la
order to elude the accusation against him, s
that if he were appointed general, he would

e island with a small force, and take it at the
st onset.

This proposal was no sooner made than in-
antly agreed to; and the chief command was
ded to him. Cleon, more clamorous than cou-
geous, and little expecting that the Athenians
ould have accepted his offer, was at a loss what
easure to pursue. Not forsaken, however, by
s natural confidence, he advanced to the middle
the assembly, and declared that he was not
raid of the Lacedæmonians; and engaged to bring
e Spartans prisoners to Athens within twenty
ys, or to die in the attempt. This declaration
cited the ridicule of the multitude; while the
ore discerning rejoiced, that they should now
ther be freed from the clamours of a turbulent
magogue, or that the Spartans in Sphacteria
ould be subdued.

Just at this time some of the Lacedæmonian
ldiers in the island, in dressing their victuals,
ppened to set the wood on fire; and a brisk
le springing up, a most violent conflagration
sued, and the whole place was threatened with
struction. This unforeseen disaster disclosed
the enemy the strength and situation of the
artans; and Demosthenes was actually preparing
embrace the favourable moment, and to attack
em, when Cleon with his troops arrived in the
mp. During the night the island was partially
vaded; and in the morning the Athenians made
descent from seventy ships. The Lacedæmonian,
volved in the ashes of the late wood, (which
ing blown about by the wind interrupted the
ght on all sides,) endeavoured to make good their
treat to a strong post opposite to Pylus; but they
ere greatly harassed in their march by showers

of arrows, stones, and darts. Being close bodied, however, and presenting a dread threatening front to the enemy, they retre good order, and with comparatively lit When they had gained possession of the po repelled with courage and vigour every app the enemy; for the nature of the ground v that they could not easily be surrounded. the whole day the contending parties fou the greatest obstinacy, under the painful of thirst and a scorching sun. At length t senians discovered an unknown path tha the enemy's rear, and immediately clim eminence. The Spartans thus encompasse sides, and reduced to a similar situation w brave countrymen at Thermopylæ, were at once by the Athenians in front and the nians behind.

Nor did this devoted band disgrace the of Leonidas. Many of the commande slain; and those who were wounded their soldiers to persevere in the battle. De nes and Cleon, perceiving that the Spart resolved to fight till every man was slain, a desirous of carrying them prisoners to checked their own troops. A herald was sent to offer quarter to the foe, provi

t. This was refused; but a conference fol-
d, and the Athenian generals sent for a herald
that army. Several messages having passed
een them, a final answer was received by the
son in the island, purporting that the Lace-
enians permitted them to consult their own
, provided they submitted to nothing dis-
ful. As soon as the Spartans in B. C.
cteria received this message they sur- 425.
red.

the next day the dead were given up to be
d, and the Athenians erected their trophy.
captive Spartans were carried to Athens:
y a decree of the people it was resolved that
should be kept in chains until the establishment
ace between the two states; but it was at the
time declared (in order to intimidate the
dæmonian government), that in case of the
onnesians invading Attica, all these prisoners
ld be immediately put to death. The Athenian
nanders left a strong garrison in Pylus, which
oon reinforced by an enterprising body of Mes-
ns from Naupactus. The Messenians, though
ssed of only a barren cape on their native
once-happy coast, infested the neighbouring
try with continual incursions; and the Helotes,
ted by their affection for their ancient kins-
and animated by resentment against their ty-
cal masters, revolted to them in great numbers.
s was now so fortified, that while supplies
l be received by sea no impression could be
upon it by land. In this situation of things,
Lacedæmonians, anxiously desirous of peace,
cted that their successful rivals would only
t them, if they made any public proposals for
commodation between the two states. They

of others still more deplorable. The citi
Olynthus, and other places of the Chalcidic
embraced the earliest opportunity of re
from Athens. When, therefore, the victo
Demosthenes and Nicias, in the eighth yea
war, were made known to them, they fea
vengeance of the Athenians, and craved ass
from their Peloponnesian allies. At the sam
Perdiccas, king of Macedonia, (who regar
Athenians as his ancient and natural enemi
the rapacious invaders of his coast,) sent
soldiers in Greece, whom he intended to
in resisting the attempts of that ambitious
and in subduing the several barbarous trib
had not yet submitted to the Macedonian p

Brasidas was therefore appointed by the S
to undertake this expedition; and he having
forces with Perdiccas, the army marched
Arribæus, king of the Lyncestians. This
however, offering to submit the differen
tween Perdiccas and himself to the determ
of Brasidas, the Spartan general listene
proposal which seemed so reasonable. A
ingly a negotiation was opened for this pu
but Perdiccas, having in view more an
prospects, refused to accept as a judge t
whom he had hired to be an auxiliary. Bras
the other hand, avowed that he could not t
waging war with those who implored his
and protection; and therefore soon after co
a treaty with Arribæus, in which that prin
numbered among the allies of Sparta. P
was highly incensed at this measure, which
been unable to prevent; and the two g
parted in mutual disgust.

Brasidas, having joined the Chalcidians

d offensive operations against the states in
e with Athens. Acanthus, in which some
principal persons were known to incline to
acedæmonian interest, was intended to be
d first. This place being summoned, after
leliberations among the people, the Spartan
nder was permitted to enter the town, and
d to declare his proposals before the general
bly. This he did in a very eloquent and
us speech, in which he inveighed bitterly
the ambition and tyranny of Athens, and
l of the great superiority of the Lacedæ-
ns, with respect to their military force; and
ngaged the Acanthians to accept the friend-
id alliance of Sparta. Stagirus, another city
Strymonic gulf, readily followed the ex-
, and became a member of the Lacedæ-
n confederacy. During the winter, the Spar-
mmander signalized himself with equal abi-
id enterprise. His operations against the
towns facilitated in a very considerable de-
e reduction of such places as by their ma-
or insular situation were most exposed to
ngeance of Athens, and therefore most
to recede from the alliance of that state.
ngth, however, by the success of his arms,
oderate use he made of victory, and his be-
r to the vanquished, all which circumstances
uted to render him uniformly prosperous,
as became master of most of the places in
ninsulas of Acta, Sithonia, and Pallene.
loss of Amphipolis was what the Athenian
most severely felt, and for which they were
afflicted. The government of Thasos had
committed to Thucydides, the celebrated
historian; and he had also the direction of
the

the gold and silver mines on the oppo
As soon as this illustrious Athenian recei
mation that the Amphipolitan territor
vaded by a Spartan army, he hastened
the town; but arrived too late to be of
service. When the success of the exp
Brasidas was known at Athens, the popu
was extremely great. A truce for one y
ever, was agreed on soon after betwee
republics. These proceedings were w
expected by Brasidas; who received the s
of two considerable places in the peninsu
lene after hostilities had been suspended.

This action of the Spartan general, a
happy influence of Cleon, promoted th
of the war. That demagogue was conti
tolling the greatness and power of At
instigating his countrymen to punish the
and perfidy of Sparta, in abetting the
those places in Macedonia after the truc
agreed on. By such exertions he su
procuring himself to be appointed to the
of a fleet of thirty galleys, twelve hundr
heavy-armed, a squadron of three hunc
and a powerful body of light-armed
With this armament, after having tak
two places, he proceeded against Amphi
applied to Perdiccas, king of Macedoni
cours, which, according to treaty, that
was bound to furnish. But Brasidas, av
inferiority of his troops in arms and
and the more confident of the resources
genius, as he knew the inability of the
had to oppose, wished to join battle
expected assistance should arrive. Ac
perceiving that Cleon advanced towards

gligent and disorderly manner, he gave orders tack the Athenians by surprise, and in different of their army. This was instantly done; and nemy, confounded with the rapidity and com- ted charge, fled with precipitation; while Cleon, gh foremost, was killed in the pursuit. Bra- , being also wounded, died soon afterward. arcely any Spartan recorded in history, and indeed of any nation, have been endowed with talents for military command, for persuasion, for making and maintaining conquests, as Bra- . The estimation in which the different states communities held this great and extraordinary , may be collected from the sorrow which they essed at his death, and the honours paid to his ory. The ceremonies of his funeral were rmed with the utmost solemnity, amidst the of those who considered his virtues and abi-

as the surest pledges of their own happiness ecurity. The citizens of Amphipolis erected nument to perpetuate his name; and, by way istinction, every testimony of their former rs and patriots was carefully destroyed. They inted annual games with sacrifices to be cele- d at his tomb; and decreed worship to him, e hero and founder of their community. It ated that his mother, hearing Brasidas praised ome Thracians, who asserted that no person was equal to him, replied, "My son was ed a man of great merit, but I hope there are y superior to him in Sparta."

y the death of Cleon and Brasidas, the prin- obstacles to peace were removed. The Athe- s, dejected by defeat, wanted the imposing uence of Cleon to disguise their weakness, varnish their misfortunes. Their armament

was greatly enfeebled, and they saw no
of regaining their possessions in Macedon
greatest part, therefore, of those who
home, seemed sufficiently desirous of fo
an accommodation with the enemy. Ni
had succeeded to the influence of Cleon,
clined to pacific measures; and, happily
sufferings of mankind, the same moder
observable in Pleistoanax, king of Sparta.
conferences were held during winter: t
tiation, however, did not appear likely t
successful, and therefore towards spring
cedæmonians circulated a report that th
fortify Attica; but immediately after, p
ries of peace were agreed on. By the c
B. C. 421. of this treaty, all places and prison
in the course of the war were t
tually restored. The several states
were supposed to be included in this
but each of the other communities refused
any restitution. The peace was to con
fifty years; and as Nicias was its great p
it was universally called the Peace of Nici
disposition of this man was exactly the r
that of Cleon. The latter was violent a
lent, and a vehement enemy of the La
nians: Nicias was gentle in his manners,
to the Spartans, and advised his countr
pursue moderate and pacific measures.
of a virtuous but timid disposition, endo
much prudence, and little enterprise;
sessed of moderate abilities, but immensel

CHAP. IX.

he Peace of Nicias to the total Overthrow of the Expedition against Sicily.

treaty of peace thus concluded, after a war ten years, was at last ill calculated to give satisfaction, and to fix and establish per- and universal quiet. The Lacedæmonians ulated that all places and possessions of they had been deprived during the war be restored to them. But their allies, and lly the Corinthians and Megareans, were suffer very considerably; and the Eleans red themselves treated with the greatest e and oppression. The Lacedæmonians ld not carry into effect some of the most nt articles of the treaty. Amphipolis, and er towns in that neighbourhood, refused to gain into an alliance with the Athenians. ere also equally unsuccessful in endeavouring mmodate matters with the Argives; and a th that state, in which the greatest part of nesus would probably be against them, inevitable. Alarmed by these considera- he Spartans sent proposals to Athens, rela a defensive alliance between the two states, was immediately concluded.

Corinthians, irritated now against the Lace- ians, and equally indignant with Athens, hed deputies to Argos as soon as the con- of the confederacy was dismissed. These, roused the ambition of the Argives, con-

jured

jured them to vindicate the honour of Pel sus, which had been shamefully abandone pusillanimity or betrayed by the selfishnes Spartans. The Argives were well disp listen to what was recommended. Hav served a prudent neutrality during the l nesian war, their state was grown wea strong. Their protection was courted by the other smaller communities of Greec before the conclusion of peace had t friends and allies of Sparta. To this as of popular governments, an accession st important was soon acquired; and Ath received into the confederacy. The n which this was effected it is proper to expl

Amidst the factious turbulence of ser assemblies in that city, whatever was prop adopted by one party was certain to meet position from another, however prudent cessary the measure might be. Those posed the peace of Nicias were many; b the number, one man shone illustriously nent above all his companions, and on th sion first displayed those singular but unl lents which proved fatal to himself an country.

By the constitutions of Solon, no Athe permitted to speak in public till he had c his thirtieth year; but Alcibiades had n tained this age. Every circumstance, l which could plead an exception to that la in his person. His birth and fortune, hi and acquired abilities, the accomplishmer mind and body, all conspired to render favourite of the people. Amidst the rhetoricians and sophists at that time i

, Alcibiades distinguished the superior
f Socrates, who, rejecting all fictitious and
e studies, confined himself to matters of
portance and utility. He was, however,
armed with the eloquence than with the
ice and integrity of the philosopher; and
thful levity of Alcibiades was chiefly de-
with the splendour of particular exploits.
active intrepidity of Socrates, when, quitting
de of speculation and the groves of Acade-
d grasping his spear, he justified by his
achievements the useful lessons of his phi-
, could not but attract the esteem and re-
of his young disciple.

if Alcibiades was fascinated by the abilities
eriority of Socrates, that philosopher enter-
no less respect and affection for his pupil.
s favourite youth laboured under a lamen-
effect, which neither his birth and fortune,
great mental and bodily accomplishments,
n the friendship of Socrates, could com-
. He wanted a sincere and honest heart.
ents of Socrates had led Alcibiades to ad-
nd attach himself to that philosopher; this
ient he was induced to maintain, not through
e of becoming a wise and good, but a great
e, man by his instructions. Some inclina-
virtue he might in such company feel, or
feign; for he was capable of adopting at
e the most opposite manners; and though
passed occasionally the splendid magnificence
ens, he could conform, when it was neces-
o a more rigid frugality than even Sparta
d. He could imitate the laborious exercis
Thebans, or the voluptuous conduct of Ion

He could assume the soft and effeminate
of an eastern potentate, or rival the vic
Thracians.

It was generally reckoned important f
who sought eminence in the state, to ext
strengthen their political connections wi
Grecian communities. The family of A
had been long united, in friendly and h
intercourse, with Sparta; and he had b
duous in kind attention to the Laced
prisoners taken at Sphacteria. The Spa
vernment, however, little partial to seein
men raised to political eminence, and
averse to the wild and luxurious extrava
Alcibiades, disregarded his advances, and
no respect. Whenever they had any bu
transact with the republic of Athens, they
made their suit to Nicias, for whom they
the highest regard.

This conduct induced Alcibiades, with
of gratifying at once his resentment, his
and his jealousy, to renew the war, and
the Spartans and Nicias. We have befor
the obstacles with which that people ha
tend in carrying into effect the treaty
The Lacedæmonians were bound to cede
places and possessions to the Athenians: t
though they set at liberty the prisoners
Sphacteria, refused nevertheless to surren
until the conditions stipulated in return
performed. Mutual reluctance (or, what
is more likely, inability,) to comply with th
of peace, produced animosity and disa
between the two states. In their eagerne
cover Pylus, without which they were

e impossible to contend with any advan-
ainst Athens, the Spartans renewed their
with the Thebans, from whom they re-
Panactum. In this transaction, however,
erlooked an important clause in the treaty
thens, "that neither state should, without
consent, conclude any new confederacy."
xcuse this infringement of the treaty, which
irmed to have been unintentional, they sent
ıdors to Athens; and requested that state
pt Panactum, which they had carefully dis-
l, in exchange for Pylus. And as these
s declared in the senate, that they were in-
with full powers for cementing a permanent
hip between the two communities, their pro-
as heard without emotion or surprise. After
lience, Alcibiades invited the Lacedæmonian
ıdors to an entertainment; when he pretend-
e a great admirer and friend of the Spartan
ınd professed his readiness to cooperate with
ı obtaining the object of their mission. But
was one circumstance, he observed, that
ed in the speech they had made, which gave
ıch concern, and which it would have been
lvantage to have entirely suppressed. This
eir mentioning the full powers with which
ere invested. They must beware of repeat-
ıt error in the popular assembly; for the ra-
of the citizens was such, that if they should be
d of this circumstance, their demands would
great that the honour and the safety of Sparta
not possibly allow them to be complied with.
conc.aled the extent of their commission,
lare which would only indicate timidity and
e insolence, he pledged himself to support
ause, and to procure for them the full gra
ı of their wishes.

The Spartans, ignorant of the character
cibiades, and of his having been formerly i
with the neglect and ingratitude of their c
confided in him as their public and political
When, therefore, they appeared before the
the artful Athenian interrogated them, with
voice, as to the object and extent of thei
mission. They replied, that they had
powers granted to them. Alcibiades, affe
transport of indignation, arraigned the b
and audacity of a people, by whom his ov
suspecting credulity had been abused. "I
yesterday," cried he, "they declared in the
the full powers with which they were inv
and to-day they deny what they so lately as
They have totally infringed the articles
treaty; Amphipolis is not restored; an alli
entered into with the Theban state; and the
you Panactum, after they have demolish
walls and fortifications. Can you tamely s
Athenians! to such indignities? Will yo
expel such traitors from your presence, an
your city?" This extraordinary and unex
harangue wholly disconcerted the ambas
and they retired abruptly from the assembly.
cias and others, who were known to favo
Lacedæmonian republic, shared the disgrace
Alcibiades endeavoured to persuade the
to embrace the Argive alliance. But befo
was effected, Nicias proposed that he mi
sent as ambassador to Lacedæmon. To th
posal the assembly immediately consented.
instructions, however, given to Nicias by the
nian people were such, that upon his arri
Sparta his demands were ill-received, a
returned to Athens without obtaining an
object of his mission. A league offensive a

f

between the Argives and the Athenians,
hundred years, was instantly negotiated;
h the several independent allies of each
ng power were included: and by this
on, Athens instead of Lacedæmon be-
e head of the Dorian states, and of the
l confederacy in Peloponnesus.

alliance, though it did not cancel that
g between Sparta and Athens, was never-
wholly inimical to the former state. Though
ds of Alcibiades could not commend the
by which he had attained his purpose,
considered it as a masterpiece in politics,
e and shake all Peloponnesus. By these
the war would be removed to a great
from Athens; and, if the Spartans should
uerors, success would avail them little;
ey suffered a defeat, the whole of Lace-
would be in danger.

ght be expected, that the weight of such
rful confederacy would have speedily
the weakness of Sparta, already enfeebled
austed by the former war. But the military
ns of Greece depended not so much on the
strength of the contending powers, as on the
preponderance of faction. The Spartans,
the confederacy thus formed against them,
to endeavour to crush the evil at once, and
intimidate other cities from revolting. A
us and formidable army was therefore col-
and as their king Pleistoanax had been a
r of the peace of Nicias, the command
en to Agis, his more warlike colleague.
llies showed unusual ardour in the cause,
tered all their troops to join the Lace-
an army.

The Argives observed the approaching and prepared to resist its force. The Ele Mantineans joined their troops to the A who, without waiting for the Athenian aux boldly took the field to oppose the invaders skilful manœuvres of Agis completely cut c return to Argos; and a battle seemed ine But whether the Argive commanders were certed by the judicious position of the ener saw the danger of their own situation; or v they were touched with compunction at such numerous bodies of men, principally n the same country, of the same extractio speaking the same language, about to imbr hands in kindred blood, is unknown. however it is, that they went privately t and, pledging themselves to endeavour to p reconciliation and alliance between Argos cedæmon upon satisfactory terms to the latt prevailed with him to grant, by his sole au a truce for four months. The Lacedæmonia therefore, to the astonishment of every o immediately ordered to retreat.

B.C. 417. This measure occasioned unive content, which was followed by l licentious clamours. The Spartans a allies complained, "That, after having as such a body of forces as had scarcely ev seen in Peloponnesus, whose attachment cause was ardent, and whose numbers and were invincible; and after surrounding th mies on every side, and depriving them c resource, the glorious hope or rather cert the most complete and important victo snatched from their grasp, by the treach cowardice, or the caprice, of their gen

other hand, the Argives lamented, that merous enemies, inadvertently enclosed the allied army and the garrison of Argos, h situation they might easily have been and cut to pieces, should have been to escape, by a hasty and ingredient ion. Nor was the resentment of the ople confined to vain and fruitless com- The public indignation, apparently ob- by the democratical leaders, rose so high houses of Thrasyllus and Alcibiades were by the most daring and seditious of the . Thrasyllus and his colleague, however, eir lives by fleeing to the protection of but a decree of the people declared all cts confiscated.

after the retreat of the Lacedæmonians, nian auxiliaries arrived at Argos. Alci- s invested with the character of ambas- that state. His activity would not fail to the popular tumult, in which his own and enian interests were concerned. His en- revailed over the few who seem to desire ing moderate and pacific measures. He ed the Argives with their breach of faith Athens: represented the irresistible and s strength of the confederacy; showed y peculiarly favourable the circumstances continuing the war; and concluded by g, that they might now make an import- ipt, with a certain prospect of success. proposal they at once accepted; and, thus ed by the Athenian ambassador, the Ar- their allies were persuaded to break the h Sparta. The army marched to Orcho- an ancient and wealthy town of Arcadia.

The

The fortifications of the place were weak people, alarmed by the greatness of the f pared to attack them, and apprehensive overpowered before succours could arriv to a capitulation.

The Eleans were now urgent that bined army should endeavour to recover a district upon their own borders; but paid no regard to their solicitations. Th neans proposed the much more import sition of Tegea; and giving assurance carried on a correspondence with a fact town, the Argives and the Athenians with this project. The Eleans were so satisfied with this preference of the great of the confederacy to their own particular that they returned home; and the army to lay siege to Tegea.

It was not without indignation that dæmonians heard of the submission o menus, the siege of Tegea, and the daring infraction of the treaty. They displeased with the truce granted by thei but whilst peace was the apparent conse the measure, they had confined their re merely to expressions of disapprobation. however, did they feel the ruinous and d effects of his misconduct, than their ir became outrageous. He was called t with a degree of severity not usual with dæmonians. They determined to destroy and to condemn him in a fine of several pounds. But considering his former and service, and his general character, he received into favour. His talents for w mended him once more to the comma

; and he promised his countrymen, that his
e services should speedily wipe off the memory
late disgrace. The Spartans, however, ap-
ed ten counsellors, without whose concur-
he could not lead the forces beyond the La-
monian territory.

e whole force of Laconia, with that of the
states, was assembled with great celerity;
s the Spartans were desirous of withdrawing
Argives from the siege of Tegea, the army
diately marched to Mantinea. By these
s they compelled the enemy to defend that
, or permit it to fall into their hands. The
es withdrew their troops from before Tegea,
approached the Mantinean frontier. Both
s, whose ambition or resentment had been so
disappointed of an opportunity to display
force, now eagerly prepared for an engage-

eviously to the commencement of a battle,
ncient custom was for the leaders of their
ctive nations to harangue their soldiers in a
ng and appropriate speech. The Mantineans
exhorted, valiantly to contend for the de-
of their city, and the safety of their wives
hildren. The event of this battle, they were
would determine the very important alterna-
f dominion or servitude; a dominion which
had lately assumed over several cities of Ar-
or a servitude which they had already
ed under the galling yoke of Sparta. The
es were reminded of the pre-eminence they
ormerly held in Peloponnesus, and which they
ewly recovered; and of the long and bloody
carried on for the defence of their liberty
roperty, and to repel the usurpations of a
powerful

powerful and ambitious neighbour. enemy they were now about to attack; provoked their arms, and whose crim justice, exercised for several centuries, about to revenge. The Athenians h repeated, that it was glorious to ma head of warlike and faithful allies, ar themselves worthy of the ancient r Athens. They were inferior to no nati of bravery and courage. Their pow rivalled; and when they had conquere dæmonians in Peloponnesus, their domi not only be more extensive, but more

The Spartans, sensible that discipline carefully exercised, will give more co troops than the most eloquent harang exhorted their followers to exert that in and valour which could receive no assistance from the laborious display words. Thus saying, they marched i in perfect order; and moved, with thei pact and even, to meet the impetuous Argives and Athenians. Never in P had two such numerous and powerful seen before. Above a thousand Argi from among their noblest youths, ha long time employed in the constan arms, that they might maintain the pretensions of their country. These the bravest manner; while the Athe themselves not inferior in courage, a fame which their country had obtaine exploits was justly founded. The strenuously defended every thing de able to them. The Eleans, however ceded from the confederacy, the alli

eatly weakened; and the martial enthusiasm of
ng Agis, aided by the valour of the Spartans,
cided the fate of the battle. The allies were
pulsed, thrown into confusion, and completely
uted. Agis, true to the institutions of Ly-
rgus, observed the ancient maxim, which en-
ined the Spartans "to make a bridge for a
eeing enemy;" and therefore pursued the foes no
rther than to make the victory sure. In conse-
uence of this, the killed were not numerous in
roportion to the numbers engaged, and the com-
leteness of the success. The Spartans lost three
undred men, and the allies eleven hundred. The
ents of this battle restored the lustre of the Lace-
emonian character; and the misfortunes, the
isconduct, and the apparent slackness of the
artans in the course of the war with Athens,
ere no longer attributed to any degeneracy of the
ople, but to the mismanagement of the leaders,
d the chance of war.

The unfortunate battle of Mantinea strengthened
e oligarchical interest in Argos. The dread of
ch another event, and of the consequences that
nerally followed the termination of an unsuc-
ssful war in Greece, induced the Argives to
ink of an accommodation with Lacedæmon.
ccordingly, the popular form of government was
olished, the partisans of Athens were destroyed,
e league with that state was abjured, and an
liance offensive and defensive entered into with
parta. During the two following years, however
rgos paid dearly for a moment of transient splen
our. This state underwent three bloody revol-
ons, in which the atrocities committed in t
orcyrean sedition seemed to be renewed. Th

cont

contest ended, as in Corcyra, in favour o
and democracy.

The island of Melos, the largest of the
and which lies directly opposite to the
Malea, the southern promontory of Lac
next attacked by the Athenian arms. This
island, in possession of an agreeable tem
and affording the usual productions of a fine
had early invited the Spartans to send
colony, which had now enjoyed politi
pendence for seven hundred years. Bu
commencing hostilities, the Athenians
bassadors to persuade the inhabitants to s
without incurring the punishment whic
necessarily follow a vain and fruitless r
The Melians would not consent to join t
nian alliance; and declared their resoluti
betray, in an unguarded moment, the lib
had so long maintained. But they entr
Athenians to accept their offers of neutra
to abstain from an unprovoked violence.
bassadors only replied by a sarcastic thr
their government, irritated by oppositi
forces to invest the capital of Melos, and
up by sea and land. The besieged, hav
fered greatly by famine, made several
sallies, seized the Athenian magazines,
stroyed the hostile works. They were, h
partly by domestic faction, but chiefly b
gorous efforts of the enemy, compelled s
to surrender. The citizens now bec
victims of a revenge equally cruel and i
All the males who had attained the ag
turity were put to the sword; the wo
children were carried into servitude;

an colony replaced the unfortunate Me-

urch has ascribed the inhuman massacre of abitants of Melos to the pride and ambition biades. More ancient and authentic writers, er, seem by their silence on this part of bject to exculpate him from this atrocious but at the same time uniformly represent the promoter of the expedition against an expedition unjust in its principles and mate in its consequences.

re commencing the narration of those im- events which were the result of this expe- it will be proper to take a brief review of ecian colony settled in Sicily. Corinth B. C. arly acquired considerable reputa- 1084. nd power as a maritime state; and niversally seen, that the improvement of tion tends to discovery, to commerce, and onization. It produced all these effects the Corinthians. The coast of Sicily had en long known to them, when they pro- a scheme to settle a colony of Peloponne- n that country. Archias, therefore, one of eraclidæ, or descendants of Hercules, was vith a fleet, and had every thing provided for plishing the enterprise. He built and peopled use, the metropolis of Sicily, and, according ero, the greatest and most wealthy of all the possessed by the Greeks. Thucydides equals Athens when at the summit of its glory; Strabo says, that for its advantageous situa- the stateliness of its buildings, and the im- e wealth of the inhabitants, it was one of the famous cities of the world. It consisted of principal divisions: the island, which lay on outh side, and communicated with the main

land by a bridge; Achradina, whicl along the sea-coast, and was the mo and strongest part of the city; and Tyc stood between Achradina and the hill I was long subject to the Corinthians; b appear to have exercised, for any great time after its foundation, a democratic government. As it increased in power, proud and insolent; and by degrees rel dependence on Corinth. To its emanc owing the occurrences which are now lated.

As the names of Sicily and Cyre seldom occur in the subsequent parts o tory, it may be proper to notice in a bri the causes that withdrew from the sphe cian politics a fruitful and extensive an island equally fruitful and extensive, more populous and powerful. The Gr it very inconvenient to interfere in the these remote provinces, on account of tached situation. And the colonies bei moved from any assistance or protection be afforded them by their parent coun frequently obliged to submit to the op domestic tyranny, and to the ravages barbarians.

The Cyrenaicans waged alternate wa Libyans and the Carthaginians. The tyra had usurped the authority over them, exercised in a manner equally despotic a Soon afterwards, however, they receiv civil liberty; but were frequently con contend for the independence of th Though often attacked by the barbari never submitted to their oppression; a not until after the time of Alexander

ved of their liberties by an invading foe.
r that first subjected them to his dominion
rtunate general, who in the division of
s conquests succeeded his master in
ment of Egypt.

olutions that happened in the affairs of
much better known. The Syracusans
induced, by the succour granted them
cedæmonians for the defence of their
o engage in the Peloponnesian war.
rthaginians having made some formi-
ents on Sicily, by which the safety of
nd of the capital was endangered, the
were under the necessity of recalling
nent from the assistance of the Peloponnesians, in order to repel the invaders of their
The Carthaginians had entered into this
purpose of acquiring at once those va-
modities, the annual purchase of which
Africa of such immense treasures; and
ort the pretensions of Segesta and other
es at variance with Syracuse.

l, the grandson of Hamilcar, was ap-
neral of the Carthaginians. He com-
rations in the 410th, which continued
rmission until the 404th, year before
n æra. Considerable levies were made
g the native Italians and Spaniards;
ily envied the splendour and dreaded
f the Greeks, to whose conquests and
y saw no bounds. The whole army
l amounted in the spring to three
ousand men, who were transported
a proportionable number of ships.

eem that the designs of Hannibal were,
himself of the inferior and more de-

fenceless cities, before he attempted the reduc
of Syracuse; which being naturally strong,
been lately fortified by art, and could not be t
otherwise than by a blockade. In the
B. C. 409. campaign, the Carthaginian general
himself master of Selinus and Him
most of the inhabitants of which places
cruelly put to death by the victors, without re
to sex or age; and the slaughter was so ter
in Himera, that the streets flowed with b
After plundering the temples and houses,
levelling the city with the ground, Hannibal ca
three thousand of the captives to be carried t
place where his grandfather had been def
and killed by the cavalry of Gelon, in the
Carthaginian invasion: they were then ex
to the insults of the barbarians, and sacrific
the manes of Hamilcar.

This success emboldened the Carthaginians
revived the design they had always entertain
subduing the whole island of Sicily. They t
fore began to make new preparations, and
mitted the whole management of the war t
same general: but he pleading his advanced
as an excuse for not taking upon him th
command, they joined in commission with
Hamilcar, the son of Hanno, and a person c
same family. Every thing being ready, th
merous and formidable armament sailed for S
it landed on the coast of Agrigentum, and i
diately marched to that city.

The Syracusans and their confederates ha
ambassadors to Carthage, to complain of th
hostilities committed against them by Han
l to entreat the senate not to send any
ops into Sicily. The Carthaginians, hov
l

ving returned a doubtful answer to this em-
ssy, the Syracusans had made preparations for a
fence, and were ready to receive the enemy.
he Agrigentines also, expecting that the attack
ould first be made on their city, had carefully
ovided every thing necessary for sustaining a
ge; following the directions of Dexippus, a
cedæmonian, and an officer of great bravery
d experience.

Hannibal sent ambassadors to the Agrigentines,
ith a proposal either to join his standard, or to
main neuter; and declared that he would be
tisfied with their conduct, and forbear all hosti-
ies, provided they would agree to a treaty of
endship. This offer being rejected, the two Car-
aginian generals began to lay siege to the place.
t a plague broke out in the invading army,
hich carried off a great number of the soldiers,
d their general Hannibal. The Agrigentines
pected an army of Syracusans to march to their
lief, under the command of Daphneus. Ha-
lcar, having received intelligence of the approach
this force, detached all the Iberians and Cam-
nians in his army, together with forty thousand
arthaginians, with orders to engage the enemy
the plains of the river Himera. Accordingly
e Syracusans were attacked soon after they had
ossed the river, and while they advanced in good
der. through the plains, towards Agrigentum.
he contest was fierce and bloody, and the victory
r some time doubtful. At length, however,
e Syracusans, being greatly superior in point of
umbers, routed the Carthaginians, and pur-
ed them, with great slaughter, to the walls
f Agrigentum. On their approach to that
ty, the besiegers fled with precipitation to the

camp of Hamilcar, upon the neighbouri
.. Daphneus followed, with an intention of
the camp; but finding it strongly forti
thought it more advisable to guard with his
the avenues leading to it, and thereby st
enemy, or compel them to venture an
ment.

While the numerous army of Carthagini
thus blockaded, and greatly straitened fo
sion, a Syracusan fleet of sixty transports lac
corn and all kinds of necessaries was int
by the galleys of Hamilcar. Agrigentu
thus deprived of the expected relief, the n
soldiers in the city went over to the enem
the inhabitants desponding for want of nec
an assembly was convened, in which it
solved to abandon the town, and transpo
selves to some place of safety. According
greater part of the inhabitants left the city
night; and, under the escort of the Syracusa
arrived safe at Gela, where they were
with kindness and humanity, and had the
plentifully supplied. The city of Leontin
fertile territory were afterward granted to

After the departure of the Syracusan arm
milcar marched out of the trenches, and
B.C. the city; but not without betrayi
406. fear and suspicion. All who were
Agrigentum were massacred, wit
gard to sex, age, or condition. Gellias, a
and hospitable man, and the richest ci
Agrigentum, betook himself for protecti
temple of Minerva. But when he under
universal desolation of his country; and
temples were profaned and plundered, a
murdered who had sought refuge in them

o the sacred edifice, and chose to perish by
lames rather than fall into the hands of the
and merciless foe.

early fourscore years before the demolition of
gentum, Sicily acquired great renown by
ing more numerous invaders. But the efforts
e whole island were then directed against the
non enemy; whereas now, amidst the uni-
l danger and consternation of the Carthaginian
the Sicilians were distracted with domestic
ons. Hermocrates, whose prudence, valour,
ntegrity, were well known, was the only man
to direct the public affairs in the present
estuous juncture; but he had been banished
ountry. In the interval, however, between
aking of Himera and Agrigentum, he made a
le attempt, at the head of his numerous ad-
nts, to gain admission into Syracuse. The en-
ise, however, proved fatal to himself, and, in
nsequences, to the freedom of his country.
artisans were discomfited and banished: but
soon found a leader qualified to avenge their
, and to punish the ingratitude of the Syra-
s.

onysius, a native of Syracuse, of mean ex-
on but unbounded ambition, contrived to
the sovereignty of his country. He is said
ve been destitute of almost every virtue, and
ssed of almost every talent; and it was his
ne to live amidst those perturbed circum-
es of foreign and intestine war, which call
ction great and superior abilities, and favour
elevation. He distinguished himself in a
particular manner at the battle near Agri-
um. He was possessed of great bravery.
loquence also was unrivalled. In the object
of

of his pursuit he persevered with inflexibility: but the means of obtaining his purpose were not embarrassed with scruples on the score of justice, and were suited to the exigency of his affairs. Professing himself a patriot and a lover of his country, he acquired the esteem and affection of the people and employed this influence to restore his banished friends. Many who perceived the object he had in view durst not oppose his proceedings; because he had now gained so much popularity, that all resistance would have been ineffectual, and have only involved its authors in certain destruction.

Soon after this, he had the address to procure himself to be elected commander in chief of the army, with absolute and unbounded authority. In order to secure himself against the fickleness, and change of disposition, in the Syracusan populace, he pretended to be afraid of assassination during his abode at the castle of Leontini (whither he had purposely repaired), and therefore desired that a guard of soldiers might be granted him. He had requested no more than six hundred; but he engaged a thousand men, whom he caused to be completely armed, and flattered them with great promises. The mercenary soldiers also were attached to him. With this train he entered Syracuse, and the citizens were greatly alarmed at his approach. They were, however, no longer able to oppose his designs, or dispute his authority. Thus did Dionysius, by his crafty and daring ambition, raise himself to the sovereignty of the greatest and most opulent city of Sicily.

B.C. 404.

In the mean time, the Carthaginians under the command of Hamilcar, having razed the town of Agrigentum, marched with all their forces against Gela. This city, though indifferently fortified resisted

or a long time an army of three thousand
hout receiving succours from any of its
length, however, Dionysius marched an
fifty thousand foot and a thousand horse
ef; but not choosing to risk a general en-
t, he persuaded the inhabitants to abandon
ntry, as the only means of saving their
s soon as they had done this the Cartha-
ntered the city, and put to death, or
, all they found in it. Camarina shared
fate as Gela. The affecting sight of the
infirm obliged to hasten from both those
d all the citizens deprived of their wealth
essions, raised compassion in the hearts
oldiers of Dionysius, and incensed them
heir general. They considered him as
a concert with the Carthaginians; and
the Italians, in a body, left his camp
rned home; while the Syracusan cavalry,
ttempted his death on the march, rode
ed to their city, blocked up the gates,
he tyrant's palace, and ransacked and
d all his treasures. Dionysius, suspecting
igns, followed them with all expedition;
ving made himself master of the city,
the streets with his cavalry, and put to the
ll that came in his way. He even entered
ses of those whom he suspected to be
o his interests, and destroyed whole fami-
ther.

mean time a plague broke out in the Car-
n camp; and Hamilcar, finding himself
to continue the campaign, sent a herald
ysius to offer terms of peace. These un-
l overtures were very acceptable to the
And a treaty being concluded between the
two

two contending parties, the Carthaginian
mander, after losing more than half of hi
by the plague, which afterward made d
havoc in Africa, embarked the remains
troops, and sailed for Carthage.

During the long and active reign of Dic
he was generally engaged in war; sometime
the Carthaginians, and at other times with l
affected and seditious subjects: but he wa
formly victorious. The Carthaginian power ir
he greatly diminished, and appeased or i
dated domestic faction. His present dignity
ever, he only considered as a preparation f
higher. Being under no apprehensions of th
thaginians, he turned all his thoughts to the
tion of Rhegium, the key of Italy. His de
this measure was, to reduce under his domini
Grecian cities in that country. Having th
laid siege to the city, the inhabitants held
eleven months against his whole force, till
come by famine, they were compelled to sur
at discretion. When Dionysius entered th
he was astonished and terrified at the meag
pearance of the survivors, and the number
dead. He collected, however, about six th
prisoners; whom he sent to Syracuse, where
as were unable to redeem themselves were s
slaves. But the cruelty of the tyrant did n
here. He resolved to take revenge on Phy
chief magistrate of the place, by whose b
and counsel it had resisted his efforts for so
time. He caused that officer's son to be t
headlong into the sea; and the next day
himself was scourged through the city, unde
innumerable other cruelties, and was also d
to a similar death.

robable that the feeble confederacy of the Greeks could not have prevented the conthat country by the arms of Dionysius, had renewed hostilities of the Carthaginians, estic faction, hindered the execution of his This growing storm, however, he resisted ssfully as before; and transmitted to his peaceful inheritance of the greatest part of The fortifications of his capital Dionysius ened with wonderful art. He enlarged proved the form of the Syracusan galleys. nted the catapult*, an engine of war, which loyed very advantageously in reducing the Motya and Rhegium. And he not only his native island against all foreign invait rendered its power formidable to the aring countries.

intervals of leisure, Dionysius unbent his th the study of the liberal arts and sciences, cially poetry; and valued himself highly xtent of his genius, and the eloquence of ormanees. Philoxenus was the only person s court who had the courage to refuse flatis self-conceit in this respect; a conduct the tyrant was so much provoked, as to im to be carried to the common prison. leased, however, the next day, Philoxenus n desired to give his opinion of some verses onysius had composed. Upon which, he ttely cried out, "Carry me back to my This pleasantry Dionysius took in good

---

catapults here mentioned were engines from leys of arrows and stones were discharged against ed. But this word is sometimes used simply for

part,

part, and told Philoxenus that his wit atc his boldness.

Notwithstanding such endeavours to ur him, Dionysius still considered himself a the greatest of poets; and even sent his Thearides to the Olympic games, to dispu name the prizes adjudged to poetry, and to riot-races. The most skilful rhapsodists of were chosen for reciting his verses. The were, at first, charmed with the poems of sius. But when they considered, not the of delivery, but the sense and compositi reciter was immediately hissed off the sta the ambassador of the tyrant was insulted most humiliating indignities. Lysias, tl brated orator, who was then at Olymp nounced a discourse, in which he maintai it was inconsistent with the honour of and therefore improper, to admit the repre of an impious tyrant to assist at a solemnit crated to religion, virtue, and liberty.

The oration of Lysias gives ground to that the plenitude of Dionysius's power, rat the defect of his poetry, exposed him to the and derision of the Olympic audience. is, that having caused a tragedy, which he l ten, to be acted at Athens, in the last yea reign, he obtained a poetic crown from tl nian assembly; which was always cons impartial in its literary decisions.

It is remarkable, that, with a mind activ rous, and comprehensive; with a variety o and an accumulation of glory; Dionysiu be universally held out and branded as t odious of tyrants, and the object of terro own, and of hatred in after ages. But tl

cious and cruel in some respects, history will
afficient testimony that his character was not
ely flagitious. It is probable that his situ-
endered it artificial; and he is acknowledged
e assumed the appearance of virtue. He was
crafty and cautious. Sometimes, and when
ed his purpose, he was mild, affable, and
cending: at other times he was cruel, arro-
and imperious. It was not until the Syra-
had provoked his indignation, by insulting
altreating his wife and children during an in-
tion, that they felt the rigour and cruelty of
sius. There are two circumstances observ-
his character, which in all probability have
l the indignation of the Greek and Roman
sts, and occasioned them to consider him
yrannical and oppressive than he really was.
are, the usurpation of the government of a
epublic, and the profession of contempt for
ligion of his country. The bare suspicion of
ter crime had brought to death, as we have
he most amiable, most innocent, and most
tel of men*. But the impiety which Diony-
ofessed was nothing more than the dictate
interest, and sometimes the occasion of his

celebrated statue of Jupiter he stripped of
of gold; observing that such a covering was
wy in summer, and too cold in winter. For
n not less ingenious, he ordered a statue of
apius to be deprived of its golden beard; as-
; that such a venerable ornament ill became
of the beardless Apollo. If, however, he
d the statues and temples of what belonged

* Socrates.

to them, it is certain that he augmented fleets and armies of Syracuse, which were suc fully employed against the common enemy. Ag the general current of satire and invective, which the character of this extraordinary m treated, it is necessary only to mention, tha cording to the opinion of Polybius and Scipio canus, no man ever concerted his schemes greater prudence, or executed them with gr promptitude and boldness.

On his death, his son Dionysius the younge sumed the government of Syracuse. He is s
B. C. 366. have exceeded his father's vices, wi possessing his abilities. The reign o latter tyrant was distracted and inglo His disposition was mild and temperate ; bu proceeded more from indolence than a wis judicious understanding. Dion, who was acquainted with him, and knew that he was rally endowed with an inclination to virt taste for arts and sciences, and a love of le and learned men, proposed to correct the in fect and vicious education he had received. young prince, by the advice of Dion, invited to his court. But to correct the vices of D sius was a task too hard even for the united of Plato and Dion. The latter, unable to re the excesses of Dionysius, became advocate f people. The former was driven back into C by the tyrannical conduct of the prince. B patriotism of Dion, though it served to inte did not finally destroy the tyranny of Dion The magnanimity of Timoleon, however, abo the government of the tyrant in Syracuse Dionysius, who was once king of one of the wealthy states then known, became a privat

ived during the rest of his life an exile at

on no sooner perceived himself master
ie, than he invited the citizens to demolish
and citadel, which he considered as
only for the refuge and protection of ty-
fter carrying this measure into execution,
oying every vestige of tyranny, Timoleon
nany wise and salutary laws, and settled
peace and tranquillity. He then pre-
arry his arms against the Carthaginians;
d a very considerable and important vic-
that people, in which thirteen thousand of
y were slain, and fourteen thousand made
. All the baggage and provision, with a
coats of mail, and ten thousand shields,
he hands of the conquerors. Timoleon,
divided among the soldiers all the gold
plate, and other things of value, and re-
thing for himself beside the glory of the
He concluded a treaty with the Cartha-
in which it was stipulated, that all the
ies in Sicily should be released from their
ependence.

se enjoyed for the space of twenty years
of Timoleon's victories. But after his
new tyrants started up in that and al-
ery city of Sicily, and held a precarious
ler the alternate protection of the Cartha-
nd Romans. The Syracusans, not for-
their ancient fame, dethroned their usur-
enjoyed considerable intervals of liberty.
length the Romans gained pos- B. C.
of the city. This success, how- 200.
ey did not obtain but by a siege of
ars. Nor would the perseverance of Mar-

model of wisdom and virtue; and adorne history of Sicily and the age in which he The poets Simonides, Æschylus, and Bacch frequented his court, and paid their homa the greatness of his mind rather than of his for Pindar has celebrated the magnificent gene of his patron; and Xenophon, who had nc to hope or to fear from the ashes of a ki Sicily, has recorded Hiero as a prince of the consummate virtue and prudence. His succ however, was a wretch that disgraced botl throne and human nature; and was expelled Sicily by the just indignation of his subjects, forgetting the fame of Gelon, and the me Hiero, exchanged the odious power of kings furious democracy.

Distracted by internal discord, and harass external hostilities, the Greek settlements cou attend to the continental politics of Greece Syracuse, imitating the ambition of Athens, obliged most of the Dorian states to become federates, or rather tributaries. Not sati however, with having reduced these commu to dependence, the Syracusans next exerted valour against the Ionic settlements of Leont Catana, and Naxos. In the sixth year of th loponnesian war, the Leontines sent to Athen solicit assistance against the injustice and usu tions of Syracuse. The Athenians immedi complied with this request, and twenty shi war were sent to the aid of their Ionic breth Two years afterward, the Leontines again portuned the assistance of Athens; and that rep was in consequence about to engage in the with vigour, when the Syracusans, alarmed a intrusion of these ambitious strangers, promo

ge

congress of the states of Sicily. In this
ion the general interest of the island was
egarded; and all parties were engaged to
te their domestic contests, lest the power
ens should subvert and destroy their inde-
ce.

his plan of union, so seasonable and salu-
as not of long duration. Leontium was
fter taken and destroyed; its inhabitants
riven into banishment; and the Egesteans,
onfederates, were closely besieged by the
Selinus and Syracuse. These unfortunate
nities again sent to implore the aid
ens. They pleaded the rights of
guinity, and addressed not only the
s but the interest of the Athenians. They
l that their allies were bound to assist them
y principle of sound policy. They further
that the growing greatness of Syracuse, if
ressed, would become a formidable acces-
the Peloponnesian league; and that while
onian kinsmen were capable of acting with
against the Syracusans, it was the proper
or undertaking the enterprise. That they
add weight to these arguments, the am-
ors of Egesta gave an ostentatious and a
ake account of the wealth of their state,
, they assured the Athenians, was capable of
ing the whole expenses of the war. The
ians, however, deemed it advisable to send
es to Sicily, who might inquire into the
f the island, and particularly respecting the
ans.

B. C. 416.

the arrival of the ambassadors at Egesta,
ate borrowed the riches of their neighbours,
they displayed to the Athenians; and in
the

the spring following the commissioners returr with new deputies from Egesta, who brou with them about sixty talents of silver, as a mon pay in advance for sixty galleys. With this mo in their hands, which they asserted their s would monthly repeat, they were introduced the assembly of the Athenians. Allured by extravagant but flattering prospects of grand the people of Athens held two successive ass blies, in which the reasons for and against the cilian expedition were considered. In the lat the Athenians came to a resolution to raise suc naval and military force that the war might prosecuted with vigour and success.

While, however, they deliberated on the m for carrying this measure into execution, Ni who had been appointed with Alcibiades and machus to the command of the armament, omi nothing which prudence could suggest, or pa tism enforce, to deter his countrymen from dangerous and fatal design. He urged the im sibility of contending with the Spartans, an sending at the same time so great a body forces into Sicily. He expatiated on the n ness and folly of attempting to reduce so popu and powerful an island, when they had not l able to subdue the states of Greece. The assem he said, ought not to be moved by the argum and entreaties of which the Egesteans had n use, heightened as they were by feelings of sentment and misery. In short, the question, asserted, ought to be again debated; the de that had passed should be rescinded; and cause of the Egesteans be for ever abandonec the Athenians.

Alcibiades expressed an opinion diametri opp

posite to what Nicias had proposed. The under-
ing which he advised, he said, was founded in
tice and prudence; and no reasonable objection
ld be made against it: for the Egesteans and
er confederates would furnish the expenses of
war; and the danger could not be great, be-
se Sicily, however extensive, populous, and
werful, was inhabited by different nations, who
never been exercised in the discipline requisite
obtaining victory, and were without arms,
oid of patriotism, and incapable of union.
The assembly murmured their applause of the
timents of Alcibiades, ratified the decree they
already passed, and testified greater alacrity
the war than before. Nicias perceived the vio-
ce of the popular current; but he determined
make one last though ineffectual effort to resist
torrent of public opinion, and to bring the
henians to a due sense of the danger and diffi-
lty of the enterprise. The success of an in-
der, he observed, generally depended on the force
d rapidity with which his first impressions were
ade. By these means, the confidence of friends
s confirmed, and the terror and dismay of ene-
ies were excited. If the Athenians were de-
rmined to invade Sicily in spite of the dangers
d difficulties that would attend the undertaking,
ey ought to remember, that the utmost vigour
ould be requisite for carrying their designs into
ecution. They would have to contend with
ven large and powerful cities, against which no
val armament would be sufficient. Great num-
rs of pikemen, with a proportionate number of
chers and cavalry, could not ensure the success
the invasion. The towns in Sicily must be
ormed, or besieged; workmen with all kinds of

implem

presume to make the attempt with a less
than he had supposed adequate to the purpo
would decline the command, and they must
another general in his room.

This last attempt of Nicias to deter his co
men from their mad design, by magnifyin
dangers and difficulties to which the enterpri
liable, produced a quite different effect from
he intended. The obstacles which he affir
would be difficult or impossible for Ath
surmount, only served to animate the cour
the assembly. The generals were directed
decree of the people, to raise such sums of n
and levy such a body of forces, as they
suppose sufficient for rendering the success
lible. The domestic strength of Athens, ho
was not equal to the undertaking. They
therefore, to demand the assistance of their
dependent states, and to summon the reluct
of their more warlike allies. Corcyra w
pointed to be the general rendezvous of the

umber of troops was completed, and the galleys ere manned and fitted for sea.

Such were the general expectations on raising is great and powerful armament, that the hopes nd ardour of all ranks can scarcely be conceived. he aged supposed that nothing could withstand r resist such a numerous and well equipped force. he young eagerly seized the opportunity of gra-fying their curiosity and love of knowledge, in a istant navigation; and of sharing the honours nd dangers of so glorious an enterprise. The rich mbraced the means of displaying their magni-cence and liberality; and the poor rejoiced, that ie success of this expedition would procure for iem the means of future ease and happiness. In mpleting the levies, the greatest difficulty ap-eared in deciding, amongst the numbers that ffered their services, to whom the preference of alour and merit belonged; and the whole com-lement of forces, intended to be employed by sea nd land, was composed of men chosen for the urpose.

Socrates was the only person who dared openly nd boldly to deliver his opinion, condemning ie expedition, and predicting the misfortunes nd disgraces that would attend it. The authority nd sentiments of the sage philosopher, however, ould not damp that universal ardour and enthu-ism that had seized all ranks and degrees of ersons; and which not even the anniversary stival of Adonis, a sacred and melancholy rite, nd been permitted to check or interrupt. This lemnity inauspiciously happened a few days receding the embarkation. The dreary ceremony as performed through the streets of Athens: nectres appeared in funereal robes; the domes

and

and temples resounded with loud and lamenting vociferations; and the Grecian matrons, tearing their dishevelled hair, and beating their naked bosoms, bewailed in mournful strains the untimely death of Adonis, the lover and the favourite of Venus.

B. C. 415. All the citizens enrolled for the expedition appeared early on the morning of the day appointed for the embarkation. The whole city accompanied them to Piræus. The people were divided between hope and fear, when they reflected on so great a proportion of the strength of Athens, in which every one had a friend or relation, committed to the uncertainty of the elements, and the chance of war. But no sooner were the men put on board, and the fleet prepared to get under way, than the trumpets sounded, as a signal for silence. Immediately prayers were offered up to the Gods with great solemnity; and the numerous spectators upon the shore answered with corresponding vows. Libations were then poured out in goblets of silver and gold. This ceremony being performed, triumphant hymns were sung in full chorus; and the fleet moved to Ægina, thence to take its departure for Corcyra.

When the whole armament of the Athenians and their allies had arrived at Corcyra, it consisted of one hundred and thirty-four ships of war, with a proportionable number of transports and tenders. The heavy-armed troops amounted to five thousand, to which were added a sufficient body of slingers and archers. The whole military and naval strength of this expedition is computed at twenty thousand men.

With so powerful a host, had the Athenians attacked the Syracusans in their present security and ignorance

ce of the armament coming against them, ould have been a probability that the en- , adventurous and imprudent as it certainly ight have been successful. But the Gre- riners, unaccustomed to make long voyages, ıot have been prevailed on to trust so great ıment on the wide expanse of the Ionian hey determined to coast along the eastern f Italy until they reached Messina, and then the strait for Sicily. That they might exe- s design with the greater safety, three ships spatched to the Italian and Sicilian shores, ire which of the cities would give them a ɔn; and afterward to rejoin the fleet as soon ible, and acquaint the commanders with rmation they had been able to collect.

r crossing the gulf, and making the Japy- romontory, without any disaster, they di- to seek supplies around the bay of Ta- ı; but not a single town would admit within its walls, or even furnish them ıoney) with the necessaries of life. The of Tarentum and Locris would not grant he use of their harbours, and refused even ɔly them with water. At length the whole assembled at the port of Rhegium, without ıt. The magistrates of Rhegium allowed ɔ purchase the commodities of which they n immediate need, but cautiously denied dmittance within their walls. Alcibiades, er, strongly remonstrated against this con- and exhorted them, as a colony of Eubœa, st their brethren of Leontium, to aid and whom the Athenians had fitted out this tion: but his remonstrances were inef-

he mean time the three Athenian ships had

sailed as far as the Egestean territory, and rejoined the fleet in the harbour of Rhegium. They brought information, that the inhabitants of Egesta, notwithstanding the boasted accounts of their riches, were poor, and had grossly deceived the commissioners sent by the Athenian government to inquire into the real state of their treasury. This disagreeable intelligence, and the unexpected reception they had met with from the cities on the Italian coast, induced the commanders to call a council of war, to consider how they should act. The opinion of Nicias was, that the Egesteans ought to be supplied with such a number of ships only, the charges of which their treasury was able to defray; and that the Athenian fleet, after having settled, by arms or persuasion, the quarrels among them, and exhibited to the Sicilians their ability and readiness to aid and protect their allies, should return to Athens.

Alcibiades, who had formed his plan of procedure, and whom a slight disappointment could not deject, declared that it would be disgraceful to the Athenian republic to dissolve so great an armament without having performed some exploits worthy of the vast preparations; that they should solicit the cities of Sicily to a confederacy against Syracuse and Selinus; and attack the former if it refused to restore the Leontines, and the latter if it did not conclude a peace with the Egesteans. Lamachus, more of a soldier than of a politician, differed from both his colleagues. He said, that what appeared to him the most prudent and likely measure to be pursued was, to sail directly for Syracuse, and lay siege to the city before the inhabitants had time to prepare for their defence; as this plan, if immediately adopted, would effectually prevent the necessity of military

military operations against any of the other cities of Sicily.

This advice, which does honour to the abilities of Lamachus, was rejected by both the other commanders; and the opinion of Alcibiades prevailed. The fleet now sailed from Rhegium, to execute the plan which had been formed; and promote, if possible, a confederacy of the Sicilian cities against Syracuse. A considerable detachment was sent to examine the fortifications and strength of that metropolis; and to proclaim liberty, and offer protection, to all the captives within its walls.

Naxos was persuaded to accept the alliance of Athens. Thence Alcibiades proceeded to Catana; but the prevalence of the Syracusan party in that place procured at first a refusal even to treat with the Athenians. Apprehensive, however, of the Athenian armament, or of a faction among themselves, the Cataneans consented, at length, to admit Alcibiades to declare his proposals in the general assembly. The forces were therefore disembarked, and ordered to remain without the gate of the city. The artful Athenian transported the people of Catana with his eloquence. While he was speaking, the citizens flocked from every quarter, to hear his discourse; which he purposely protracted. Some of the Athenian soldiers, observing an entrance unguarded, burst into the city; of which they thus became masters. The sight of these men, in the place where the assembly was held, made the Cataneans believe that the town was betrayed by the party in opposition to Syracuse. Some, therefore, of those who favoured the Syracusans, hastily, but silently, withdrew. The rest, fearing the dreadful consequences and calamities that generally attended the weaker party of

those who promoted factions in Grecian
concurred in a decree, which was speedil
posed, that the Cataneans should conclu
offensive and defensive alliance with Athe
was soon apparent, that the scheme of Alc
to strengthen the Athenian interest by nego
was justly and extensively founded. A fac
Camarina, encouraged by what had happ
Naxos and Catana, and awed by the stre
the Athenian armament, sent to request as
for attempting a revolution in their state
fleet accordingly sailed to that place; but
found that the innovators had been too l
their measures, and that the project was nc
ciently ripe for execution: an Athenian
however, still remained in that city.

The fleet proceeding to Catana discovere
the Salaminian galley, appropriated to purp
a sacred and solemn office. By this ship Alc
was informed that the Athenian people had
his immediate return to Athens, in orde
tried on a capital accusation.

The cause of this we find in the follow
cident. The night preceding the sailing of th
ment for Sicily, the numerous statues of M
erected in the streets of Athens as boundarie
ferent edifices and tenements, were thrown
broken, and defaced. Only one large and be
image of the God, which was called And
from standing before the house of the or
that name, had been saved from the general
This insult, and act of impiety, was at first a
to the wicked and sacrilegious contrivances
Corinthians, to deter the armament from
to the relief of Egesta. The enemies of Alci
however, succeeded in making the people

ıe had been guilty of this atrocious deed; for,
e evidence of slaves, he was accused of having
d with rude familiarity other adored images
e Gods, and it was therefore inferred that he
nost likely to be guilty of this profanation.
ıring the terror which this event produced in
ıinds of the Athenians, it happened that some
ments in Bœotia occasioned a small body of
ponnesians to march towards the isthmus of
ıth. This circumstance seemed to justify
ıion, and redoubled fear. Androcles, and
artful demagogues, persuaded the Athenians,
he profanation of the mysteries, the defacing
e statues, and the movements of the Lacedæ-
an army, all tended to indicate a conspiracy
molish the present form of government; the
rvation of which, ever since the expulsion of
Pisistratids, had been an object of universal
nxious regard.

ıe eloquence and address of Alcibiades were
y and instantly employed in defending himself
st the malignity of his enemies, and these
ges of impiety and treachery: while, at the
time, the soldiers and sailors, who were
for the expedition against Sicily, interceded
ıim; and the Argives and Mantineans refused
ve the Athenian coast, unless he should be
ıitted to accompany them. These combina-
in his favour disappointed the present hopes,
ld not disconcert the future projects, of his
ies. They perceived, that were he brought
trial at this time the populace would set him
erty. They therefore urged, that Alcibiades
ıt be permitted to sail for Sicily, where
ence would be so much wanted; and
his return home, he should either vin-

his innocence, or suffer the punishment of guilt. Alcibiades perceived the drift of this conduct in his enemies, and testified his reluctance to leave behind him such materials for malice; but was obliged to comply with the public wish.

No sooner, however, was he removed from Athens, than the people were continually convened to consider of, and inquire into, the violation of the statues. Every one was desirous that his own private and personal enemies should be found traitors and criminals against the state. Resentment was invited to false accusations. A decree of the assembly was passed, by which rewards were offered to those who should discover the guilty; and even to the guilty themselves, that would give up their accomplices. Among the persons on whom suspicion fell, and who had been seized and put in prison, was Andocides; a profligate and impious person, before whose house the statue of Mercury had escaped the general destruction. Andocides, in order to avoid the punishment for which his character had marked him out, like a true villain, turned informer; and denounced many persons as guilty of the mutilation of the statues. The persons whom he named, that were present in the city, were either banished or put to death. The absent, among whom was Alcibiades, were recalled, in order to stand their trial. The latter did not obey, however, the commands which had been transmitted by the Salaminian galley. Alcibiades, to escape the fury of the storm, first fled to Argos; but being informed that the Athenians had promised a reward to any one who should apprehend him, he finally took refuge in Sparta. Here his active and enterprising genius seized the opportunity to advise and to promote

ote measures, which, while they gratified his pri-
te resentment, occasioned the ruin and subver-
n of his country.

It was soon apparent that the removal of Alci-
ades occasioned a languor and delay in the ope-
tions of the expedition against Sicily. Lamachus,
hose character was warlike and daring, was com-
lled, on account of his poverty, to be subject to
e wealth, eloquence, and authority, of the timid
d cautious Nicias. Instead of attempting any
ing against Selinus or Syracuse; the possession of
e colony of Hyccara, a small and inconsiderable
wn of the Sicanians, fully contented him. He
vaged, or laid under contribution, some places of
s note; and obtained thirty thousand pounds
erling from the Egesteans, towards defraying the
penses of the war. This sum, with the booty
llected from the cities in Sicily, might indeed be
some service; but could not compensate for the
successful attempts against Hybla and Himera,
d the inactivity and delay at Naxos and Catana.

The Athenian troops murmured at these dilatory
d ignoble proceedings. Nicias therefore, con-
ary to the timid caution of his disposition, was
bliged to comply with their demands, and to make
eater and more vigorous exertions. Syracuse
as now intended as the object of his attack; and
this city formed the main obstacle to their ambi-
on, and the reduction would seem to decide the
te not only of Sicily, but of the Italian and
frican coasts, this attempt might well stimulate
mulation, and provoke energy.

When the Syracusans were first informed of the
owerful armament fitted out against them, they
espised, or pretended to despise, the rumour, and
onsidered it as an idle tale invented to amuse and
deceive

deceive the people. But when the fleet arrived at Rhegium their incredulity was at an end. Hermocrates, one of the principal persons in the place, now persuaded the people to provide against a danger, which their presumption and folly had hitherto represented as imaginary and chimerical. When they received intelligence that the Athenian armament had reached the Italian coast, and beheld this numerous and powerful fleet stretching along the shores of Sicily, and ready to make a descent on the defenceless island, they were struck with consternation and dismay. From the height of presumption and security, they plunged into the most abject fear and dejection; while Hermocrates, who was not less prudent in prosperity than intrepid in danger, could scarcely animate the minds of his countrymen, and inspire the resolution necessary to attempt a resistance.

They were, however, at length prevailed on to prepare their arms, equip their fleet, garrison their towns, and summon their allies to assist them. These indispensable preliminaries were at length carried on with ardour and persevering activity; while the tardy operations of the enemy not only served to remove the fear and dejection which had at first overwhelmed their minds, but to restore them to their long-lost vigour and intrepidity. They appointed fifteen generals, whom they desired to lead them instantly against the Athenians at Catana. Those chiefs, however, did not think it prudent and safe to comply with the request of the troops; but parties of horse were sent out, to beat up the quarters of the enemy, to intercept their convoys, and repel their advanced posts. In these incursions, the Syracusans would frequently approach the main body of the Athenians; and, insulting

ng them with taunting and sarcastic language, Whether the boasted lords of Greece had left r native country, that they might settle at Ca- ?

hough provoked at these indignities, and ex- l by the resentment and resolution of his troops, as would neither hazard an engagement in the , nor march against Syracuse. He therefore ed a stratagem, which he hoped would in some sure divide the difficulties and dangers of the rprise. A Catanean undertook to go over to nemy in the fictitious character of a deserter. man pretended to the Syracusans, that a nu- ous and powerful body of the inhabitants of na, weary with the disgraceful yoke of the nians, longed to take up arms, and to repel nvaders of their country. He observed, that, e Syracusans would join and assist this party of Cataneans, the design could scarcely fail of suc- ; for the Athenians were extremely remiss in military duties, their posts were forsaken, and fleet was left unguarded. The people of Sy- se, therefore, were persuaded to appoint a day which they would attack their neighbouring ; and the artful Catanean returned home, to e the hopes and confirm the resolution of his nded associates.

n the very day appointed for assaulting the nians in Catana, Nicias sailed from that place his whole armament. The Syracusans had ched already with this view to the plain of ntium; when the fleet of Athens arrived in the t harbour, the troops were disembarked, and a p was formed without the western wall of the of Syracuse. In the mean time the cavalry of Syracusans, having proceeded to the walls of Catana,

Catana, discovered that the Athenians had dep
ed. Their infantry, being informed of this, marc
back with expedition to protect their own c
These warlike youths having returned, and be
joined by the forces of Gela, Selinus, and
marina, it was determined, without loss of ti
to attack the hostile encampment.

Only a few days elapsed before the Athen
and Syracusans prepared to engage. The for
relied on their superior discipline and habitual
tory; the latter, on their courage and numb
The Syracusans drew up their troops at the dept
sixteen ranks, and the Athenians of eight.
latter, however, kept a body of reserve in the ca
which was ready to engage on the first signal.
cias, having harangued his troops, led them tow
the enemy: the priests brought forth the accust
ed sacrifices; and the trumpets sounded to eng

Dreadful and furious was the attack, which
tinued with perseverance for several hours. E
thing that could animate, and impel to great
vigorous exertions, inspired the minds of the c
batants. The Syracusans fought in defence of
country, their liberty, and independence; and
Athenians were no less strongly impelled by
sentment and ambitious prospects. The b
however, was still doubtful; when a tempest
denly arose, accompanied with tremendous
of thunder. The Athenians were unconcern
the event; but the Syracusans, struck with
sternation and dismay, were broken and ro
Nicias restrained the troops from the pursuit,
a body of cavalry belonging to the enemy sl
assault them when in disorder. The Syrac
lost two hundred and sixty men, and the A
nians only fifty. The former took refuge i
city, and the latter returned to their camp.

e voyage, the encampment, and the battle, oyed the dangerous activity, and gratified the uous ardour, of the Athenian troops; but did any essential degree contribute to facilitate conquest of Syracuse; and, without more rul assistance, Nicias began to despair of being to storm the place, or to take it by siege. Soon this successful onset, the Athenian fleet re- d to Naxos and Catana, to winter there; and is expected that the inferior states of Sicily d now more readily submit, or render assist-

Emissaries were sent to Tuscany, in which Grecian colonies had been founded; ambas- s were likewise dispatched to Carthage, the y and the rival of Syracuse. The messengers to Athens returned with three hundred talents, several troops of cavalry; and the Egesteans ded them also with a reinforcement of horse, ll kinds of provision.

While the Athenians were thus preparing for the k of Syracuse, the citizens of that place exerted l vigour in providing for their defence. In- l of fifteen they appointed three generals; mocrates, Heraclides, and Sicanus. These manders were invested with unlimited power, rding to the exigency of affairs. They dis- hed ambassadors to Corinth, and also to La- emon, to implore their assistance against an ny that aimed at no less than the sovereignty ll Greece. The Syracusans received a very urable reception at both places; and especially parta, where Alcibiades enforced their request l all his credit and eloquence. At his persua- , Gylippus, an able and experienced officer, appointed to command the reinforcement des- d for Sicily; and troops were raised with a de-

sign

sign to invade the Attic territory, and thereby a powerful diversion in that part in favour Syracusans.

The importance of Camerina, on the so coast of Sicily, engaged, in the mean time, tention both of Nicias and of Hermocrates. Camerineans had given a very feeble and rel assistance to their allies of Syracuse; and eacl was desirous of attaching them to its int They dreaded equally, however, the distant tion of Athens, and the neighbouring host Syracuse; and requested that they might be ed to preserve a strict and impartial neutralit these means they hoped to avoid the resentn either of the two; and, nevertheless, defeat tentions of both.

Before any supplies from Greece could rea racuse, Nicias, leaving his winter-qu B.C. set sail for that place; and arriving t 414. the night, before the inhabitants of t were aware of his departure from Catana, po himself of the important post of Epipole. T racusans, being quickly informed of this c stance, immediately attempted to dislodg enemy. A fierce conflict ensued. Tum valour, however, could not overcome stea cipline: the Syracusans were compelled to r with the loss of three hundred men; and th refuge of their walls prevented a still slaughter. Encouraged by this success, began to execute the plan he had formed ducing the city. His design was to surro with a wall from Epipole to the sea on eac to the Trogilian port on the north, and to th port on the south. When these circumv should be completed, he expected that his

rous fleet would be able to block up the harbour. As the necessary materials had been provided during the winter, the work rose with such rapidity, that the Syracusans were not less astonished than terrified. Their former as well as their recent defeat deterred them from again risking a general engagement; but by the advice of Hermocrates they erected walls, which traversed and interrupted those of the Athenians. The workmen, urged by imminent danger, forwarded the work with great activity: the hostile bulwarks approached each other; frequent skirmishes happened, in which the Athenian troops were generally victorious.

The circumvallation was at length completed, and the town blocked up on all sides. The canals that conveyed water into the city were interrupted, and by these means the inhabitants were greatly distressed. Seeing themselves on the brink of ruin, and no hopes of relief, they began to think of a capitulation. Accordingly an assembly was convened, to propose and settle the articles which should be sent to Nicias. While, however, they deliberated on the execution of this measure, a Corinthian galley, commanded by Gongylus, entered the harbour. All the citizens crowded around the newcomer, that they might learn the design of his voyage, and the intentions of their Peloponnesian allies. Gongylus acquainted them, that they might soon expect a speedy and effectual relief; that the Corinthians had warmly espoused their cause, and had fitted out a very considerable armament, which might be looked for every hour; and that the Spartans, also, had joined a small squadron to the ships from Corinth, the whole conducted by Gylippus, a Lacedæmonian, and an officer of great abilities and experience.

The joy which this unexpected intelligence diffused in the city is incredible. The Syracusans proceeded from one extreme to the opposite. Instead of capitulating, they prepared to make sallies upon the enemy, that Gylippus might have a better opportunity for entering the city. Soon after the messenger arrived from the Spartan commander himself. He had landed his troops on the western coast of Sicily, that the Athenians might not intercept his passage; and approached Syracuse on the side of Epipolæ, where the line of contravallation was yet unfinished, with several thousand men.

The transverse wall was extended with the greatest diligence; and Nicias having fortified himself in the castle of Labdalus, Gylippus drew up his army under the walls, and sent a herald to inform the Athenian general, that he would allow him five days to embark his troops and leave Sicily. To this message Nicias did not condescend to return an answer. Gylippus, therefore, attacking the fort, stormed it, and put all the Athenians found therein to the sword. Nicias, perceiving the necessity of bringing the war to a speedy and decisive conclusion, offered battle to the Syracusan and Syracusan army. Gylippus did not decline the engagement. In the first action the Athenians were victorious. This was principally occasioned by the unfavourable situation of the Syracusan forces; who had been imprudently posted in the narrow defiles between the two walls, which rendered their cavalry and archers unserviceable.

ed, thrown into confusion, and pursued to
camp; and Gyllippus obtained a very consi-
ble victory.

his success of the Spartan general produced the
important consequences. The Syracusans
ded their works beyond the circumvallation;
uch that the Athenians could not now hope
ock up the city, without previously forcing
new ramparts. While the besiegers main-
d the superiority of arms over their enemies,
eighbouring territory had abundantly supplied
with every necessary; but no sooner was
defeat known, than every place was alike
le, and provision could not be procured with-
he greatest difficulty. The soldiers that went
n quest of wood and water were unexpectedly
ked by the enemy's cavalry, or by the rein-
ments which daily arrived from every quarter
e assistance of Syracuse; and the army was
obliged to depend for every necessary supply
e uncertain bounty of the Italian coast.

icias, finding his troops dwindling away in
ortion as those of the enemy increased, be-
greatly disheartened, and dispatched a very
nding letter to the Athenians. He honestly
ithout disguise described and lamented the mis-
nes and miseries of the army. Great numbers of
ves deserted; the mercenary troops, that fought
for pay and subsistence, saw the reasonable-
of preferring the more secure and lucrative
e of the Syracusans. The Athenian citizens,
of the war, and of the hardships to which it
ed them, left the care of the galleys to un-
tioned persons. Nicias frankly confessed his
ity to check these disorders; and observed,
the Athenians, to whom he wrote, were
ly competent to judge how difficult it was to

govern the licentious disposition of domestic troops. Finally, he exhorted the assembly to recall the forces immediately; or otherwise, to send, without delay, a second armament not less powerful than the first.

This letter made a great impression on the minds of the Athenians. They chose Demosthenes and Eurymedon to succeed Alcibiades and Lamachus in the command. Eurymedon sailed immediately with ten galleys, and a considerable sum of money, to assure Nicias that speedy and powerful supplies should be sent him; while Demosthenes was employed in raising troops, and equipping ships, in order that a numerous armament might sail in the following spring.

In the mean time, the Lacedæmonian and Syracusan generals were acquainted both with the actual distress of the Athenian army, and with the future hopes which they entertained in consequence of the letter of Nicias. It was possible that more supplies might be received from Attica than the besieged could expect from Peloponnesus. Prompted, therefore, by interest and inclination, they resolved to press the Athenians on all sides, by sea and land. Besides the weak condition of the fleet of Athens, several of their galleys were detached to conduct the convoys of provision. The Corinthian fleet, long and anxiously expected by the besieged, at length arrived; and consisted of twelve sail. The whole naval strength of Sicily, in the ensuing spring, filled the harbours of Syracuse. Hermocrates persuaded his countrymen, that the advantages of skill and experience, which he candidly acknowledged the Athenians possessed, could not compensate their terror and confusion at being suddenly attacked by a superior force.

The

The principal squadrons of Syracuse lay in the harbour of Ortygia, which was separated from the station of the Athenian fleet by an island of the same name. Hermocrates sailed out with a fleet of eighty galleys, to venture a naval engagement; and being met by the Athenians, a severe action ensued. While great numbers of the soldiers had withdrawn themselves from their fortifications at Plemmyrium, that they might be spectators of the fight, Gylippus unexpectedly attacked their forts; of which he made himself master without much opposition, and slew all who hastened from the shore to assist their companions. A noise and tumult thus arising in the camp, the Athenians at sea were struck with consternation and dismay: they endeavoured to gain the shore, that they might defend the forts and repel the enemy; but perceiving the fortifications already in the possession of Gylippus, they attacked, with their whole fleet formed in line of battle, the ships of the enemy, which were pursuing them in disorder. Eleven vessels of the Syracusans were sunk, and great slaughter made among their forces; and a complete victory at sea amply compensated the conquerors for the defeat they had experienced by land. The Athenians lost, in the forts that were taken, a large quantity of military and naval stores, and a considerable sum of money. Both parties, however, erected trophies: the Athenians for their victory at sea, and the Syracusans for their success on shore.

The Syracusans determined to hazard another naval engagement, before Demosthenes should arrive with the supplies from Athens. In order, therefore, that they might provoke the Athenians to an attack, they drew up their fleet daily before the great harbour, in line of battle. But Nicias

was averse to venture a second battle. He expected, he said, a fresh fleet every moment, with a strong reinforcement of troops. In this situation, therefore; when, too, his forces were inferior in number to those of the enemy, and already fatigued; such a measure would be the height of imprudence and temerity. On the other hand, Menander and Euthydemus, who had been appointed to take part in the command until the arrival of Demosthenes, eager to perform some exploit before they resigned their commission, represented to Nicias, that, should they decline a battle, their country would lose its reputation, and be forsaken by all its allies in Sicily. They pressed him so much, that, at length, he was obliged to comply. Accordingly, the fleet, consisting of twenty-five galleys, sailed out of the harbour. The first day, the two hostile armaments continued in sight of each other, without engaging. On the second day, a few vessels only attacked each other; and neither side gained any considerable advantage. On the third day, the Syracusans formed their ships in order of battle earlier than usual; and, having continued in this manner until the evening, withdrew as before. The Athenians, supposing that they would not return on that day, retired in disorder. But the enemy's fleet, sailing out of the little harbour, attacked the Athenians before they had time to draw up in order of battle. Victory did not continue long in suspense. Seven Athenian ships were sunk, and many more were disabled. Nicias saved the remains of his shattered and disgraced fleet, by retiring behind a line of merchantmen and transports. From the masts of these vessels were suspended huge masses of lead, which, on account of their form, were named dolphins.

dolphins. These were sufficient to crush by their falling weight the stoutest gallys of antiquity. This unexpected obstacle arrested the progress of the conquerors; but the advantages already obtained raised their hopes to the highest pitch, and equally sunk the minds of the Athenians into dejection and despondency.

Great as were the misfortunes that befel the Athenians in Sicily, the calamities of the republic at home were still more alarming and more dreadful. Alcibiades first acquired the esteem and confidence of the Spartans, by condemning, in the strongest manner, the ambition and injustice of the Athenians, in their hostility with Lacedæmon, and their cruelty towards himself. He, moreover, informed the Spartans, in what manner they might disarm and disappoint their rival. The town of Decelia was situated between Thebes and Athens, about fifteen miles from each, and belonged to the Attic territory. He therefore advised that the Spartans should surprise and fortify that place, which commanded an extensive and fertile plain; and from which they might infest the Athenians by a continual war, instead of an annual incursion.

Alcibiades often proposed and urged this measure; and at length, at the head of a powerful army into the territory of Attica, the defenceless inhabitants fled before him. But instead of treating them as before, he stopped at Decelia. The necessary materials having been provided, previous to the invading of the army, the town was speedily fortified, and the walls bade defiance to those of Athens. The watchful garrison continually alarmed the Athenians. The latter people could neither plow, nor sow, in safety; for the Spartans

tans would deprive them of the fruit of their l
bour. The valuable island of Eubœa too, fro
which in seasons of scarcity, or during the ravag
of war, they had been accustomed to derive t
necessary supplies of corn, wine, and oil, w
cut off from any communication with them. H
rassed by unremitting servitude, and in want
bread, the slaves murmured, complained, and
great numbers revolted to the enemy. By th
defection, Athens was deprived of twenty tho
sand useful artisans. Since the latter part of t
administration of Pericles, the Athenians had nev
suffered such misery and distress; while the acti
and inextinguishable hatred of a cruel and unr
lenting enemy still persecuted them.

These signal calamities at Athens did not how
ever prevent the most vigorous exertions abroa
The Syracusans had scarcely time to rejoice at th
victory, or Nicias to bewail his misfortunes, wh
a numerous and powerful armament was descri
on the coast of Sicily. All the vessels were rich
trimmed, and had their prows adorned with gaud
streamers. This fleet, consisting of seventy-thr
Athenian gallys, beside innumerable foreign ve
sels and transports, commanded by experienced o
ficers, and furnished, at a vast expense, with a
kinds of warlike machines then used in maritim
engagements, pursued its course in security t
wards the harbours of Syracuse. The emulatio
of the rowers, and the splendour of the scen
exhibited a pompous spectacle of naval triump
As they approached the shore, the sound of th
trumpets and clarions, mingled with repeate
shouts and loud acclamations from the fleet and th
camp, re-echoed through the town. This air
pomp and triumph Demosthenes purposely affec

ed, that he might dishearten and intimidate the enemy. The number of pikemen on board the fleet exceeded five-thousand; the light-armed troops were nearly as numerous; and the whole armament was equal to that originally sent with Nicias, which amounted to more than twenty thousand men.

The besieged, notwithstanding their late success, considering the power and vigour of the enemy with whom they had to contend, became dispirited, and acknowledged that Athens was the only city in the world that could furnish such a formidable and magnificent equipment. They now conceived the design of capitulating, before their capital should be reduced to extremities, and while they could hope to obtain reasonable and tolerable terms. But Demosthenes did not give them time for putting their scheme in execution. Thinking it most advisable to take advantage of the consternation and dismay which his arrival had occasioned, he prepared for an immediate attack of the city. B. C. 413.

Nicias, alarmed at this bold and hasty resolution, conjured him not to be too precipitate, but to consider maturely before he proceeded to make an attempt against Syracuse. He observed to him, that delays would ruin the enemy; who were in great want of money and provision; whose allies were now ready to abandon them; and who therefore, in a short time, would be obliged to surrender. All this Nicias stated, not from any conjectures of his own, but from the information and advice he had received of what was transacting within the walls. Demosthenes replied, that his intentions were, speedily to decide the fate of the war; or raise the siege, and return to the relief of Athens,

Athens, which was at that time blockaded by Lacedæmonians. The well-known cautious dilatory disposition of Nicias induced Euryn to approve of the opinion of Demosthenes; Nicias himself was finally obliged to acquiesc

After ravaging the banks of the Anapus, making some fruitless attempts against the fo cations on that side to divert the attention of enemy, Demosthenes marched, in the midd the night, to attack the important post of Epi The attempt was at first successful: the out were surprised; the guards put to death; an three separate encampments of the Syracu Sicilians, and Peloponnesians, formed a weak feeble opposition to the ardour and resoluti the Athenian troops.

In the mean time Gylippus had assemble whole force of Syracuse, and hastened to th lief of the place; but his troops being seized a panic, which was increased by the darkn the night, were easily repulsed, and put to fl The Athenians pursuing them in disorder, to vent them from rallying, met a body of Bœot under the command of Hermocrates, whos sistance checked the fury of the victors. sudden and unexpected firmness of the Th might alone have decided the fate of the e prise: but, added to this, the Athenians wer norant of the ground; and the glare of the n shining in the front of the enemy, illumined

ly mistaken for enemies. Fear at first seized
thenians; but this was soon succeeded by
Thinking themselves surrounded, they de-
ned to force a passage, and slew many of
llies before the mistake was discovered. To
nt the repetition of this dreadful error, they
bliged to demand the watch-word every mo-
; and hence their enemies became also ac-
ted with that signal. The consequence of
vas doubly fatal. The silent Athenians, at
rencounter, were slaughtered: the Syracu-
on the other hand, knowing the watch-word,
ed or joined the battle, accordingly as it
their weakness or strength. The terror and
sion of the Athenians increased: the rout be-
general; and Gylippus, with his victorious
, pursued in good order. The vanquished,
nt of the passages through which they had
ted, lost great numbers, who fell from the
and were dashed in pieces. Others explored
nknown paths of Epipole. Several thousands
left dead, or wounded, on the scene of ac-
and the Syracusan cavalry, the next morn-
intercepted and cut off all the stragglers.

this dreadful and unexpected disaster the
tions of the siege were suspended. Demo-
es was now decidedly of opinion that they
d return immediately to Athens. The season
e year would yet, he said, permit their cross-
e Ionian sea; and it would be much more ad-
geous to compel the Lacedæmonians to raise
lockade of Athens, than to continue the siege
racuse and waste their strength in vain and
ess foreign attempts. But Nicias dissuaded
lesign of leaving Sicily until the repu
d recall them by positive authority. T

he said, who were now so earnest for an ign
nious flight, and exclaimed so bitterly agains
calamities under which they laboured, would,
their return, be the foremost to accuse the v
ness or the treachery of their commanders.
his part, he would rather choose to die glori
by the hand of the enemy, than perish by th
just suffrages of the people.

This reasoning could not, however, con
Demosthenes; who was sensible, that the
measure by which they could hope to save th
mains of their distressed forces, was to leave
immediately, and return to Athens. But N
knowing by the secret correspondence maint
in Syracuse, that the enemy's treasury wa
hausted by the enormous expenses of the wa
that the magistrates had used their utmost to
row from their allies, hoped that the vigour of
resistance would abate with the decay of the
culties; and that the city would submit in a
time. Demosthenes, therefore, as his former
vice had been attended with such ill success, yi
in this instance to the opinion of Nicias.

In the mean time the Syracusans were
forced by powerful supplies from the differe
tions in Sicily; and the transports so long exp
from Peloponnesus arrived in the harbour of
tygia. The Peloponnesian forces had staid for
time on the coast of Agrigentum, where their
was augmented with a few Syracusan galleys.

visions of the Grecian name; and these formed, in that age, the most civilized portion of the inhabitants of Asia, Africa, and Europe.

This powerful reinforcement having arrived at Syracuse; and a plague, originating from the effluvia of the fens and marshes, near which the Athenians were encamped, breaking out among the besiegers; Nicias was induced to change his opinion. Accordingly, orders were issued privately, enjoining the officers of the fleet to prepare to sail at a minute's warning; and the troops were commanded to be ready to go on board upon a signal that should be given. But the night appointed for their departure was inauspiciously distinguished by an eclipse of the moon. This the superstitious Nicias, and his diviners, considered as an omen of evil tendency. The voyage therefore was ordered to be deferred until thrice nine days were accomplished.

But before the expiration of that period, which superstition had fixed, it was no longer practicable to depart. The Syracusans, having received notice that the Athenians intended to leave Sicily, resolved to attack them by sea and land. They attempted to destroy the fleet by fire-ships; but this enterprise was unsuccessful. They then employed superior numbers, to divide and weaken the strength and resistance of an enfeebled and dejected foe. A perpetual succession of military and naval exploits continued for three days. On the first day the battle was doubtful, and fortune hung in suspense; on the second, the Athenian fleet, commanded by Eurymedon, was deprived of a considerable squadron; and on the third, it lost eighteen ships, and two thousand men, in the number of whom was the admiral.

the port. They were now desirous to pre
departure of that force, from which they
merly expected the worst evils of subjugati
they proposed to themselves no less tha
stroy, or reduce to the dreadful condition
soners at discretion, the whole of that fo
fleet and navy.

In the mean time, dejection, not only
sense of disgrace and fear of the resen
their enemies, but also from the mos
wants, assailed the Athenians. In conseq
the resolution to raise the siege, they had
further supplies from Catana. Naval su
being lost, they had now no means of in
with Catana; and therefore their depart
become a measure of absolute necessity.
of war being summoned, it was generally
to withdraw the whole armament by sea.

After repeated defeats, and though g
tormented with a nephritic complaint w
frequently obliged him to solicit his recal

ed greatly from the hardness and firmness of
nemy's prows, Nicias provided them with
ling irons, which would enable them to pre-
he recoil of their antagonists, and the repeti-
of the hostile stroke. Armed men were
led upon the deck; a mode of fighting taught
by the Syracusans, who had too successfully
t against them.

sooner was the fleet ready for sea, than Ni-
ecalled the troops from the posts and fortresses
ccupied, and formed them into one camp on
iore. The behaviour of that commander on
ying occasion was truly great. He was little
ious; and, when fortune was favourable, ra-
leficient in exertion, and sometimes even cul-
remiss in his command: but, at this juncture,
was so warm in exhortations which might
to revive the hopes and restore the drooping
ge of the troops. The state of his health
d not permit him to take the command of the
; but he was sedulous in attending the neces-
preparations, and in directing every arrange-
. When all was ready for the projected at-
t, thinking that he had not yet sufficiently
ilated the minds of the officers and soldiers,
ent round the whole armament; and exhorted
, with a cheerful and magnanimous firmness,
member the vicissitudes of war and the insta-
of fortune. Though hitherto unsuccessful,
astness of the preparations should, he said,
e them to believe that victory might again be
s. Men who had undergone and surmounted
ny and great dangers, should not in the trying
lecisive moment desert the hope of triumph,
ie remembrance and the regret of past defeat.
as yet in their power to defend their lives, their

liberty, their friends, and (what ought to b
valued than every thing else) their countr
the mighty name of Athens. But should t
portunity be neglected, or improperly use
destruction of every thing dear to them mu
low, and the glory of their nation be no mor

In the mean time this bustle of preparati
been observed by the Syracusans, who w
formed of the grappling irons with which th
nian prows were to be armed. They th
prepared to counteract this new mode of
the forecastles of their galleys they covere
bull-hides, on which the grappling irons
have no effect.

Nicias, having led the troops to the shore
mitted the last hope of the republic to the
valour of Demosthenes, Menander, and Eu
mus; and returned to the camp with a feeb
emaciated body and an anxious mind. T
shock of the Athenians was irresistible: the
themselves masters of the vessels that o
their passage, and burst through the bar.
entrance widened, the Syracusans rushed ir
harbour. Thither also the Athenian galle
turned and followed them; either repelled
enemy, or that they might assist their cor
In the mouth of the harbour the engageme
came general; and in this narrow space tw
dred galleys fought with an obstinate and pe
ing valour during the greatest part of th
The battle was not long confined to the sh
adverse prows, and the distant hostility o
and arrows. The vessels grappled witl
other, and their decks soon flowed with
The heavy-armed troops boarded the galle
which they contended; and by that mea

their own ship exposed to a similar attack. The fleets presented every where the sole object of a massive cluster of galleys mutually adhering among themselves. The Athenians, sensible of the importance of the action, exhorted one another not to abandon an element on which their republic had ever acquired victory and glory, for the dangerous refuge of a hostile shore; while the Syracusans exclaimed against fleeing from enemies whose weakness or cowardice had caused them for a long time to meditate retreat. The cries of the wounded and of those who were perishing in the water, the noise of the oars, and the acclamations from the ramparts and the shore, prevented any orders from being either heard or obeyed.

The view of a battle, more fierce and obstinate than had ever before been seen in the Grecian seas, restrained the activity and wholly suspended the powers of the numerous and adverse battalions that lined the surrounding coast. The spectators and the actors
of this singular
the former
forcibly,
were
and the
At length,
parts,
sive,
by the
and
bly
Their
the
know
ever,

the water-side to assist and protect their un nate companions. In this well-fought battl victors lost forty, and the vanquished fifty, ga

Cicero has justly observed, that not onl navy of Athens, but the glory and emp that republic, perished in the harbour of Syr The dejection of the Athenians, on this dis occasion, was so great, and the impending so urgent, that they neglected a duty always observed, and which had formed a very respe part of their national character. No heral sent to demand the restoration of the dead they abandoned to indignities and insults the of the slain. Amid the general despair, ho Demosthenes did not lose his usual energ presence of mind. He proposed that, as the nians had still sixty, and the enemy only fift leys, they should again attempt to force a pa and he considered the measure as very pract if, embarking that night, they made the eff next morning. Nicias approved of the pr but the troops absolutely refused. They wo any where by land, they said; and fight thei if necessary: but, by sea, the experience past sufficiently proved that they could expe thing but destruction. Thus was the execu this salutary measure prevented by excess spondency, arising from the contemplation vious disasters.

The general opinion among the Syracusan that the Athenians would not attempt to again by sea, but would decamp the same This justified the proposal of Demosthene testified his prudence and foresight. But th cusans, wearied with the labour of the day, a hilarated with its success, were more eager

joy the leisure they had so well earned, than solicitous about any future events. It happened, too, that the following morning was the festival of Hercules. Among such an assemblage of people of Dorian extraction, and especially in such circumstances as the present, the celebration of the day became an object of great regard, and they refused to quit the religious revel for a nocturnal military enterprise. Hermocrates, therefore, sent some persons upon horseback in the evening to the Athenian camp; who approaching near enough to be heard, though they could not be distinctly seen, pretended they belonged to the same party which had been accustomed to communicate with Nicias. Finding that the Athenians believed this pretext, the horsemen proceeded to inform them that the Syracusans had already occupied all the passes, and that therefore they (the Athenians) ought not to attempt to move during that night. They then desired those to whom this conversation had been addressed, to acquaint the general with this information, that he might concert his measures accordingly. Nicias credited the report; and the next day was spent by the Athenians in various preparations for their march.

But Gylippus and Hermocrates, having yielded for the moment to the pleasure of their people, found means on the ensuing day to engage them in more prudent views. Their victorious fleet, sailing to the Athenian station, and meeting with no opposition, burnt or carried off every vessel. The army, at the same time, marched out under the command of the Spartan general, and occupied all the principal passes in that line of country which it was probable the Athenians would attempt to traverse. The avenues, also, leading to the fordable

able parts of the rivers, were guarded, the bridges broken down, and detachments of horse placed on the plains; so that, to whatever quarter the Athenians should direct their march, they would be obliged to fight their way.

However, as they could no longer subsist in their present situation, and every thing being prepared as far as circumstances would permit, orders for decamping were issued by the Athenian generals on the third day after the battle. Forty thousand men, of whom many were afflicted with wounds and diseases, and all exhausted with labour and fatigue, exhibited not the appearance of even a fleeing army; they rather resembled a large and populous community, driven from their ancient possessions by the cruelty and vengeance of a conqueror. From the lofty expectations with which they first set sail from Piræus to the coast of Sicily, they were now miserably fallen. Deep was the distress which arose from the reflections that the whole of their fleet had been destroyed; that, through their failure, destruction threatened Athens; and that, instead of returning from Sicily in triumph, they were obliged to attempt an ignominious flight, as the only hopes of avoiding slavery or death. Their collective sufferings were thus enhanced and exasperated by a thousand dreadful considerations, and the painful objects that obtruded on the view of every individual. The mangled bodies of their relations and friends, deprived of the sacred rites of sepulture, affected them not only with grief but with horror. No sooner did they remove their eyes from this dreadful spectacle, than one still more melancholy and terrifying presented itself. The numerous crowds of sick and wounded, unable to proceed with their companions, entreated, in the accent and

age of unutterable anguish, to be delivered the horrors of famine, or the rage of a cruel nplacable foe. Such affecting scenes as these l have pierced the heart of a stranger, and he not but have felt sympathetic tenderness and assion. How much more then must it have ed the Athenians themselves, to see their ts, brothers, children, and friends, involved exampled misery! to hear them utter their is heart-rending complaints; and yet to be d to throw the clinging victims from their ed necks and arms! Mutual and self-reproach, e share they had taken in forwarding the en-se, or in obstructing the retreat, aggravated itterness of woe. Such, in short, was the nulated weight of misery, that the whole tude were in tears; and their present affect-tuation not only absorbed any future appre-ons, but took away the power and even the to move.

length the march was begun. Amid the ex- dejection and anguish which pervaded the s, Nicias, by his character and sufferings, but more by the melancholy firmness of his con- deserves the regard and esteem of mankind. n individual, he appeared not to be [illegible] the general distress. His whole anxi- ted to relieve and alleviate the calam- s. Carried with a rapid pace around ev- army, the ardour of his mind reanim- and emaciated frame, he exc- and distinct voice,—"Athe- is still room for hope! M- greater evils than we suffe- to accuse the Gods, or yo- who am far from being the

you, (for you see to what a miserable condition my disorder has reduced me,) and who in the blessing of fortune was inferior to none, I suffer every present calamity equally with the lowest and most abject. Yet am I unconscious of deserving this reverse of prosperity. I have been regular and zealous in my duty towards the Gods; and my actions with men have been scrupulously just. I have, therefore, hope and confidence: and the calamities which guilt has not merited, cannot terrify me. If our enterprise has drawn upon us the indignation and vengeance of the Gods, we surely suffer more than our iniquities deserve. Other nations have invaded their neighbours with less provocation, and nevertheless have escaped with gentler punishment; nor can I believe, that for the frailties and errors of passion, Providence will impose penalties too grievous to be borne.

"Confiding thus far in the divine mercy, we ought not to despond, especially when we consider the means which are still left us for our defence. Our numbers, our resolution, and still more our misfortunes, render us even now formidable. Our enemies possess not an army able to intercept our course, and therefore much less to expel us from the first friendly territory that shall afford us a reception. If, therefore, we can secure our safety by a speedy, prudent, and courageous retreat, we may still retrieve our lost honour, and restore the fallen glory of Athens; for the strength and support of a state consist not in empty ships, and unfounded walls, but in brave and virtuous citizens."

Having thus spoken, he led the march. The army was disposed in two divisions, with the baggage between them. Demosthenes commanded the rear, and Nicias the van. They did not choose the

d to their friends at Naxos and Catana, but hich led to the Sicel country, where they more readily find food and safety, and have to concert proper measures for their future ons. They forced their passage over the napus, which was vigorously defended by emy. But the Syracusan horse and archers, ng them in the rear, gave them such conti- rouble, that, after marching only five miles, ncamped on a rising ground for the night. ext day they made still less progress. Having d only two miles and a half, they reached a s plain, where they were induced to halt; lly as they were in need of a supply of nd provision, which might be easily obtained he surrounding country. But on the third hen they attempted to proceed, the Sy- horse and light-armed troops, in larger han before, annoyed them so much, that any hours wasted in fruitless attempts to re- hem, the distressed Athenians were com- to return to the camp they had occupied: n account of the superiority of the enemy's , they could not even procure supplies as d done on the preceding day.

next morning they moved earlier than usual, essed their march to gain the mountain m. But the enemy, who were apprised of ntended course, had sent a detachment to pt them, and to fortify that eminence. A legree of art was capable of rendering this mpregnable; as it was of a steep and rapid and encompassed on all sides by the rocky l of a loud and foaming torrent. When, re, they arrived at the mountain, they found ed force ready to oppose them, and the dif- s of the ascent increased by a fortification.

An

deplorable to the last degree. The numb
the wounded had been increased by their l
successful attempts to pass the mountain; an
could no longer procure provision and nec
in the adjacent country. The generals, the
came to a resolution to break up their cam
pursue a different and more circuitous route,
led through a level and open territory. Accor
fires being lighted in every part of the camp,
ceive the enemy, the Athenian troops bega
march under cover of the night, and in th
order which they had hitherto observed; bu
had not proceeded far in this nocturnal expe
when, from some unknown cause, alarm and
arose in the division commanded by Demos
Order was after some time restored; but the d
unhappily mistook the road, and quitted

at party of the army under the command
osthenes. This took place in the difficult
cate defiles that led to the ford of the river
The Athenians were assaulted during the
the day with darts, arrows, and javelins.
vening, when many were thus wounded,
vere worn out with fatigue, hunger, and
ylippus sent a herald to proclaim liberty to
he islanders who would come to the Syra-
amp and surrender their arms; but not
ven in their present forlorn situation, and
l the evils which the warfare of barbarians
so inflict were impending, would desert
eneral and confederates. Gylippus at
ntered into treaty with Demosthenes, who
red himself and all his troops prisoners of
No other stipulations were made, than that
ould neither suffer death, imprisonment,
ine. With their arms, they gave up all
ney: this they threw into the hollow of the
and it filled four broad bucklers. The pri-
about six thousand in number, were sent
use.

s arrived, the same evening, at the river
Gylippus pursued and overtook him
banks of Asinarius. He immediately sent
to acquaint him with the capitulation of
henes, and to exhort him to imitate the ex-
f his colleague, and to surrender to his
and irresistible pursuers without further
ed. Nicias disbelieved, or affected to dis-
the report. He was therefore allowed to
confidential person to make the necessary
When the messenger returned, and as-
m of the fact, Nicias proposed (in the
the Athenian republic) to reimburse Syra-

cuse for the expenses of the war; and offered t
leave a citizen as a hostage for every talent th
should thus become due, provided hostilities migl
immediately cease, and his army be allowed to d
part without molestation.

The proposal was rejected with disdain; ar
the Syracusans surrounded the Athenian arm
The former, however, would neither make n
sustain any regular attack; but continued un
the evening to annoy the Athenians unceasing
with missile weapons. About midnight, Nici
called his troops to arms as silently as possibl
and hoped that they might escape under cover
the night; but the watchful enemy perceived h
motions, and immediately began to sing the pæa
Upon this the Athenians returned to their form
station, and again deposited their arms, in despai
A body of about three hundred men, however,
determined courage, without any orders from t
general, gallantly broke through the guards, a
effected their escape. The return of the morni
no sooner appeared, than Nicias pursued his marc
The river was still the object they desired to reac
but in their way thither they were miserab
galled with missile weapons, and desultory charg
of cavalry. Their distress was most lamentab
and incurable; but they nevertheless hoped, th
could they reach the opposite bank of the rive
they should obtain some respite from the heav
armed soldiers and the horse of the enemy.

Urged also by the desire of assuaging the
thirst, they strained every nerve to reach t
river; but notwithstanding all the exertions
which such powerful motives impelled, when th
reached the fatal banks of Asinarius, the heav
armed forces of the enemy were close in their rea

Discipli

pline then yielded to the pressure of necessity. hurried down the steep in confusion, and ut order; and trod one another to death in ream. Their first object was to assuage in- ible thirst; and to the gratification of this ite even personal safety was sacrificed. In ean time the enemy's light-armed troops oc- d the opposite banks; and the whole army, nclosed in the river, was exposed without the r of resistance to missile weapons on both

The Peloponnesians at length led the way e Syracusans down to the river, that they complete the slaughter. The Athenians ed the foe to the utmost; but here another of danger and of horror presented itself to es of Nicias. In the midst of the action, his rs turned their fury against each other, and ed with the point of the sword the un- some draughts of the turbid and bloody n. At the sight of this, the manly soul icias melted within him: he felt that all st.

eady the Athenians were lying dead in heaps river, when Nicias found an opportunity bmit to Gylippus. He asked merely for r for the miserable remains of his troops, ad not perished in the Asinarius, or upon nks. According to the barbarous practice of ge, many of the Syracusan soldiers had seized pri-oners as slaves, before the orders of the amonian general to give quarter could be n. These Athenian captives were afterwards outed among the communities of Sicily, which nt assistance to Syracuse. The public pri- s, with the spoil that could be collected, carried in triumph to the city.

It would have been a singular and glorio trophy of victory, to have exhibited in Sparta t two Athenian generals, who were the most illustr ous men of their time; and though Nicias h little to expect from the *humanity* of a proud a victorious Spartan, Demosthenes certainly h reason to flatter himself with the hope of *justic* Both the generals, however, were condemned death. Demosthenes urged, but urged in vain, t observance of the capitulation: which had be ratified in due form, and according to which h surrendered himself and all his troops prisoners war. But the fears of those who had carried on treasonable correspondence with Nicias induc them, if not to promote, at least to concur in t decree against the two commanders. The Cori thians also are said to have harboured particul enmity towards Nicias; and, for some unknow cause, to have been apprehensive that the restor ti n of this great but unfortunate man to Athe would eventually be detrimental to the interest a pr sperity of their state.

Hermocrates, the Syracusan general, who reported to have been famous for his probity a justi , attempted to remonstrate against the cru and t rrical decree for putting the Atheni commanders to death: but the shouts whi echoed from all parts interrupted him; and much w the multitude incensed against t Athenian invading their country, that th would not him to continue his speech. that inst red an old man, venerable f his years ty, who had lost two sons i the war, heirs to his name and estat He was d by two of his servants; an the people sooner saw him, than a profoun silenc

lence was observed, as no one doubted that he ould pronounce a bitter invective against the risoners.

" You see before you," said the old man, " an nfortunate father, who has more severely felt ie fatal effects of this war than any other Sy- icusan. My two sons, who were the hope and ipport of my old age, and the only comfort of y declining years, have both been slain in battle. cannot but admire and commend their courage id patriotism, in sacrificing a life for the defence id welfare of their country, of which they must ie day have been deprived by the common law of ature. But at the same time I feel myself strongly lected with the loss which I have suffered; r can I forbear to detest the Athenians, as the thors of this unjust war, and the destroyers of y children. I cannot, however, conceal one rcumstance; which is, that I am more jealous the honour of my country than sensible of my ivate affliction. The Athenians, assuredly, merit ery punishment that can be inflicted on them. ut have not the Gods, who are the proper engers of every thing criminal and unjust, sufficiently revenged our cause, and retaliated upon em the injuries they have done us? When the thenian commander surrendered himself and his oops prisoners, was it not stipulated, that none them should suffer death, imprisonment, or mine? If, therefore, you condemn them to die, ill you not thereby violate the sanctity of your omise and the law of nations, and commit an tion the most perfidious and inhuman? Will u suffer the glory you have acquired by the war be thus tarnished?

" You, doubtless, have not forgotten that Ni-

cias, whose fate you are about to pronounce
the man who pleaded your cause in the Ath
assembly; using all his credit, influence, an
quence, to dissuade his country from emb
in the war. Where then would be the ju
or the interest, of pronouncing sentence of
upon this good and worthy man? As for m
O Syracusans! I would rather suffer death
behold you guilty of an act fraught with so
injustice, tyranny, and dishonour."

Notwithstanding the visible effect which
magnanimous speech had upon the mult
the Athenian generals were consigned t
executioner by a solemn decree of the Syr
people. In the mean time, the miserable
nant of their army, the greatest ever sent
one Grecian state, was doomed to a still s
lot. The prisoners, who exceeded seven the
men, were condemned to labour in the min
quarries of Sicily. The food that was given
was scarcely sufficient to support life; an
cruelty of the Syracusans was still more exhibi
their scanty allowance of water. They had no s
to screen them from the inclemency of the
and while they suffered the reflected heat
scorching sun, the chill damps of the autu
nights were injurious to their health. N
was taken of those who sickened; and whe
died, (as great numbers did,) the bodies rem
to putrefy among their living companions.
a confinement of about seventy days, an eter
paration was made between those who should
the happier lot of being sold for slaves into
lands, and those who were to be for ever co
to these terrible dungeons. The Athenians,
such Sicilians and Italians as had unnaturall

t

ed their cause, were reserved for the latter
n. The people of Athens justly regretted
loss of Demosthenes, a gallant and en- B. C.
rising commander; but all posterity 413.
lament and mourn the fate of Nicias,
most pious, the most virtuous, and the most
rtunate man of his age.

mid the relation of these dreadful and melan-
y scenes, it would be unjust to omit the men-
of a singular act of humanity. The Syracu-
who could punish their helpless captives with
unrelenting severity, had been often affected
the tender and plaintive strains of Euripides,
thenian poet. Euripides had learned, in the
ol of Socrates, to adorn the lessons of philo-
y with the charms of fancy; and was consi-
d by his contemporaries as the most pathetic,
most philosophical and instructive, of all the
ic writers. The pleasure which the Syracu-
received from his inimitable poetry, induced
n to wish it might be rehearsed by the flexi-
voices and harmonious pronunciation of the
enians; which were so unlike, and so superior
the rudeness and asperity of their own Doric
ect. Such of the captives as were able, were
uested to repeat the plaintive and affecting
ages of this favourite bard. They obeyed;
in representing the woes of ancient kings and
es too frequently of their own. The
tensils were likewise, by common consent,
ity, to treat those prisoners entrusted with great
lness, loose their chains, and restore them to their
ving and afflicted country. When they re-
ed to Athens, they waited in solemn pro-
sion to the house of Euripides, and hailed him
their deliverer from slavery. This was an

acknow-

acknowledgment infinitely preferable to all splendour that ever surrounded the person poet, and even than all the temples and altars ever immortalized the memory of genius. attend the career of a hero, like the progress comet, with terror and dismay; but repose w fond delight on the contemplation of talents tivating the arts of peace, and softening the city of martial minds.

CHAP. X.

e Affairs of Greece, from the Defeat of the Expedition against Sicily, to the Conclusion of he Peloponnesian War.

'HE news of the total destruction of the most powerful armament that ever sailed from a cian harbour, did not immediately find credit at ens. So far from supposing that such a dread- catastrophe could ever happen to it, this fleet was sidered as capable of accomplishing almost any quest. Multiplied concurring testimonies, how- r, removed at length every doubt of the mag- ude of the calamity; and the public anguish ame extreme. In one rash enterprise the enians lost their army, their fleet, their best most experienced generals, and the flou- ing vigour of their manly youth: in fine, all ir proudest hopes perished for ever in the har- r of Syracuse. These irreparable misfortunes bled them from resisting the confederacy of ponnesus, reinforced as it now was by the ession of a resentful and elated enemy. A acusan fleet would probably assault Piræus, ile a Lacedæmonian army invested their city; l to these combined attacks the citizens had son to fear that Athens must finally yield.

t was no wonder, therefore, that the minds of Athenians should have been seized with con- nation and despair, when they knew the extent their losses. The venerable members of the opagus expressed their grief in the solemn jesty of silent sorrow: but the piercing cry of e was heard for several miles along the walls that

that joined Piræus to the city; and popular rage vented itself against the diviners and orators, whose blind predictions and ambitious language had promoted an expedition eternally fatal to their country.

The distress of the Athenians indeed was too great to admit of any consolation, because they felt it to be merited in all its magnitude; but had they been capable of receiving comfort, there were none who would pity their sorrows, and compassionate their sufferings. What was afflicting to them, gave unspeakable joy to their neighbours. Many feared, most hated, and all envied, a people that had long usurped the sovereignty of Greece. Their allies, scattered over so many islands and coasts, prepared to assert their independence. The confederates of Sparta, among whom the Syracusans might justly be considered as holding the first rank, were unsatisfied with mere victory, and longed for revenge. The republics which had hitherto declined the danger and uncertainty of a doubtful contest, considered the present moment proper for decision; and meanly solicited to be engaged in the war, that they might assist in the destruction of Athens.

In the mean time the Lacedæmonians, with the characteristical rancorous coolness of their government, enjoyed with unspeakable satisfaction the view of this various ferment, and prepared to exert themselves, and to profit by the misfortune of their neighbour. They now considered the establishment of their own permanent superiority over all Greece, as an acquisition completely within their power. But, should all the efforts of such a powerful confederacy be unable to accomplish the ruin of Athens, there was still another

er enemy behind, from whose strength and
sity the Athenians had every thing to fear.
s Nothus, who had now succeeded to the go-
nent of the Persian empire, had employed his
in extending his dominion towards the shores
e Ægean, and of the Hellespont and Pro-
s. The recent misfortunes of the Athenian
e flattered the Persian commanders, who
ned in Asia Minor, with the hope of restoring
hole of that coast to the authority of the
king. They considered it also as now prac-
e, to execute exemplary punishment on the
city which had resisted the strength, dismem-
the empire, and tarnished the glory, of Persia.
e terror of such a powerful combination
t well have reduced the Athenians to despair.
afford the illustrious and the only example of
ple, who by the virtues and qualities of the
alone acquired an extensive dominion over
equally skilful with themselves in the arts of
nd government. The nations around consi-
the Athenians as superior in courage and ca-
y to every other people; and by the force of
pinion they were enabled to maintain with
feeble garrisons an absolute authority over the
ls of the Ægean sea, and the cities of the
ic coast. But the disasters and disgrace of the
lition against Sicily destroyed at once every
and ideal support of their power. Its results
ved them of a third part of their citizens;
hey could not supply their garrisons abroad
fresh recruits. The dread of their a[illegible]
ore: and their multiplied defeats,
and in the harbour of Syracuse
d into contempt that admiratio

Athens had been long held both by Greeks barbarians.

But in free governments there are many la resources, which public calamities alone can veal. Adversity also furnishes in the enthusi of popular assemblies the greatest opportunit men of strong and vigorous intellects, of disp ing national honour and magnanimity. The spark of generous ardour, excited by the lov virtue, of glory, and of their republic, was fused and cherished by the natural contagio sympathy. The whole surrounding multit caught the patriotic flame; and its social and i gorating warmth was reflected from such a var of objects, that its intenseness could not be resi even by the chill and damps of despair. Athenians determined with one mind to brave severity of fortune, and to withstand every ass of their collective foes.

Nor did this resolution evaporate in useless culation. The wisest measures, and the most gorous that circumstances would admit, were mediately put into execution. They began to store the navy, to collect stores, to raise mor and to save and use it according as the exigenc affairs seemed to demand. They abridged only private but public luxury, which was becc immoderate, and therefore pernicious, in the At nian state. They endeavoured to obviate the fection of the allied and subject states, and pa cularly of Eubœa, the most valuable dependa of the commonwealth, and without which the of Athens could not easily subsist. Never w the Athenian people so disposed to listen and obey, wise and proper advice. "It w

th

' says Thucydides, " and it was done;
ımer ended."

following the defeat of the expedition
t Sicily, the Peloponnesians equip-
ı fleet of one hundred sail: of which
›artans furnished twenty-five galleys;
twenty-five; the Corinthians fifteen;
rians, Phocians, Megareans, with the
tants of the maritime cities in Pelo-
he rest. By the defeat in Sicily, it
lly supposed that Athens had com-
the command of the sea; and imme-
Greek Asiatic cities began to think of
The Lesbians had commenced the ex-
the Chians and Erythræans followed.
owever, of their own strength, their
e was to communicate with Tissapher-
the Persian governors in Asia Minor;
rap did not think himself able, with
rces, to give them protection. He
adly united his interest with theirs,
tly they sent ministers to Lacedæmon.
hich the Peloponnesians had prepared,
d to encourage and support the revolt
ic subjects of the Athenians. Tissa-
his part promised, that if they would
of this force to the assistance of the
bians, and Erythræans, he would pay
and victual the ships.

ame time, ambassadors arrived from
populous and opulent city situated on
the Propontis. They requested the
ians to send their armament to the
apacious harbours which had lon
wealth and the ornament of that ci
›el the Athenian garrisons from

island. Pharnabazus, the Persian govern
the northern district of Asia Minor, sec
their proposal, and offered the same ter
Tissaphernes. These satraps, however, we
disunited, that each urged his particular re
with a total unconcern about the importa
terests of their common master. The La
monians and their allies, unable to come t
resolution, for a great length of time held
consultations. They hesitated, deliberated
solved, and then changed their determin
but, at length, Alcibiades prevailed upon
to accept the overtures of Tissaphernes ar
Ionians, and to abandon, at present, the ca
Pharnabazus and the Hellespontines.

This state of indecision had not been the
cause of delay. A variety of private cons
tions diverted the Peloponnesians from the g
aim of the confederacy; and the season w
advanced before the Corinthians, who ha
tinguished themselves in antipathy and hat
Athens, were ready to sail. It happened
that the time for performing the Isthmian
was at hand; and such was the inviolable
tity of the armistice on that occasion, th
Athenians might come to Corinth and re
there in safety and security. The prepara
therefore, could not long remain a secret
even the negotiations would probably also
pire. The movements of the fleet, in the
time, excited suspicion at Athens; and the
sons coming and going directed the suspici
its true object. Aristocrates, therefore, o
the Athenian generals, was sent to Chios
instructions to inform himself of the present
of things in that island; and, as a precautio

he future conduct of its inhabitants, to demand he ships which, according to the terms of the onfederacy, they were bound to furnish for the thenian fleet. The leaders of the revolt, there- re, thus taken unprepared, denied any intention f breaking their ancient connection with the thenian republic; and, in conformity to the quisition, sent seven ships to Piræus.

The Athenians who attended at the Isthmian ames, neglected not the commission with which heir country had intrusted them. The prepa- ations were seen, and the purpose was suspect- d; and they secretly learned the plan and par- icular circumstances of the revolt, and the pre- ise time fixed for the departure of the Corinthian leet. The Athenians took their measures ac- ordingly; intercepted the Corinthians as they ailed through the Saronic gulf; and having at- acked and defeated them, pursued, and blocked hem up in their harbours.

Meanwhile the Spartans and their allies sent quadrons successively to the Ionian coast, under he command of Alcibiades, Chalcideus, and Astyochus. The fleet under Alcibiades sailed to Chios, and on its arrival excited universal asto- nishment and alarm among the inhabitants, ex- cept those of the aristocratical party. The coun- cil, according to what had been previously con- certed, was now sitting. Alcibiades boldly affirm- ed, that a large fleet was on its way from Pelo- ponnesus. The people had not heard any thing of the defeat on the Corinthian coast. A decree was proposed for renouncing the confederacy with Athens, and entering into an alliance with the Peloponnesians; which, without being materially opposed by the democratical party, was imme-

diately carried. The Erythræans followed this example; and three ships being sent against Clazomenæ, that city also surrendered. Alcibiades had an old and hereditary interest at Miletus; and he proposed next to engage this, which was the richest and most important of the Asiatic Grecian cities, in revolt against his native state. Miletus soon after surrendered. Thus, with the trifling force of a few triremes, did Alcibiades strike a greater blow against his country; than the Lacedæmonians and their confederates, even after the signal advantages obtained in Sicily, had dared to meditate.

The affairs of the Athenians were now in so critical a situation, that they voted an expenditure of a sum of a thousand talents, which, in the more prosperous times of the commonwealth, had been deposited in the citadel, to be employed in the moment of extreme necessity. By this seasonable supply, they were enabled to send a fleet, under Phrynichus and other commanders, to the isle of Lesbos. With this armament, having secured the fidelity of the Lesbians, they endeavoured to regain possession of Miletus. The Athenians and their allies consisted of two thousand five hundred men. Eight hundred heavy-armed Milesians under the command of Alcibiades, with the Peloponnesians that had been commanded by Chalcideus, and a force of Asiatic infantry and cavalry led by the satrap Tissaphernes in person, opposed them; and a bloody battle was fought under the walls of Miletus. The Argians in the Athenian army, thinking that the Ionians would avoid them at the first onset, advanced without order; but the Milesians presently routed them, and killed near three hundred

ed men. In the mean time, the Athenians, ho were opposed to the Peloponnesians and siatics, fought with great courage and bravery; id having attacked and defeated the former, ie barbarians immediately fled. In both parts the engagement, therefore, the Ionic race, ommonly reckoned by the Greeks the less war- ke, prevailed over their Dorian rivals and ene- ies. The Athenians having erected their tro- y, prepared to make an assault upon Miletus. ate, however, in the evening of the same day on hich the battle was fought, they received intelli- nce that a fleet of fifty-five triremes had arrived om Peloponnesus. But it was not by the exer- ons of the Peloponnesians alone that this power- l armament had been fitted out. Hermocrates id prevailed upon the Syracusans to equip a uadron of twenty triremes; which, being join- l by the Peloponnesian galleys, had proceeded the relief of Miletus. Theramenes, the Spar- n, was commander in chief.

Phrynichus, the Athenian commander, consi- ering, that to perform what appeared most con- ucive to the welfare and interest of his country as in reality most honourable, prudently de- ined to engage the hostile fleet; and his firm- ss despised the clamours of the Athenian sol- ers, who stigmatized his retreat with the name cowardice. However, he calmly retired to amos, with forty-eight galleys, and refused to ommit the last hope of the republic to the danger f an unequal combat.

The superiority which the Peloponnesians now ossessed over the fleet of Athens, was fully tes- fied, in obliging the armament of that republic quit the harbours and the coast of Miletus,

among the sailors on account of the redu
their wages, a sum of money judiciousl
luted among the commanders would p
easy expedient for silencing the licentious c
of the common men.

Tissaphernes heard the proposal, with
tention natural to an avaricious man des
saving his money; and the event prov
true a judgement Alcibiades had forme
Grecian character, when it was found t
mocrates the Syracusan was the only per
disguised meanly and perfidiously to be
interests of the men under his command.
phernes however afterward declared, th
mocrates, though more coy, was not less
tible; and that the only reason why he u
the patronage of the sailors was, to ol
himself a more exorbitant sum. How
assertion was true, is uncertain; but it

ersaries: but it was evident that these exertions ad almost exhausted them; and the more intelli- ent among the people were sensible, that they ould not long resist the Peloponnesian confede- acy, aided as it then was by the wealth and pow- r of Persia. At this juncture, Alcibiades applied ecretly to Pisander, and other persons in the thenian camp. He gave them assurance, that e would engage Tissaphernes in their interest, nd, through his means, lead the Persian monarch imself to an alliance with Athens; provided they vould consent to demolish their turbulent demo- racy, which was odious to Darius.

His overtures excited attention, and a great majority of the people approved the proposal. Phrynichus, however, the commander in chief, irm in the interest of democracy, was not, at irst, made acquainted with the innovation that nenaced the state. But no sooner was he aware of what was transacting, and perceived how deaf is colleagues were to every objection against recalling the friend of Tissaphernes, than he in- formed Astyochus, the Spartan admiral, who was himself Astyochus, become the pensioner and creature of the satrap, communicated both to him nd Alcibiades the intelligence he had received. Alcibiades immediately informed the Athenians n Samos of the treachery of their general. Phry- nichus alarmed, wrote again to Astyochus, com- plaining that secrecy had not been observed, and acquainting him with the means of surprising the Athenian fleet at Samos. Phrynichus, under- standing that the Spartan admiral had commu- nicated this also to Alcibiades, extricated him- self with singular boldness and dexterity. The consideration that Samos was unfortified, and

that

and thus was the Athenian democracy s
after it had subsisted one hundred years
exampled public glory, though with m
time disorder.

B. C. 411. But the conduct of the four tyrants, for such they certai soon abolished every vestige of freedom. Mercenaries from the islanc Ægean sea were hired to overawe and i the people, and to destroy the real or enemies of the tyrants. They neglecte portunity of attacking the Peloponnesia time when the forces of that people wer at the treachery and duplicity of Tiss and mutinous for want of pay and sul but they sent a humiliating embassy to solicit peace on the most dishonoural Their tyranny became odious in the their cowardice contemptible in the Samos. The generous youths, engag defence of their country by sea and l indignant at the insults and outrages their fellow-citizens. The tyrants might inflict the same indignities on them, i to proceed in their career, and the p glected to vindicate their freedom. T murs broke out at last into loud and clamours, which the approbation of th greatly promoted. Activity and bold given to the insurgents, by Thrasyb Thrasyllus; two officers of great merit entrusted with a share in the principal The abettors of the new government were attacked by surprise: thirty of criminal were put to death; three were and the rest, submitting to democracy, free pardon.

The first concern of Thrasybulus, now appointed to the supreme command of the armament, was to recal Alcibiades; who had been deceived and disgraced by the tyrants, and who was most capable of avenging the indignities and wrongs both of his country and of himself. Accordingly, an assembly of the Athenian citizens belonging to the armament, was convened as the legal representatives of their commonwealth. This body assenting to the recal of Alcibiades, Thrasybulus went to communicate the information to him in the palace of Tissaphernes; and they returned together to Samos. Several years had now elapsed since the eloquent son of Clinias had spoken in an Athenian assembly. He began by lamenting his calamities, and accusing his fortune. His banishment, however, though otherwise unfortunate, had procured him, he said, the acquaintance and the friendship of Tissaphernes; who, at his entreaties, had withheld the pay from the Peloponnesians; and would, he doubted not, continue his good offices to the Athenians, supply them with every thing necessary for continuing the war, and even assist them with a Phœnician fleet.

These flattering promises raised his credit with the army, by whom he was immediately appointed general; widened the breach between Tissaphernes and the Spartans; and struck terror into the tyrants of Athens, who were soon made acquainted with the speech of Alcibiades. Matters being thus settled, the Athenians at Samos already despised the efforts of the Peloponnesians. They even prepared to revenge themselves on the four hundred tyrants at Athens; but Alcibiades dissuaded them from their purpose,

with the name of Tissaphernes, and Tissa
with that of the Athenians. Upon his retu
Magnesia, he found the partisans of dem
who had been inflamed with the report of
dignities and cruelties committed at Athens
to sail thither to take vengeance on their e
and to protect their friends. By these
Athens would have been plunged into the
of a civil war; and all its remaining depend
Ionia and on the Hellespont, would have su
to the enemy. No man but Alcibiades wa
ble of preventing the people from committ
rash and destructive action; and he effe
checked the design: but at the same time
notice to the usurpers at Athens, that, unl
divested themselves of their illegal power,
stored the ancient constitution, he would s
a fleet to Piræus, and deprive them of thei
rity and their lives.

When the message reached Athens,

ed by their colleagues; Phrynichus was
ly stabbed by one of the city guards; and
rrors of a Corcyrean sedition seemed ready
renewed in Athens: when the old men,
n, children, and strangers, interposed for
fety of a city which had long been the or-
it of Greece, the terror of Persia, and the ad-
on of the world.

the duplicity of the satrap, and the trea-
of their own officers, the Peloponnesians
ascribed the want of pay and subsistence,
all the misfortunes which they suffered.
resentment becoming violent and furious,
attacked and destroyed the Persian for-
ions near Miletus, the garrison was put to
ord, and Astyochus, their own general, sa-
is life by fleeing to an altar. Nor were they
sed, until the guilty were removed, and an
r of approved valour and fidelity appointed
command.

e dreadful consequences which must have
ed to the Athenians, had a large and power-
et appeared on their coast during the late
otions and sedition in Athens, may be
conceived from the terror and consterna-
hat were inspired by the sight of a squadron
ty-two galleys, commanded by the Spartan
andridas. The friends of the constitution,
the partizans of oligarchy, had been con-
in two distinct and separate assemblies;
the most important matters were in agita-
when the Peloponnesian fleet was discovered
ie coast. Immediately the whole force of
parties in Athens united against the com-
enemy, and ran to Piræus as by mutual
nt. Some went aboard the triremes that

ter of an open enemy and that of a treacher ally. The Spartans now courted the friends and protection of Pharnabazus: and a numer and powerful armament was sent to the provi where he commanded. As soon as it was kno that the Peloponnesian fleet had sailed for Hellespont, the Athenians, animated by manly counsels of Thrasybulus and Thrasyll the generous defenders of their freedom, purs the same course; and in the straits that join Euxine and Ægean seas, the conflict began, continued for a long time. In three succes engagements, the event of which became co nually more decisive, did the Athenians, in twenty-first year of the war, prevail over t Peloponnesian enemies. The first battle fought in the narrow channel between Se and Abydus; in which Thrasybulus took twe Peloponnesian ships, but lost fifteen Athen galleys. The glory, however, remained entire w the Athenians.

A squadron of fourteen Rhodian vessels, n cape Rhœgium, was intercepted by the Athen fleet. While the islanders defended themsel with great bravery, Mindarus, the Spartan miral, seeing the engagement, hastened to t assistance. The principal division of the A nian armament attacked the Peloponnesi Through the greater part of the day the f was maintained with various success in diffe parts of the line; but, towards evening, eight Athenian triremes were seen entering the st from the south. This proved to be the squad under the command of Alcibiades. The P ponnesians immediately fled; and, fortuna for them, the satrap Pharnabazus with his la

fo

forces was at hand. He rode into the sea, at the head of his cavalry, as far as his horse would carry him, that he might relieve his distressed allies. Through his assistance, the crews mostly escaped; but the Athenians carried off thirty triremes.

B.C. 410.

The Spartans now yielded possession of the sea, which they hoped soon to recover, and retired to the friendly harbour of Cyzicus, that they might repair the remains of their shattered armament; and the Athenians, profiting by their victories, raised contributions from the numerous and wealthy towns in that neighbourhood. But meeting with little success in their design, the several divisions returned to Sestos; nor could they expect that such strongly fortified places as Byzantium, Selymbria, and Perinthus, on the European coast, or Lampsacus, Parium, and Chalcedon, on the Asiatic, would be intimidated, except by more decisive and important advantages. It was therefore determined, chiefly by the advice of Alcibiades, to attack the Peloponnesian fleet at Cyzicus. The Athenians, coasting along the Chersonese, arrived at the small island of Proconnesus, near the western extremity of the Propontis. A heavy rain occurred, which favoured their purpose of a surprise. As the weather cleared, and they approached Cyzicus, they descried the Peloponnesian fleet manœuvering at such a distance from the harbour, that its return was already intercepted. The enemy, perceiving the Athenian armament so much stronger than they expected, were in great consternation; they expected not success from a naval action, but it was impossible for them to return to their port. A general engagement ensued, and the Athenians obtained

in few but expressive words to the Sparta
vernment, in a letter from Hippocrates the s
in command, which exhibits one of the mo
rious and authentic specimens of Laconic wr
"Success has turned against us: Minda
"slain: the men starve: what to do we
not!". These four short sentences made the
of the dispatch.

Alcibiades now raised contributions on th
habitants of Cyzicus. The fleet then proc
against Perinthus and Selymbria, and ex
from these places also large sums of money.
ing thence to Chrysopolis, in the Chalce
territory, near the entrance of the Euxine,
biades caused that place to be fortified, and
established a custom-house for collecting
of a-tenth in value on all cargoes passing the
As this mode of levying money required ar
ed force; he left there, besides a garrison,
ships, under the command of Theramenes.

recommended the most submissive obedience to the authority of the republic. He then requested the sailors to name temporary commanders; but was answered, that he and his colleagues ought to continue in office. He again urged them, not to rebel against the government. "The time will come," he said, "when we shall desire your "support; to relate the battles you have fought, "the ships you have taken, and the success that "has attended you, under our command; and "you will then bear testimony to our conduct, "upon all occasions, by sea and land." The admonition had its full effect: nothing disorderly happened. The armament shewed, however, that they would not have suffered any violence to their generals: and they entered into an agreement upon oath, to exert themselves, on their return to Syracuse, for procuring their restoration.

For several years the measures of the Athenians had been almost uniformly successful; but the twenty-fourth campaign was distinguished by peculiar favours of fortune. The Persians and Peloponnesians were repeatedly defeated, driven from their encampments and fortresses near the shore, and pursued into the country, which was plundered and desolated by the victors. The Athenians returned in triumph to attack the fortified cities, which had not yet submitted. Alcibiades displayed the wonderful resources of his extraordinary and enterprising genius in this kind of warfare. By gradual approaches, by sudden assaults, by surprise, by treachery, or by stratagem, he soon became master of Chalcedon, Selymbria, and Byzantium. His naval success was also equally conspicuous. The enemy had fitted out several

B. C. 408.

butions in the Euxine and Mediterranc
as abundantly supplied his fleet and army
necessary subsistence and accommodation

But while the Athenian arms were
with such glory abroad, the Attic terri
continually harassed by the Spartan k
the Lacedæmonian garrison at Decelia.
foes frequently indeed threatened the safe
country; the desolated lands afforded
plies; and the Athenians durst not ventu
out their walls, to celebrate their acc
festivals. Alcibiades, therefore, hoped,
ter so many foreign conquests, he might,
be able to alleviate the domestic sufferin
country. He longed, also, to revisit
tive city, after having been absent si
and he hoped likewise to enjoy the
and honours which the Greeks gener
stowed on successful valour.
B. C. 407 lebrated voyage was performed

reached him at sea, that the decree respecting his banishment had been repealed; and, that he had been elected general of the republic. Even after receiving this agreeable intelligence, he was unable to conquer his well-founded distrust of the inconstant and capricious humours of the people. Nor would he approach the Attic shore, until he beheld, among the multitudes that had crowded from the city, his principal friends and relations, inviting him by their voice and action. He then landed amidst the almost universal acclamations of the spectators. The general language was, that Alcibiades was the most meritorious of the Athenian citizens; that his condemnation had been the pernicious measure of a conspiracy of wicked men, who scrupled nothing to promote their own interest; that his abilities were transcendent, and his liberality unbounded; that he had been compelled to oppose his country, and his readiness and eagerness to return to its service proved his patriotic disposition. That with respect to the danger of the state, men of his temper and inclination, could have no desire to innovate; for the favour of the people gave him all the power and pre-eminence, which he could possibly wish. He had never oppressed any: but his opponents had destroyed and assassinated the most worthy men of Athens; and, if ever they appeared to possess any popular confidence, it was only when the death, or exile, of the great and leading men, left them, without competition, to enjoy the principal situations of the commonwealth.

While, however, these were the common sentiments and expressions of the people, a few were heard to murmur, that Alcibiades alone had occasioned

casioned all the past misfortunes and disasters of the republic; and it was to be feared he would still be the promoter of measures dangerous and hostile to the public welfare. His friends did not entirely confide in the protection which the late established government could, or would, afford. They came, therefore, prepared to resist any attempt that might be made against his person; and, surrounded by them, Alcibiades proceeded to the city.

His first business was, to attend the council of five hundred; and then to address the general assembly of the people. Before both, he asserted his innocence, with respect to the sacrilegious profanation of which he had been accused; contrasted the situation of Athens before, and since, his taking the command of the Athenian armament; apologized for his conduct during his banishment; and criminated his prosecutors. It was not difficult for Alcibiades, to plead his defence before judges, so favourably disposed to hear and to believe him; and the popular favour was so great, and so evident, that not a word was spoken in opposition to him. But the transports of the people became even immoderate; and they would have loaded their favourite with honours incompatible with the genius of a free republic, and which might probably have proved detrimental to his future safety. The crowns and garlands, and other pledges of public gratitude, he thankfully received; but respectfully declined the regal sceptre, and expressed his firm resolution to support and maintain the liberty of Athens. The state, he said, did not stand in need of a king; but a general, who should possess undivided power, capable of restoring the ancient

ory and splendour of the commonwealth. To is illustrious and exalted rank, which Themisocles and Cimon had formerly filled, Alcibiades ight justly aspire. He was accordingly chosen ommander in chief by sea and land, with sureme authority; and a hundred galleys were imediately equipped, with transports for containg fifteen hundred heavy-armed men and a proortional body of cavalry.

The Eleusinian mysteries, a time set apart for ommemorating and diffusing the gifts of Ceres, ow approached. This Goddess, whose festival as distinguished by appropriate honours, had troduced corn, wine, and oil, among the thenians, who had communicated them to the st of Greece. Minerva, who had given the live, and was supposed to be the protector of thens, was also distinguished with innumera- e solemnities. In appointed days of the spring d autumn, various were the professions of gra- ude expressed to the generous author of that it. The worship of Ceres, indeed, returned frequently. But in two particulars it seemcalculated to excite reverence and awe: by seldom occurring; and by the *mysteries*, those en treasures of wisdom and happiness which diffused on the initiated in the temple of sis. These mysteries are said to have exed, by external signs, the immortality of uman soul, and the rewards that will be ed in a future life on the virtuous and the

r Decelia had been occupied by a Laceian garrison, the Athenians were no longer of the road leading to Eleusis; and the us expedition having always passed by

sea, many of the prescribed ceremonies were necessarily either omitted, or imperfectly performed. Alcibiades determined to wipe off the stain of impiety which had long adhered to his character, by renewing this venerable procession in all its lustre. With the forces returned from Asia, added to the strength of the city, he undertook to conduct, by land, the peaceful ministers and votaries of the Gods, and to protect them in the fullest performance of every accustomed rite. This accordingly he accomplished: the train went and returned without suffering any disturbance from the enemy; who, as if by mutual compact, suspended hostilities at this season.

Soon after this meritorious enterprise, Alcibiades prepared to sail for Asia Minor: and about this time Lysander was appointed to the command of the Peloponnesian fleet, in consequence of a rule jealously observed by the Lacedæmonian government, that none should be the admiral of the fleet above a year. Lysander accordingly, in rotation, was nominated commander. He had been educated in all the severe discipline of the Spartan state; he had spent his youth and manhood in those honourable employments which properly became him; and it was not until the decline of life, that he assumed this important station. Experience was added to his valour, and he had not yet lost the ardour and resources of that ambitious mind which animated his youth. His transactions with the world had taught him to soften the asperity and severity of the Spartan manners; to obtain by fraud what could not be gained by force; and, in his own figurative language, to eke out the lion's with the fox's skin. This mixed character admirably

ably suited the part he was called to act in this crisis of public danger.

Having received his command early in the winter, he sailed first to Rhodes; and proceeded with a squadron to Cos and Miletus, and thence to Ephesus, where, with the ships he had collected in the way, he found himself at the head of seventy triremes. But the assembling of such a force was a matter of little consequence, unless proper measures were pursued for holding it together, and enabling it to act with vigour. As soon, therefore, as he heard that Cyrus was arrived at Sardis, to take upon him the government of the inland parts of Asia Minor, he hastened to pay his court to the young prince. Here he experienced a favourable reception: and Cyrus declared, that he had brought five hundred talents, (one hundred and twenty-five thousand pounds sterling,) for carrying on the war against Athens; and that, if this sum should prove insufficient, he could expend his own revenue, and melt down and coin into money the golden throne upon which he sat.

This discourse gave great satisfaction to Lysander, and he requested that the seamen's wages might be immediately raised. Cyrus answered that he had received express orders from his father, that the pay should continue on the ancient footing. Lysander, however, contrived, before he left Sardis, to procure the augmentation to the sailors: and this measure induced the Athenian crews to desert in great numbers to the Lacedæmonian fleet. Cyrus delivered to him ten thousand daricks (about five thousand pounds sterling); with which he returned to Ephesus, and discharged the arrears due to his troops.

While Lysander was manning his vessels, and preparing them for action, Alcibiades attacked the small island of Andros; but, meeting with more resistance than he expected, and being obliged to procure pay and subsistance for his troops, he sailed to the Ionian, or Carian, coast, with a view of raising contributions. He committed the principal armament to Antiochus, a man wholly unworthy of such an important trust; and commanded him to continue in the harbour of Notium, where the fleet then was, during his absence, and by no means to risk an engagement. No sooner, however, was Alcibiades departed, than Antiochus sailed towards Ephesus, approached the sterns of the Lacedæmonian ships, and with the most licentious insults challenged their admiral to battle; but Lysander had the prudence to delay the engagement until the presumption of the enemy had thrown them into confusion. When he perceived the Athenian vessels scattered in disorder, then he gave orders to the Peloponnesian squadrons to advance. A few galleys were immediately launched and manned, and pursued the hostile fleet. This being seen at Notium, a superior force was instantly sent to the relief of Antiochus; upon which Lysander having led out the whole Peloponnesian fleet, the Athenians did the same with theirs, but in such haste that they observed no order. Lysander began the action with his fleet regularly formed: the Athenians, one after another, endeavoured to get into the line, and for sometime maintained an irregular contest; but at length they were obliged to retire to Samos, and lost fifteen vessels, with a considerable part of their crews. This was a very mor-

tifying

tifying event for Alcibiades. He instantly sailed to his fleet, and, anxious to restore the tarnished lustre of the Athenian armament, sailed to the mouth of the harbour of Ephesus, and again offered battle; but Lysander declined to venture a second engagement with the superior strength of Alcibiades.

The people of Athens, who expected to hear only of victories and triumphs, were not a little mortified, when they received the intelligence of this defeat; and, as they could not suspect the abilities, they distrusted the fidelity of their commander. The enemies of Alcibiades immediately took advantage of the popular temper; and Thrasybulus arrived from the fleet, in order to impeach him. He represented the misconduct of Alcibiades, as having ruined the affairs of his country. He had selected, said the orator, such friends as were the meanest and most worthless of men; and to such persons he had committed the command of the fleet, while he passed his time in the effemin te pleasures of Ionia, or raised contributions on the dependent cities, that he might maintain a fortress which he had erected, in the neighbourhood of Byzantium, to shelter him from the vengeance of the republic.

By the same assembly therefore, and on the same day, Alcibiades was accused and almost unanimously condemned; and, that the affairs of the republic might not again suffer by the abuse of undivided power, they proceeded to elect ten generals. Among the newly-appointed commanders, were Thrasyllus, Leon, Diomedon, Conon, and Pericles; men whose approved valour and love of liberty had recommended them to public honours.

These had scarcely assumed the command c the Athenian fleet, when Callicratidas was sen to succeed Lysander, the Spartan admiral. Th character of the former was directly opposite t the ambitious and intriguing temper of the lat ter. A cabal was soon formed against Calliera tidas, by some of the principal officers in th armament, and among the allies; and an univer sal discontent prevailed on account of the chang which had taken place in the command. In or der to bring matters to an issue, Callicratidas ask ed them, whether they would give him their zealou co-operation in his authority, or he should retur home and relate the present state of things i the Peloponnesian armament. Order was there upon immediately established, and the com mands of the Spartan government were obeyed.

This was not, however, the only difficult which the new admiral had to encounter. H repaired to Sardis, to demand the stipulated pe cuniary succours; but could gain no admission t the royal presence. The first time he went t the palace, he was told that Cyrus was at table "Well;" replied he, "I shall wait until h has dined." He came a second time, but wa still denied admittance. This behaviour migh have deserved his resentment, but it chiefly ex cited his contempt. He left the royal city, des pising the pride and perfidy of the Persian al lies: and exclaimed, that he saw what would b the consequences of these quarrels among th Greeks; and that if he lived to return home, h would do his utmost to reconcile Lacedæmon an Athens.

The first operations of Callicratidas were di rected against the isle of Lesbos; or rathe

against the populous and wealthy towns of Methymna and Mitylene, on the northern and southern divisions of that island. Methymna was taken by assault, and the allies proposed the sale of the inhabitants. But Callieratidas, with a spirit of liberal patriotism, of which we meet with few instances in Grecian history, nobly declared, that where he commanded no Greek should be made a slave.

Conon, the Athenian commander, having sailed with a squadron of seventy ships, to protect the isle of Lesbos, Callieratidas, with a far superior fleet, intercepted the return of the armament to Samos. The Athenians fled towards the coast of Mitylene; but were so vigourously pursued by the enemy, that both entered the harbour together. Conon, thus compelled to fight against numbers so superior, lost thirty triremes, and only saved the rest by hauling under the protection of the battlements of the town. Callieratidas stationed his fleet in the harbour; and sending for infantry from Methymna and Chios, formed the siege of Mitylene both by sea and land. After these successes Cyrus sent supplies, unsolicited, and also a present for the admiral. The supplies were accepted by the Spartan, but the present he refused; observing, that if Cyrus meant to be upon friendly terms with the Lacedæmonians, he supposed he should be included in the general favour.

Conon was now in a very distressing situation. He embarked some of his bravest and most experienced seamen in two swift-sailing vessels; one of which, eluding the vigilance of the enemy, escaped to the Hellespont, and made known to the Athenians the misfortunes of their general.

The

This news soon reached Samos and Athens. The importance of the object, which was no less than the safety of forty ships, and more than eight thousand brave men, excited the attention and activity of the Athenians. A fleet of one hundred and fifty sail was immediately equipped, and manned; the assistance of their allies having added to their domestic strength, and all the able-bodied men in the republic being pressed into the service.

This large and powerful armament instantly sailed for Lesbos, to the relief of Conon. The Spartan admiral did not decline the engagement. Having left fifty triremes, under the command of Eteonicus, to continue the blockade of Mitylene, he went with one hundred and twenty ships to meet the enemy. The same evening the Athenians had advanced to the islands, or rather rocks, of Arginusæ; and both parties meditated a surprise, which was rendered ineffectual by a violent tempest of rain and thunder. At day-break the two armaments prepared to engage; but some experienced seamen, and the chief councellors of Callicratidas, advised him not to hazard the weakness of the Peloponnesians against the superior strength and numbers of the enemy. The generous and intrepid Spartan, with the spirit of a true disciple of Lycurgus, answered; "My death cannot be destructive to Sparta; but my flight would be dishonourable both to Sparta and to myself." The fleets met, and the action was bloody and obstinate on both sides. Various evolutions then broke the regularity of order; nevertheless, the fight was maintained for some time with much equality. Callicratidas, who commanded in the right wing of the fleet, striking

ng an enemy's galley with the beak of his
fell overboard and perished. Different
of fortune prevailed in different parts of
battle; but the Peloponnesians at length
compelled to give way on all sides. Se-
of their galleys were taken, and the rest
ed.

It was now the design of the Athenian
admirals to proceed against Methymna,
Mitylene, and Chios, and to attempt the
very of the bodies of the drown or slain.
Eteonicus, having notice of the defeat of the
tan armament, gave orders to the galley to
to sea again, and to return by broad day-
into the harbour, with the crew attired
garlands, and proclaiming, that Callicrati-
had been successful against the Athenian
This stratagem succeeded: the Spartans
ned thanks to the Gods with hymns and
fices; the sailors were enjoined to refresh
selves by a copious repast, and to profit by
ourable gale for sailing to Chios, while the
ers burned their camp and marched to garri-
Methymna.

hat place was now too strongly fortified to
ken by assault; the Peloponnesian fleet had
ed itself in its harbour, and the Athenians
l it impossible to effect their designs. In the
time, at Athens, the flattering intelligence
h had been received respecting the victory,
converted into disappointment and sorrow,
it was understood the fleet had returned to
s without attempting any thing more; and
Athenians lamented beyond measure the loss
e wrecks, by which their brave and victorious
countrymen

countrymen had been deprived of the sacred rite of funeral.

Hence followed one of the most extraordinary, most disgraceful, and most fatal strokes of faction, recorded in history. The people by a decree deprived all the generals of their command, Conon only excepted. Protomachus and Aristogenes chose a voluntary banishment; but the rest returned to answer the charges brought against them. In matters of treason, perfidy or malversation of men in power, the senate of five hundred, or rather the prytanes who presided in the senate, performed the offices of the magistrate; while the collective body of the people, convened in public assembly, executed the functions of judge and jury. The prytanes prescribed the form of action or trial; and admitted the accuser to implead, or impeach his antagonist. The people then, as judges of the fact, gave their verdict; and as judges of the law, passed the sentence or decree.

But, in the present instance, the accused were not allowed the usual forms of defence; and each was permitted only to make a short speech to the people. The commanders were accused, tried, and condemned; and immediately delivered over to the executioner. Before they were led to death, Diomedon addressed the assembly in a short but memorable speech. "I am afraid," said he, "lest the sentence of death passed upon us should be hurtful to the republic. I would therefore have you employ proper means for averting the vengeance of the Gods. Our misfortunes have deprived us of an opportunity of performing the sacrifices, which we had promised, in behalf of ourselves and you, before the

ttle at Arginusæ: and this just debt of gratitude
exhort you to pay; for we are sensible, that
e assistance of Heaven enabled us to obtain
at signal and glorious victory." Diomedon
ving thus spoken, the six generals were execu-
d: but the cruelty of the Athenians was follow-
by a speedy repentance, and punished by the
arp pangs of remorse; which they endeavoured
mitigate, but without effect, by inflicting a
ell-merited vengeance on the worthless and de-
stable Callixenus, who had been the chief pro-
oter of this unjust and tyrannical action.

The removal and execution of the Athenian
lmirals, and the defeat and death of Callicrati-
s, suspended the military operations on both
des for some time. Two other commanders,
hilocles and Adimantus, had been joined in
uthority with Conon. The former was a man
f a violent temper, unaccustomed to reflection,
oid of experience, and incapable of governing
thers or himself. The latter did not want hu-
anity; but was destitute of spirit and activity,
alities for which the Athenians were in general
remarkable. He was careless of discipline,
egligent of duty, and was even suspected of car-
ying on a treasonable correspondence with the
nemy.

In the mean time, the Peloponnesian cause,
fter the death of Callicratidas and the disper-
on of the fleet, seems to have been for some
me neglected by Cyrus. The squadron which
ad escaped from Mitylene, remained at Chios.
Teonicus, the commander, had rejoined it from
Methymna; but he was without money with
hich to pay the troops, and without resources.
For some time, by various methods, the sol-

diers,

diers, during summer, earned a comfo ta subsistence; for the Greeks had been accusto ed to live, when on military service, by th own means, and therefore, at first this did give them great uneasiness: but when autu had advanced, their clothes were worn out, a with the increasing demands of necessity means of earning it were lessened. The proaching season of winter, therefore, affor little hope of relief; and the most serious app hensions were entertained. A conspiracy, in c sequence, was formed by the troops, to ma themselves masters of the island; and they termined to become rich at once, by seizi and plundering the large and wealthy capi of Chios.

This design, though formed in secret, nevertheless openly avowed. The conspira that they might assume a distinction whi should enable them the better to know their sociates, who were very numerous, agreed t every man of their party should carry a re The intelligence of this plot did not reach Et nicus, until it was hazardous to oppose the m tiny by open force; and to destroy them by fra would incur the obloquy and reproach of Greece. He therefore selected fifteen perso in whom he could confide; and arming the with daggers, patrolled the streets of Chi The first person they observed to carry a re was instantly put to death; and a crowd sembling about the body, to know why t man was slain, they were told it was for carr ing a reed in his helmet. This information quickly communicated through the city. T conspirators, unprepared, and ignorant of t

on they had to expect, hastened to throw
e reeds, which exposed them to the dan-
assaults of their unknown enemies; and
ith the loss of only one man, a mutiny
pletely quelled, which, under a hesitating
der, might have spread havoc and deso-
ver the most populous and wealthy island
Egean sea.

ngress of the Peloponnesian confederacy
ut this time held at Ephesus; to which
ans, and all the Asiatic confederates, sent
s. In this convention it was decreed, to
nisters to Lacedæmon, in the joint names
is, the armament, and the allies, for the
of stating the present posture of affairs,
requesting that Lysander might be re-ap-
commander in chief.

pting Brasidas, we may safely affirm, that
rtan had ever so much conciliated the
of the allies as Lysander; none was
acquainted with the method of rendering
agreeable to a Persian prince: for flattery
insinuating address were the principal, if
only qualifications necessary in obtaining
our and esteem of a Persian court; and
he severe discipline of Lycurgus had al-
recluded from existing in the Lacedæmo-
mmonwealth. The military and political
t of Lysander had, besides, been distin-
; and the success attending the engage-
gainst Antiochus, had procured him great
y.

Spartans, though inclined to comply with
ishes of their allies, were, nevertheless,
perplexed by an ancient law, enacted in
louſy of freedom, and still considered of

 importance:

of Persia; contributed not a little to t
them to relax in this point. They still,
ever, in form adhered to the law; while, a
same time, they complied with the requ
Cyrus and of their Grecian confederates.
invested Aracus, a weak and obscure man,
the name of admiral; and sent Lysander to
mand in Asia, under the appellation of
admiral.

Lysander, on his arrival at Ephesus, made
preparations to have a fleet able to oppos
Athenian armament. Having, therefore
rected matters for this purpose, he haster
pay his compliments in that quarter to the P
prince at Sardis. Absence, he found, ha
lessened his interest and esteem. Cyrus re
him with the greatest demonstrations of joy;
plied him with money for satisfying the imm
expenses of the fleet; and, as he was abo
make a journey to Suza, consigned the reven
his wealthy provinces, during his stay there,
esteemed Spartan friend. Such powerful a
means resources could not long remain unen

ent. His emissaries had universally enga-
pressed, the seamen on the Ionian and
coasts. Lysander, however, determined
isk a general engagement, which no neces-
his present circumstances required. In all
ns on the Propontis and the Hellespont,
had submitted to the Athenians, under the
nd of Alcibiades and Thrasybulus, a La-
onian faction still existed. The consequen-
erefore, of giving support to such factions
probably be the accomplishment of two
nportant objects; the obstruction of the
e, that supported the Athenian fleet; and
overy of the trade with the Euxine, whence
rocured the best supplies of corn.
these reasons, the Hellespont was the point
h Lysander directed his principal atten-
Desirous of avoiding the Athenian arma-
he coasted along the shores of Asia, and,
t receiving any interruption from the ene-
ached Abydos. Here his fleet rode in se-
in the harbour. The city was populous;
e body of infantry which it furnished, was
der the command of Thorax, a Lacedæ-
n. The important town of Lampsacus was
ttacked; and though bravely defended by
atives and an Athenian garrison, was at
taken by storm. It was abandoned to the
ous rapacity, the lust, and fury of the con-
s; according to the barbarous and predo-
t custom of the age.

government of Athens, after the violent
uel proceedings occasioned by the spirit of
in which the six brave and unfortunate
anders lost their lives, seems to have acted
supineness and langour. The dilatory and

to Lysander; and, but for the division of supreme authority, the Athenian armament have excelled, in every respect, that of the Lacedæmonian. Confident of success, and flushed with victory, the fleet of Athens passed from Samos to the coast of Asia, and plundered the dependences of the Persian monarch. They sailed for Ephesus, with the intention of offering battle to the enemy; but received intelligence that Lysander had already proceeded northward. Under alarm for the Athenian interests on the Hellespont, they immediately hastened after him. Lampsacus, however, had been taken before they reached Elæus. Staying therefore at this place a very short time, they proceeded to Sestos, and arrived the same evening at Ægospotamos, opposite against Lampsacus.

This station was injudiciously chosen; as it afforded very insecure riding for the fleet, and was two miles distant from Sestos, the nearest place for furnishing them with provision. The strait between Lampsacus and Ægospotamos being only two miles wide, the arrival of the Athenian

ponnesian fleet, advanced in order of the harbour of Lampsacus; and the ene- aining motionless, the Athenians waited e evening, and then returned in triumph, owledged masters of the sea. No sooner, had the armament of Athens withdrawn ore the harbour of Lampsacus, than Lysan- two of his swiftest galleys after them; with ons to observe whether the enemy debark- to form some judgement of their imme- entions, and then to hasten back with the ion. This was punctually executed. In n time, Lysander kept his fleet in readi- action; and not until he was assured that ıy's motions indicated no intentions of at- an enterprise, did he dismiss his troops re refreshment. The next morning the ns repeated their insults, and the two fol- lays also he prudently indulged their pre- n.

the battle of Notium, on account of Alcibiades had been deprived of his com- and banished, that illustrious Athenian ded in his castle on the Thracian Cher- The two hostile fleets of course attracted ation, as they were both in the neighbour- his residence; and he was, at least, so ible of the welfare of his country, as to be at what he saw. The coast of Ægospo- ffered only a beach on which the galleys e hauled; or near which, in the shelter of it, they might safely ride at anchor. The was commodious for encamping; but the vent to Sestos, two miles distant, (as has fore observed,) for a market: while, on er hand, the enemy at Abydos had the se-

curity of a harbour for their fleet, and a town for their people, where they could procure what necessaries they wanted. Alcibiades visited the Athenian camp; modestly admonished his countrymen of their imprudence; and observed, that if they moved only to Sestos, they as well as the enemy would have the benefit of a town and a harbour, and where, equally with their present situation, they might fight whenever they pleased. This admonition was received with arrogance and disdain; and Alcibiades was reproached for presuming, while an outlaw of his country, to give advice to the admirals of Athens. Their conduct, indeed, too faithfully corresponded, in every particular, with this insolence and folly.

Lysander, in the mean time, observed, that every day's experience of his inaction increased the negligence and confidence of the Athenians. He was informed, by the vessels which he sent to watch their motions, that they did not confine themselves to the market of Sestos, but wandered into the country, to seek, or on pretence of seeking, provision. In the morning they failed not to offer battle to the Peloponnesian fleet, and in the afternoon returned again to their camp. On the fifth day, they advanced as usual to the harbour of Lampsacus; and provoked the hostile fleet to an engagement, by more daring menaces than on any former occasion. Confident of success, they yielded without reserve to all the petulance of power and prosperity. They even debated among themselves, in what manner the Lacedæmonian prisoners should be punished, who had the misfortune to fall into their hands. The cruel Philocles proposed, they should have their right hands cut off; that those enemies of the republic might

apable of handling the oar, or brandishing
ear. This inhuman proposition, though op-
by Adimantus, was approved by a majo-
f his colleagues, and finally resolved on.
insulting the Peloponnesian fleet in the
nortifying and disdainful manner, they re-
l with an air of triumph and contempt to
station.

ander then gave directions to the comman-
f his detached ships, that, if they observed
henians disembark and disperse as usual,
hould hasten to return, and by the elevation
hield communicate the intelligence. The
boats, therefore, having followed the ene-
a convenient distance, noticed that they
ner landed at their station, than the troops
ed about the shore, advanced into the in-
ountry in quest of provision or amusement,
dulged in indolence, or revelled in disorder.
der had embarked the troops, cleared his
and made every necessary preparation, to
himself of the opportunity of effecting by
gem, what would have been difficult and
rous to have attempted by force. The ad-
oats returned, the expected signal was made,
ie fleet steered across the strait.

ion had endeavoured to keep together the
th of the Athenians: but his advice was
ned by officers incapable and unworthy of
anding; and the seamen, unaccustomed and
ling to obey the commands of their leaders,
ed his orders. At length, however, when
s too late, they became sensible of their

The Peloponnesians had advanced close
m before any effectual and salutary mea-
of defence could be taken. The soldiers and
seamen

fled into the inmost recesses of the Chersor
sought protection in the Athenian fortress
tered over that peninsula.

Conon's trireme, with seven others of
vision, and the sacred ship Paralus, ha
crews complete, and pushed off from the
One hundred and seventy-one galleys wer
by the enemy, at anchor or on the beac
effort within the power of nine ships cou
any other effect than to add to the los
fleet. While the enemy, therefore, were
upon their capture, Conon fled, unpurs
the island of Cyprus. Three thousand p
were taken, among whom were Philoc
Adimantus; and Lysander returned with
valuable spoil to Lampsacus, amidst the
acclamations of naval triumph.

B. C. 405. It now became a matter of seriou
deration, how to dispose of such a
of prisoners, unexampled by the re

"to enumerate, though it was impossible to forget, the multiplied and abominable crimes, of which so many individuals and so many communities had been the innocent and unhappy victims. Even lately the Athenians had taken a Corinthian and an Andrian vessel; and destroyed the crews by throwing them down a precipice. The Gods had averted the odious and inhuman proposition of Philocles, of which the author and approvers were equally criminal; nor could those deserve pardon or mercy, who had no pity on the sufferings of others."

It was therefore instantly resolved, that all the prisoners who were Athenian citizens, except Adimantus, should be put to death. The unarmed prisoners were then conducted into the presence of their armed judges; and, as a prelude to the inhuman massacre, Lysander sternly demanded of Philocles, what he ought to suffer for his intended cruelty. The Athenian replied with firmness and intrepidity, "Accuse not those whom it is in your power to judge; but inflict that punishment on us, which we, in your situation, would have inflicted on you." No sooner had he spoken thus, than Lysander began the execution, and killed Philocles with his own hand. The Peloponnesian soldiers followed the bloody and inhuman example of their commander. Of the three thousand Athenians, Adimantus alone was spared; and it was probably on this account that it was afterwards asserted, that he had been corrupted by Lysander with the gold of Persia, and betrayed the fleet.

It might have been expected that the Spartan admiral, after an event which gave him the complete command of the sea, would have immediately

a ely sailed to Piræus, and assaulted the city, already grievously oppressed by the Lacedæmonian army at Decelia. But Lysander foresaw the numerous obstacles that would oppose his conquest of Athens, and therefore prudently restrained the ardour of the troops from the enterprise. The strongly fortified harbours of that capital, the long and lofty walls that surrounded the city, and, above all, the ancient renown and actual despair of the Athenians, must, he was sensible, render the siege, if not fruitless, at least difficult and tedious.

On the coasts of Greece and Asia, and of the intermediate islands, there was no naval force capable of contending with the fleet of Lysander; nor, except the city of Athens alone, was there any fortified place in all those countries, sufficient to withstand the impression of his army. It was a design, therefore, deserving his ambition, and which his prudence could not disapprove, to establish or confirm the Lacedæmonian power over those valuable and extensive coasts. He had nothing more to do than to direct the course of his victorious fleet, and to take unresisted possession. Accordingly, as soon as he appeared between Byzantium and Chalcedon, the inhabitants of those places, astonished and terrified by the dreadful misfortunes of their Attic allies, offered to capitulate. The Athenian garrisons were allowed to depart in safety; but policy more than lenity prompted this measure: Lysander looked forward to the conquest of Athens; and against the uncommon strength of the fortifications, and other obstacles with which he would have to contend, famine was considered as the most certain and efficacious weapon. As, therefore, every augmentation

n of their numbers would promote his
he permitted all Athenian citizens to go
s, but to Athens only.

mean time, the Paralus, arriving by
Piræus, communicated to the Athenians
lligence, as no crew, perhaps, of the un-
fleet, without the protection of the sa-
racter of that ship, would have dared to
The alarm and lamentations, commen-
ediately in the vicinity of the harbour,
ckly communicated through the town of
and in the same manner reached the city.
ternation immediately became universal;
ng that night no person in Athens slept.
the slain, who consisted of the best part
thenian youth, and among whom every
some friend or relation, was not the pre-
assion: this was overborne by the dread
fate which threatened themselves; and
ry other feeling was absorbed in personal
ations.

at this time, however, Athens was not
of able men, capable of directing the
ffairs in any ordinary calamity. But,
e of the incompetency of the republic to
an equal force to that which would be
against it, the endless strife of faction,
violence of intestine tumult, had destroy-
herence in the constituent parts of the
ent. Nothing now remained of that pub-
fidence, which, after the defeat of the
expedition, had enabled the leading men
tate to surprise all Greece with new ex-
and to regain the superiority of the sea.
morrow, however, after the arrival of
alus, a general assembly was convened,
and

walls, to appoint guards, and to prepare
thing in their power to resist the enemy a
sustain a blockade.

In the mean time, Lysander, having awe
Hellespontine cities into submission, sailed
island of Lesbos, reduced Mytilene, and co
ed the allegiance of Methymna. While h
extending his arms over the coast of Lyd
Caria, and the neighbouring islands, he
Eteonicus with ten ships to the Thracian s
who ravaged the maritime parts of Me
subdued the towns and cities of Thrace
ing on the coast, and rode triumphant
Hellespont and Propontis, the Ægean and
seas. Soon after the disaster of the Athen
Ægospotamos, the fairest and most favoure
tion of the ancient world submitted with
ance to the power, or voluntarily accepte
alliance of Sparta.

During this long series of triumphs, Ly
never lost sight of the reduction of Athe
object not only useful, but necessary, for

s of years. Their allies were summoned
and the whole force of Laconia joining
ey marched toward Attica, under the
l of Pausanias. Agis now united the
om Decelia to this numerous and power-
; and both proceeded to the gymnasium
emus, close by the city, where they fix-
quarters.

Athenians, though destitute of allies, of
nd of stores, and blockaded by a power-
y by sea and land, made no proposals
ulating. In sullen and silent despon-
ey beheld the formidable appearance of
ponnesians on the sea and in the field;
all the means in their power they pre-
r a defence, which, at best, could only
inate their final doom, and would be at-
with nothing but present sufferings. When
r had blocked up the entrance of their
s, and no supplies could be procured for
, famine soon began to be severely felt
Athenians. Still, however, they defended
your their walls and ramparts, patiently
hardship and hunger, and beheld with
e unconcern the affliction of their wives
dren. Disease and death now advanced
them with increasing horror: yet, even
his dreadful scene of woe, they punished
ratus with the utmost severity for propo-
capitulation; and at the same time de-
that their independence and their lives
e lost together.

notwithstanding the noble sentiments and
oly firmness of the popular assembly, a
us and powerful party of men existed in
te, who were governed by interest more
than

than by honour: and the greatest enemies liberty of Athens flourished in the bosom commonwealth. The whole body of the was infected with the spirit of the five hu and not only Theramenes, but several oth of abilities and influence in the state, re the destruction of that tyranny, and the r tion of the democratical form of gover Amidst every species of public distress, the nians caballed, clamoured, accused, and cured each other; and the aristocratical being capable, from the smallness of its n to act with superior concert and vigour, d ed, by every base, cruel, and illegal mea friends and partisans of democracy.

A deputation, however, was at length on between the two factions; and acco ministers were sent to Agis, the Sparta who commanded the blockade. The At proposed an alliance, offensive and defensiv the Lacedæmonian commonwealth; whi the language of the politics of Greece, me thing less than the subjection of Athens to S and stipulated only for the preservation c fortifications, and of their harbours. A plied, that he had no power to treat, a proposals must be addressed to the admini at Lacedæmon. Ministers were then se Peloponnesus: but when they arrived at S on the borders of Laconia, they received a and haughty message from the ephori, con ing their immediate return; and informing that the terms they brought were already at Lacedæmon, and, if they desired peac must procure more ample powers from Ath

This answer being communicated in th

led the Athenians with despair. They consi-
red themselves as already condemned to slavery,
not to death, by their merciless and implacable
enies; and even before another deputation
uld return with an answer from Lacedæmon,
any must perish with hunger. It was under-
ood, that the Lacedæmonians proposed among
her things, that the long walls for the space of
n furlongs should be demolished. Theramenes,
hose character was extremely dubious, ventured
offer, that, if the Athenians would commission
m to go to Lacedæmon, he would undertake to
ing certain information, whether the Peloponne-
ans really intended to reduce the Athenians to
avery, or whether the demolition of the walls was
ly required to insure political subjection. He
med nine persons to be his colleagues in this im-
ortant mission; and flattered the people, that he
ould procure some moderate terms of accommo-
ation. A decree was therefore immediately pass-
l by the Athenians in assembly, investing the am-
ssadors with full powers.

Having assumed the badge of their inviolable
aracter, they proceeded to the Spartan camp,
eld a conference with Agis the Lacedæmonian
ing, and then set forward on their journey
wards Sparta. But when they arrived at
ellasia, the embassy was again met by an officer
om the ephori; who would not permit them to
roceed farther, until they had given assurance,
at they were invested with indefinite authority,
treat for a peace with the Lacedæmonian
ommonwealth. When they reached Sparta,
n assembly of the deputies of the Peloponnesian
onfederacy was convened, in which the fate of
e Athenian republic was to be decided. The

deputation

deputation from Corinth and Thebes vehemently contended, that no terms whatever should be granted. The republic of Athens, they said, which was the enemy of the common liberties of Greece, and had been so nearly successful in the horrid attempt to enslave or exterminate the whole nation, ought to be annihilated, and suffered no longer to exist. Many of the other deputies also supported the same opinion. The Lacedæmonians, however, whose administration was little subject to passionate counsels or hasty decisions, had previously considered the matter, and thought otherwise. Athens, if deprived of its navy, and of the revenue and power arising from transmarine dependences, might, under an oligarchical government, become a necessary and valuable acquisition to Lacedæmon. The recollection of what had happened only a few years before, when almost the whole of Peloponnesus had united in war against this latter state, might probably occasion an apprehension, that at some future period a balancing power might be wanted against Corinth, Thebes, or Argos.

With an ostentation, therefore, of regard for the common welfare and glory of the Grecian nation, the Lacedæmonians declared, that it would not become the Peloponnesian confederacy, and least of all themselves, to reduce to slavery a Grecian people, to whom the Greeks had been more than once beholden for the most important services, in the greatest and most imminent dangers that ever threatened their liberty. Accordingly it was proposed and resolved, that the conditions on which the Athenians should be permitted to retain their civil freedom, should be the following: that all their ships of war, except twelve,

be

be surrendered; that the long walls, and the fortifications of Piræus, be destroyed; that all exiles and fugitives be restored to the rights of the city; that the Athenians consider the same states as friends or enemies, which should be respectively so to the Lacedæmonians; and that the Athenians send their forces wherever Lacedæmon should require, by sea or land.

With these terms Theramenes and his colleagues hastened back to Athens. During the long absence of their ambassadors, the Peloponnesians had pressed the siege with redoubled vigour. The Spartans, reinforced by the Thebans and their other allies, had surrounded the city on every side. Lysander blocked up the harbours with his fleet; and had made himself master of Melos, Ceos, Ægina, and Salamis; islands so near to Athens, that they were almost regarded as a part of the Attic territory. Within the walls the greatest misery prevailed: the famine had become intolerable, but the diseases which it engendered were still more so; and such numbers had already perished, that it was considered by the besieged as impossible to hold out many days longer.

No sooner, therefore, was the arrival of the ambassadors announced at Athens, than people from every part of the city flocked about them in the most painful suspense, lest an irresistible and perhaps also an implacable enemy should still refuse to treat, and no other alternatives should remain to them, than to perish with hunger, or submit to the mercy of those from whom they scarcely hoped to receive any. The information, that a treaty had been concluded, gave them some relief for the night. The day following,

had no longer strength or spirit to resist, o
courage to die. A considerable body, he
pertinaciously declared, that they would
consent to the demolition of the walls.

But the principal leaders of the patriotic
had been destroyed by the perfidious sn
their opponents; who were prepared to
foreign yoke, provided they were allowed
ercise domestic tyranny. That odious a
testable faction was ready to approve the
sures of Theramenes, however degrading a
vile; and Theramenes himself might w
fluence the resolution of the assembly,
forming them, that the severity of the L
monians, excessive as it seemed to be, v
tremely moderate and lenient in comparis
what was proposed by the furious and in
ble Corinthians and Thebans. Argume
this nature he certainly might have made
if necessary, to justify his negotiations w

IE NEW YORK PUBLIC LIBRARY
REFERENCE DEPARTMENT

book is under no circumstances to be
taken from the Building